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BACKGROUND TO THIS REPORT 
This summary technical report contains important background information on which the 
Commission has based its analysis in the main Communication on the implementation of the 
electricity and gas Directives
1
. The main Communication, combined with this report responds 
to the requirements of Article 28(1-3) of the Electricity Directive and Article 31(1-3) of the 
Gas Directive concerning reporting requirements during 2005. 
The bulk of the information is based on the reports made by national regulators, which were 
submitted in the second half of 2005. These individual reports are being published 
concurrently with this document and can be found on the website of the European Regulators’ 
Group for Electricity and Gas (www.ergeg.org). Those wishing to know the full details about 
progress in individual Member States regarding electricity and gas competition should consult 
these documents closely. Submissions from stakeholders have also been taken into account in 
this report which contains summaries of the main points raised. These submissions can be 
found on the website of the Commission. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/electricity/report_2005/stakeholders.htm.  
Some issues initially raised by this report will be covered in more detail by the sector inquiry 
on the electricity and gas markets undertaken by the Commission on the basis of it antitrust 
powers
2
. This work, however, is still ongoing and will be finalised in the course of 2006.  
In addition, two studies by external consultants are being prepared. The first concerns the 
implementation by companies of the unbundling provisions of the Directives. The second 
study will assess the experiences of customers, especially large users, of the introduction of 
competition, in particular their behaviour as regards changing supplier or renegotiating 
contracts, and recent trends in electricity and gas prices. These reports will be published early 
in 2006. 
Finally, the report refers to two other European Commission documents that will be published 
before the end of 2005. The first is a Communication of the Commission on the support of 
electricity from renewable energy sources which will be published as a requirement of 
Directive 2001/77 (“2005 renewables report”). The second report quoted is the 2005 
horizontal evaluation of the performance of network industries providing services of general 
economic interest (“2005 SGEI report”). This refers to a study by Copenhagen Economics on 
the general economic effect of market opening across all network industry sectors. It also 
contains general customer satisfaction surveys that are reported in this document. 
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2
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As well as an executive summary which appears as the next section, the report is organised 
into the sections below which deal with each aspect of the functioning of the electricity and 
gas market under the headings contained in the relevant parts of the Directives. 
• Section 1  Legal Implementation of the Directives 
• Section 2  Issues related to service provided to customers 
• Section 3  Extent of customer activity 
• Section 4  Price developments and competition issues – electricity 
• Section 5  Price developments and competition issues - gas 
• Section 6  Existence of non-discriminatory network access 
• Section 7  Experience with independent network operation 
• Section 8  Effective Regulation 
• Section 9  Development of Interconnection  Infrastructure 
• Section 10 Security of Supply 
• Section 11 Environmental Issues 
• Section 12 Employment and other Economic Issues 
Each section is drafted as a stand-alone report on the subject in question summarising all the 
relevant information available. Most of the data used was submitted at the end of July 2005 
and generally reflected the position at that date. However, some data items, referring to the 
information in a particular calendar year, will refer to the year 2004 as a whole. Where data is 
currently unavailable, this appears in tables as follows: “-”.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1 General Overview 
It is now seven years since the first electricity Directive and over five years since the first gas 
Directive
3
 came into force in which markets were partially opened to competition. The 
Commission has been monitoring these markets on an annual basis since the first 
"benchmarking" report in 2001. These reports, culminating in this document, as well as the 
submissions from regulators, demonstrate that, although some progress is being made in 
developing competition, and that some important benefits have been realised in terms of 
increased efficiency, the picture is extremely variable. In some cases developments are 
positive; in many others progress is slow, and in some instances there does not seem to have 
been any advance at all. In summary, the idea of a single market for electricity and gas is far 
from being realised. The Communication of the Commission associated with this document 
summarises progress as follows: 
The most important shortcoming on the internal electricity and gas market is the lack of integration of 
national markets. Key indicators in this respect are the absence of price convergence across the EU 
and the low level of cross-border trade. This is generally due to the existence of barriers to entry, 
inadequate use of existing infrastructure and - in the case of electricity - insufficient interconnection 
between Member States in many cases, leading to congestion. Moreover, many national markets 
display a high degree of concentration of the industry, impeding the development of real competition. 
The gas market continues to suffer from a lack of liquidity of both gas and transport capacity. In this 
context, the effects of long-term gas contracts will have to be taken into account. Another indicator of 
the lack of real competition is that switching by customers remains limited in most Member States and 
that choosing a new supplier from another Member State remains the exception. 
The Commission has arrived at this assessment having considered a number of basic 
indicators notably;  
i)  the degree of price convergence, 
ii)  the extent of development of electricity and gas markets across borders,  
iii) the extent of entry into national markets by foreign companies and/or other 
new entrants fully independent of network interests, 
iv) the extent of customer activity, 
v) the degree of concentration at both wholesale and retail level. 
Although other indicators could be envisaged, and indeed many have been put forward by 
stakeholders in their responses, the Commission believes that the performance of electricity 
and gas markets measured against the above list will give a representative picture of the state 
of progress in introducing competition. Certainly, it is highly doubtful that competition can be 
described as functioning if performance against most of these indicators is limited. This is the 
case in too many instances at present. Conversely, there are few Member States which exhibit 
positive characteristics against all of these indicators for both electricity and gas. 
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For electricity the main problems can mostly be traced to the failure to create an integrated 
market. This stems further from poor availability of cross border capacity and the need to use 
more effectively the capacity that does exist.
4
 This is the single most important issue for the 
electricity market and if it could be resolved satisfactorily, the prospects for a fully 
functioning market would already be greatly improved.  
For gas, competition is only really active in the North Sea region and to a lesser extent in 
Spain for instance. There are a number of obstacles in other regions. In particular, the 
necessary level of liquidity and transparency are lacking. Moreover, network access 
conditions do not appear to be sufficiently developed in order to allow for natural gas to be 
traded across Europe. Liquid trading hubs and hub-to-hub trading including cross border 
transactions, for example, do not exist and as a consequence, historical supply pattern are still 
very much prevailing. Long term reservations of important cross-border pipelines and 
operational barriers, such as non-harmonised balancing systems, also make it difficult for any 
company trying to enter new markets.  
This document sets out the main obstacles to the internal market in more detail and, in 
particular the reasons why a real European market for gas and electricity is still rather far 
from being realised. In some cases, the problems relating to introducing relate to a failure to 
fully implement the Directives or are the result of late implementation. Other issues are likely 
to require further initiatives from, respectively, Member States, national regulators and the 
Commission. Many of these could and should be taken within the current legislative 
framework.  
2 Background:  Requirements for a functioning European market 
The gas and electricity Directives were adopted by the European Parliament and by the 
Council in order to create competition. The key element is the introduction of non-
discriminatory and transparent third party access to the networks with ex-ante supervision by 
regulators. As a result of regulated network tariffs and conditions, network users must be able 
to accurately anticipate the exact costs which will be incurred from using the system. 
Without this, the initiative is likely to fail since networks are largely natural monopolies 
providing the basis and the fundament upon which competition among gas and electricity 
suppliers is to develop. This means that there is a non-competitive and a competitive part of 
the gas and electricity sectors. The former is made up of the necessary infrastructure and its 
operation, which should work to facilitate the market, while the latter is represented by 
suppliers and producers, often with traders and big customers contracting directly with the 
producers. These market participants should compete with each other for market shares in 
both the wholesale and retail market enjoying non-discriminatory use of the necessary 
infrastructure. Non-discriminatory access implies, for example, that neither size, the 
relationships between suppliers and network operators, nor portfolio considerations in the 
case of large system users must affect the tariffs and other conditions. This implies that tariff 
systems should not contain structural elements, such as distance related charges, which tend to 
discriminate, for example, against companies with a small portfolio.  
It is considered that non-discriminatory and transparent network access requires as a 
minimum legal and functional unbundling of transmission and distribution system operators. 
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The underlying objective of these provisions is to create a structure of interests of network 
operators which is geared towards the provision of a good transportation and/or distribution 
service no matter on whose behalf and no matter for which purpose. The main interest of the  
network operator would then be to offer transportation services ensuring efficient use of the 
network, which means to contract all the capacity available as much as possible on a firm 
basis and, once the firm capacity is sold out, to market unused capacity to the extent possible 
as the only means to maximise its revenues. In reality, legal and functional unbundling 
should, if properly implemented, result in an interest structure of the network operator that is 
very similar, if not identical to that of a network operator also separated from any supply 
interests by ownership, i.e. the network would not be owned anymore by any vertically 
integrated company with supply interests. 
In such a system, operators of transmission and distribution grids would act as market 
facilitators allowing system users (suppliers, traders, large consumers etc) to exploit market 
opportunities to the extent possible. It would be characterised by  
• the complete absence of operational barriers to enter and exit the system;  
• a level of transparency which provides a level playing field for all system users;  
• effective secondary capacity trading among system users with a view to optimising 
capacity and supply portfolios 
Once network conditions are developed in such a way, liquid wholesale markets for electricity 
and gas would develop, almost by themselves, at both national level and subsequently at 
European level through hub-to-hub trading for gas increasingly decoupling its physical and 
contractual flow and integration of power exchanges for electricity. This integration would 
initially create regional markets and eventually go beyond this and integrate the whole 
European market. Inevitably this would mean an increased number of market players active at 
retail and wholesale levels. 
The development of a framework for network access suitable for the development of a 
competitive European market for electricity and gas and its overall integration could be 
measured against these criteria. If the regulatory framework emerging from the current 
internal market Directives and associated Regulations
5
 is properly implemented and applied in 
the sense described, market forces will make their way.  
3 Views of Regulators 
As well as their individual reports, regulators have, through ERGEG (European Regulators 
Group for Electricity and Gas)
6
, provided an overall assessment of the outstanding issues in 
developing the gas and electricity markets. The CEER/ERGEG view concurs with that of the 
Commission in that they conclude that the state of a true European market for electricity and 
gas has been only slowly advanced. Indicative of this lack of progress is the large variation in 
prices between different wholesale markets.  
A key problem highlighted by regulators is the need to ensure that all network customers are 
able to gain access on non-discriminatory terms; that network capacity is not hoarded (ie, that 
                                                 
5
 Regulation 1228/03/EC and the forthcoming Regulation on Gas Transmission. 
6
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unused capacity is released for resale); that network availability is maximised (subject only to 
physical and security constraints); that physical congestion is managed in a non-
discriminatory manner; and that new capacity is constructed and made available when there is 
a demand for it. Achieving this requires that transmission system operators (TSOs) act 
independently of any interest in the competitive parts of the market. Regulators therefore 
argue that ownership separation is a pre-requisite for effective competition and is therefore a 
key component of the liberalisation process. In the absence of ownership separation, it is, as a 
minimum, necessary to attempt to substitute the effects of ownership separation through 
monitoring and enforcing strict regulations on the conduct of a the legally separated TSO (i.e. 
strict ring fencing arrangements and the publication of information into the public domain).  
Regulators consider that, in particular, the unbundling requirements implemented by some 
Member States in national legislation needs to be reinforced by further measures relating, in 
particular, to the management of information held by TSOs (for putting it into the public 
domain where possible and strict ring fencing arrangements where publication is not possible 
or is only possible with some delay). Finally it is noted that whilst sufficient unbundling of 
TSOs in important for wholesale market development, efficient DSO (distribution system 
operator) unbundling is key for the necessary development of retail competition. 
A second area of concern for regulators is their own powers. As well as the question of 
whether regulators have sufficient powers to fulfil the role of surveillance of the current 
unbundling requirements in the Directives, it is also argued that in order to carry out their 
functions effectively, that they must be equipped with the necessary tools. Regulators argue 
that they must, as a minimum, be able to: 
o exercise appropriate regulatory oversight (and where appropriate control) over key 
market rules which may impact upon the operation of the market, 
o monitor activity (for example through gathering information) within the market and 
detect non-compliance, 
o impose sufficient sanctions on parties such as to be able to deter inappropriate 
behaviour, 
o act as a catalyst for market reform, driving forward progress.  
At present it is thought that the powers which are available to individual regulators are varied 
and in some instances regulators do not appear to have the necessary powers to monitor and 
enforce compliance with the legislative and regulatory framework. In particular, not all 
regulators operate at arms length from government. Some Ministries have reserved the right 
to make decisions in important areas with the risk that political influences may undermine 
economic principles and bring regulatory uncertainty to the market. 
Finally, regulators underline their commitment to developing a functioning European market 
with, if necessary, regional steps as an interim phase. It is agreed that, often, the enlargement 
of the market may be the only realistic solution to issues of market dominance if structural 
measures on a national scale are considered unacceptable. Regulators acknowledge that 
measures have already been, or will shortly be, introduced at the European level, which are 
intended to further facilitate cross border trade.  However, their view is that further steps are 
required: in particular; 
o arrangements that enable and give incentives to TSOs to deliver cross border 
infrastructure and capacity, particularly for electricity; 
o a strong regulatory framework for both electricity and gas to oversee cross border 
network access and trading arrangements. 
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Regulators consider that, at present, obligations placed upon TSOs invariably have a national 
focus relating to the operation and development of their respective networks. However, if 
regional (or European) markets are to be developed and operated efficiently and effectively, it 
will be necessary to consider to what extent the roles and responsibilities of TSOs may need 
to be adapted to this end.   
Similarly, the arrangements for market participants to transport gas over long distances are 
thought to be unnecessarily complex. A consistent approach and framework for dealing with 
key market arrangements is needed, for example, to facilitate hub to hub trading in gas or the 
compatibility of wholesale market rules in gas. Regulators consider that the presence of 
appropriate network arrangements which will facilitate cross border trading would lead to the 
natural emergence of liquid trading markets at a regional or European level, and help 
overcome the issue that many markets in Europe are very much dependent on external 
suppliers. Gas release programmes may alleviate the situation as well as LNG (liquid natural 
gas) supplies, which may have the potential to render the European gas markets more liquid.   
Such improvements to the functioning of the market on a regional or European basis will 
require national regulators, in certain circumstances, to work together in regulating regional 
activity if they are to fulfil their roles in a pan European market which, by definition, spans 
national jurisdictions. Co-operation between national regulators will need to occur under a 
clear framework operating across national boundaries and against a backdrop of strong 
independent and transparent regulation within all Member States. 
3 Views of Stakeholders 
As well as the opinions of the regulators, the European Commission has received over 40 
submissions from associations and companies active in the electricity and gas markets, 
including producers, suppliers and end users. Of course, not all of these stakeholders share the 
same views. Despite this, some common themes have emerged from this initial consultation. 
Electricity 
Established electricity companies stress that the market is developing in a positive way with 
strong efficiency improvements and significant benefits to customers in the form of lower 
prices. They note that service standards remain at high levels with strong customer 
satisfaction. Many companies highlight the need to make wholesale markets more liquid 
through promoting cross border exchanges and that a higher degree of co-operation between 
system operators and regulators is needed to achieve this. Finally, the existence of a regulated 
price structure is seen as a large obstacle to effective competition, particularly where prices 
are not reflective of the full inclusive costs of providing the service. 
Electricity network operators underline the need for full implementation of the existing 
Directives and the Regulation. In their view, the arrangements for cross border electricity 
exchanges are not yet satisfactory or compliant with the Regulation and this is damaging 
market liquidity. They also note the lack of scope, in the short term, for construction of new 
infrastructure favouring instead that more cross border capacity should be made available 
through greater and more pro-active co-operation between transmission system operators with 
appropriate regulatory incentives. Some transmission system operators suggest that increased 
use of counter-trading could be a way to do this if sufficient incentives existed. Network 
operators also stress the need for coherence between different energy policies noting, in 
particular that the uneven development of wind generation is, under current procedures, 
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reducing availability of cross border transmission capacity. Distribution companies also point 
to the need for regulated network tariffs to allow sufficient funds for maintaining the 
performance of the network over time. 
Electricity traders highlight many of the same points relating to the lack of compliance with 
existing legislation, especially the unbundling provisions and the requirements for congestion 
management. Lack of market liquidity and a high level of concentration remain a problem in 
the absence of a real European market being developed. They argue that more cross border 
capacity should be made available, on a firm basis, via the use of counter-trading. Market 
operators and power exchanges also shared many of these views, also arguing that the role of 
market operators should be recognised in legislation and that similar requirements should be 
imposed in different jurisdictions, for example on transparency. 
Large electricity users point to the significant impact of increases in wholesale electricity 
prices since 2002. These are having a disproportionate effect on the very largest users. They 
are critical of the trading arrangements that electricity companies have put in place, in 
particular the tendency for most electricity to be exchanged in bilateral arrangements between 
generators and suppliers – often between affiliate companies. In their view, this has served to 
constrain liquidity of markets for standardised contracts for which determine reference 
wholesale market prices which, it is argued, encourages tacit or explicit collusion. Excessive 
concentration in electricity markets is, in any case, a key concern for large users. They report 
that the range of offers being received by them is inadequate with all being based on the 
aforementioned, possibly manipulated, reference prices with little or no effort by companies 
to differentiate their service or contract structure. They also argue for a more comprehensive 
reporting and disclosure requirements on participants in electricity markets. They further 
point out that the emission trading scheme has exacerbated the trend in higher prices and that 
those companies that were allocated certificates in national allocation plans have received an 
unearned windfall profit. 
Smaller electricity suppliers and new entrants, argue that the level of unbundling of 
transmission companies is not sufficient in some cases and that the Directives should be 
further developed in this respect. Some new entrants see network tariffs as too high and that 
separation at distribution level is not sufficient. They also argue that greater co-ordination of 
the transmission system at European level is necessary, working towards a framework for a 
single European transmission operator. They particularly highlight the large variations in 
balancing regimes, several of which they consider to be unfair. All these problems erode the 
margins of possible new suppliers and discourage entry. Meanwhile, the benefits to 
incumbents of generation plant whose costs are already amortised provide a distortion to the 
market that needs to be resolved, preferably through capacity release or divestment. 
Gas 
From the point of view of most stakeholders
 
submitting their views to the Commission, the 
lack of liquidity in terms of both commodity and capacity represents the most serious 
obstacles to overcome in order to arrive at a competitive, well functioning market for gas. 
Long-term transportation and supply contracts, albeit not questioned in principle, are 
identified as one of the main reason for this observation. Furthermore, an apparent lack of 
transparency in the market, not only, but also with respect to available capacities for both 
pipelines and storage, is considered another significant shortcoming. Capacity allocation 
mechanisms, such as first-come-first-served are often perceived as discriminating against 
newcomers. Gas release programmes, effective use-it-or-lose-it principles, an increased level 
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of transparency providing a level playing field with incumbent companies and non-
discriminatory and transparent capacity allocation mechanisms have been suggested to 
represent possible solutions to some of the problems identified. 
Apart from these fundamental concerns, stakeholders pointed to a number of further deficits 
restricting the development of competition on the natural gas markets. Equity shareholdings 
along the gas chain often allow incumbent companies to exert their influence with a view to 
preventing new market entrants to gain market shares. Regulated retail prices, which apply to 
a large proportion of customers across the European Union, often seem more attractive to 
customers, since they might be more stable and do not as quickly adapt to market 
developments as free prices do. Regulated prices are seen as entailing cross subsidies, thereby 
distorting competition on the free market and reducing the potential for competition. In the 
view of many stakeholders, they should be phased out and replaced by genuine retail 
competition involving the household sector. 
Network users generally do not consider unbundling to be as effective as it ought to be. In 
particular, its implementation in practice is thought not to ensure the necessary separation of 
system operators from the interest of the incumbent supply companies. Stakeholders call for 
introducing explicit obligations to ensure functional unbundling. In the event, that such 
obligations would not convincingly achieve equal treatment of all network users by system 
operators, they would advocate ownership unbundling, in order to free system operators from 
a persisting conflict of interest. Furthermore many stakeholders underline the fact that 
problems related to unbundling, confidentiality and equal treatment are more obvious at 
distribution rather than transmission level. 
Access to storage is said to suffer in particular from a lack of transparency. Here again, it is 
generally more perceived to represent a problem at the level of distribution system rather than 
transmission system operators. It has been highlighted that access to storage should only be 
negotiated if there is effective competition between storage operators; otherwise regulated 
access would be more appropriate. 
System operators in generally consider the provisions of the gas Directive sufficient, in order 
to achieve a well functioning internal market for gas, provided they are properly implemented 
and applied. They admit, however, that not all market rules are put in place and that the 
market is still developing.  
Harmonised balancing systems with daily balancing periods would, in the view of many 
stakeholders, bring about significant improvements in cross-border trade.  
Common Issues 
Gas and electricity distribution companies point to the need for realistic levels of network 
tariffs which allow for long term investment in the network, particularly maintenance and 
renewal of assets. They also highlight their own key role in developing smooth procedures for 
changing supplier but also point to the costs of implementing this requirement, which should 
again be reflected in the tariff structures. 
In relation to both electricity and gas, representatives of small commercial companies and 
households agree that no significant problems in terms of quality or continuity of supply have 
emerged. Small businesses consider that they have not yet felt the expected benefits of 
opening the market to non-households. Consumer groups suggest that switching supplier is 
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not always a simple procedure and in some cases the complications (e.g. possible mis-selling, 
complicated contract structures or unclear network access rules) means that households will 
be reluctant to use their new rights. Measures to protect customers should not be neglected in 
terms of disconnection, efficient billing practices and transparency of contracts.  
Finally, public sector unions consider that market opening has not lived up to expectations 
and, at the same time had a negative impact on employment in the sector. They also criticize 
the fact that emission certificates have been allocated in such a way as to enhance the profits 
of the main companies. Their view is that vulnerable customers are unlikely to benefit from 
the ability to choose supplier and indeed that any benefits will be concentrated on wealthier 
households. Unions doubt that a functioning market is really possible at all in the electricity 
and gas sector in view of the many specific technical and political characteristics of the sector. 
They question whether the supposed benefits outweigh the transaction costs associated with 
introducing competition. 
4 Commission Evaluation of Implementation of the Directives 
4.1 Customer Service 
The organisation of the electricity and gas sectors should have, as its first consideration the 
objective to improve the position of customers. The opening of the market to competition 
must not imply any deterioration in service standards. Indeed the combination of price and 
quality of service should improve as a result of competition.  
There exist key requirements of the Directives in this respect relating to public service 
obligations and consumer protection objectives. These are contained in Article 3 and Annex A 
of both the gas and electricity Directives and relate to the question of the service standards 
received from suppliers; for example, billing and payments accuracy, complaints handling and 
transparency, including the requirement for labelling of primary energy sources used in 
supplying electricity. The treatment of vulnerable customers and those on low incomes also 
falls into this category. The Directives require that vulnerable customers should be protected 
from disconnection. 
In general, regarding these questions of customer service, the initial analysis of the 
Commission is that these requirements are being met. Surveys of user/consumer perceptions 
have concluded that the level of satisfaction with the electricity and gas service providers is, 
in general, good, even if reasons for dissatisfaction exist
7
. Fears that the introduction of 
competition would lead to a decline in service standards have, by and large proved 
unfounded. However, Member States and regulators will need to continue to address these 
issues of relevance for consumers and users in particular; access to service, prices, quality of 
service, information provision, terms and conditions of contracts and complaint handling. The 
Commission also intends to investigate these issues further and a study is being conducted 
with a view to promoting a general policy on public service obligations and customer 
protection in the electricity and gas sector. The results will emerge during 2006. 
On the specific question of labelling of energy sources used, a requirement set out in Article 
3(6) of the electricity Directive, it would appear that this requirement of the Directive has not 
yet been fully implemented. Some Member States have already incorporated this requirement 
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into companies’ supply licence conditions. Others are still developing an appropriate 
methodology and there are delays as a result. 
Finally, regarding vulnerable customers, one indicator of progress is the affordability of 
electricity and gas to low income groups. This continues to improve as confirmed by analysis 
in the forthcoming 2005 SGEI Report.  
4.2 Customer switching 
The number of customers switching supplier is a natural indicator as to the effectiveness of 
competition. If hardly any customers are changing their supplier, especially business 
customers which have a strong incentive to save money, there is likely to be a problem in the 
functioning of the market. This does not mean to say that every customer has to switch every 
year. Similarly the benefits from the possibility to renegotiate with the historical supplier 
should not be underestimated. However taken together with other relevant indicators, a low 
level of switching may well be indicative of wider regulatory and competition problems. 
For electricity, the degree of customer activity in the industrial and larger commercial user 
sector continues to develop in most Member States. It is clear that in the majority of Member 
States that market opening is at least partially effective and that, at least, the potential for 
changing supplier exists. This is noted in Table 1, where the most improved performance of 
Member States is highlighted. 
Table 1 Classification of Member States by degree of switching: electricity
8
 
Cumulative 
switching since 
market opening 
Large Industrial 
Users 
Medium 
industrial/commercial 
Small 
commercial/household 
>50% DK, FI, IE, SE, UK, NO, 
IT 
BE, FI, UK, NO NO 
20-50% AT, FR, DE, BE, LU, 
HU 
AT, IT, HU FI, UK, SE, 
5-20% ES, LT, PL, PT, CZ, SI IE, DK, DE, PT, BE IE, NL, DE, DK, BE 
<5% GR, EE, LV, SK all others all others 
Source: regulators’ submissions 
In many cases, the smaller non-households market has only recently been opened to 
competition, and the household market is not required to be opened at all. It is therefore 
necessary to take into account the starting position of Member States in evaluating these 
figures. It cannot, for example, be expected that Member States which have only recently 
opened the market to competition, or those which have not yet allowed households to become 
eligible customers to have high levels of switching in the third column.  
                                                 
8
 The estimates may, in some case, including switching between affiliates of the same Group of 
companies or simply imply a change from a standard regulated contract to an individually negotiated 
contract.  
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For large users, however, the results are disappointing in certain countries, especially some 
EU15 countries which have had six years of experience in market opening. Indeed these have 
already been overtaken by new Member States in terms of a development of a competitive 
electricity sector. For smaller consumers, it is rather too early to evaluate performance in most 
instances. However, as well as those which already have mature markets identified in 
previous reports, progress is also being made in the medium-sized commercial market in 
Member States such as Austria, Belgium and Italy. 
The development of an active gas market remains rather slower. The most progress in the last 
two years shown in Table 2 below appears to have been made in Benelux region, Denmark, 
Spain and Italy. However, for many others, including almost all the new Member States, 
opening of the gas market to competition has had little or no impact on customer behaviour 
even at large user level. It is clear that in some cases this may be because there are transitional 
issues, or that energy users are happy with their existing suppliers. In some cases, such as 
many of the new Member States, SME and household gas prices are rather low and the 
incentive to switch is reduced as a result. However, some of the other Member States in 
question have among the highest gas prices in the European Union. 
Table 2 Classification of Member States by degree of switching: gas
9
 
Cumulative 
switching since 
market opening 
Large Industrial 
users/ power plants 
Medium 
industrial/commercial 
Small 
commercial/household 
>50% IE, ES, UK UK, ES  
20-50% DK, IT, BE BE, IE, DK UK 
5-20% AT, FR, HU AT, BE, FR, HU,  BE,  NL,  
<5% all others all others all others 
Source: Regulators’ submissions 
The reasons for this slow development of an active market for electricity and gas are complex. 
In many cases it may be a result of market structure or network access issues discussed below. 
However, one issue that is worthy of discussion in this section is the effect of end-user price 
controls in Member States whereby an obligation is imposed on one or more suppliers to 
maintain a standard specified tariff at a level set by the regulator or the government. Such 
controls on end-user prices usually relate only to small commercial customers and households 
but in some case all customers have the possibility to opt for a regulated tariff.  
The existence of regulated end-user prices is clearly a key determinant of customer behaviour, 
especially where price controls are maintained at apparently unrealistically low levels. 
Although the retaining of controls may be justified in a period of transition, these will 
increasingly cause distortions as the need for investment approaches. It is debateable whether 
some of the price controls currently being imposed are consistent with Article 3 of the 
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Directives where the requirement for “equality of access for EU [electricity/gas] companies to 
national consumers”. Member States and Regulators should examine this issue closely. 
There may also be administrative barriers to switching. The Directives already set out clear 
requirements on Member States to ensure that customers are easily able to switch supplier. 
(Annex A). Distribution system operators play a crucial role in ensuring smooth procedures 
for switching supplier since they manage the switching process and handle metering data.   
4.3 Price developments and competition 
Price developments 
In a competitive market it is expected that prices should, over the long term, reflect the 
efficiently incurred costs of supplying the product, including both fixed and variable costs, 
and the costs of complying with environmental regulation. In general the opening of the 
market should deliver greater efficiency and, over the long term, prices should be lower than 
they otherwise would be.  
The information available to the Commission suggests that, despite the recent increases, 
average electricity prices for all consumer groups are a few percentage points lower in real 
terms than in 1997 despite the obvious changes in global economic conditions and the 
introduction of new regulatory measures. Gas prices meanwhile are visibly higher than 
1997(see Tables 3 and 4 below). Econometric analysis in a study by Copenhagen Economics, 
prepared for the Commission, attached to the forthcoming 2005 SGEI report also note that a 
direct statistical link can be established between the degree of market opening and downward 
pressure on electricity and gas prices. 
However, prices for electricity and gas will vary over time and there has been much 
discussion of increases in wholesale prices since 2002 for electricity. These have been rather 
severe in some cases, with significant increases in some markets for a standard annual base 
load contract.
10
 For example the typical price for 2004 base load purchase in early 2003 was 
around €25/MWh. The forward price for 2006 base load is currently around €40-45/MWh. 
Many complex factors may be influencing prices in this direction including global 
developments in hydrocarbon prices and anticipated costs of new investments. Higher 
wholesale prices have initially had a large impact on the very largest users such as metal 
processing, chemicals and transport industries. They are also beginning to feed through to 
smaller companies and households.  
Another factor which has also been identified as one of the drivers of the most recent 
increases is the EU Emission Trading Scheme, which started operating on 1 January 2005. 
This mechanism was established as a cost-effective market based scheme to meet the EU 
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Around 11,500 installations all over the EU, 
representing about half of CO2 emissions have received allowances according to national 
allocation plans. These installations are required to monitor and report emissions annually and 
to give up a corresponding quantity of allowances, or pay a charge. Allowances can be traded 
so as to provide some flexibility and ensure CO2 reductions are carried out at least cost. In the 
short time since the scheme was launched, allowance prices have been higher than expected 
by some market observers. This may reflect, among other things, higher demand than 
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expected as a result of low rainfall and availability of hydro power, especially on the Iberian 
peninsular. It may also reflect the late operation of emission trading registries in some 
Member States. The market for allowances in general is still rather immature and it is 
generally too early to draw conclusions about its long term impact. 
Table 3 Electricity Price Summary 1997-2005 [EU 15 only] 
11
 
1997 = 100, constant prices July 1997 July 2000 July 2005 
average (all consumers) 100 86 90 
very large
12
 100 83 96 
medium industrial)
13
 100 82 95 
small commercial and household
14
 100 88 88 
Source: Eurostat, DTI with DG TREN analysis 
Table 3 shows that the degree of increase since 2000 has been rather more pronounced for 
larger customers. Small commercial and household customers have not seen the same 
increases. Many large users suggest further increases are likely in contracts for delivery 
during 2006 and future years. 
Table 4 Gas Price Summary 1997-2005 [EU15 only]
 15
 
1997 = 100 July 1997 July 2000 July 2005 
average all consumers) 100 92 122 
Very  large industrial users
16
 100 98 135 
Large industrial users
17
 100 93 137 
medium industrial)
18
 100 95 140 
small commercial and household
19
 100 91 115 
Source: Eurostat, DTI with DG TREN analysis 
Table 4 shows that gas prices have clearly increased since 1997. Much of this increase is due 
to the fact that wholesale gas prices are often linked to oil prices. Although this mechanism 
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  Prices without taxes 
12
  “Very large” implies consumption of up to 450GWh/year (maximum load 50MW). Only data for  BE, 
DE, FR, GR, IT, NL, PT, ES, UK is included 
13
 Average of 24GWh/year and 2GWh/year consumer types 
14
  Average of 50MWh/year, 7.5MWh/year and 3.5MWh/year consumer types 
15
 Prices without taxes 
16
 Consumption of around 100mcm/year 
17
 Consumption around 10mcm/year 
18
 Consumption 1 mcm/year 
19
 Average of  10,000m
3
, 2,000m
3
 and 400m
3
 consumer types 
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may not have any economic justification, it is worth mentioning that there is no legal or 
regulatory basis for the oil-gas price link, but that it has been introduced by both importers 
and exporters of gas as a risk sharing principle in the take-or-pay contracts
20
 and when gas 
was relatively new on the market and just had to gain market shares, mainly from oil or other 
competing energy sources. In a competitive and fully liquid market, a partial decoupling of oil 
and gas prices could be expected, as has been the case in the UK until 2004. 
However, these average figures also disguise more extreme developments in individual 
Member States.
21
 For electricity, the price paid in the most expensive Member States is 
almost twice the level of the lowest price group. For gas, the differences are less pronounced 
but still evident. Analysis in the 2005 SGEI report suggests that the current level of 
convergence of prices is slow for both electricity and gas, much slower than the experience in 
telecommunications.  
Developments in gas and electricity prices will always be called into question to the extent 
that markets are still characterised by a high level of concentration and a poor level of 
integration between Member States, or even between regions of individual Member States. 
This situation has not improved significantly over time and national markets remain highly 
concentrated as set out in Table 5 below. Concentration in upstream markets inevitably feed 
through into retail markets since, even if there are numerous suppliers, these will be reliant on 
the main upstream players. Further vertical integration risks leading to reductions in liquidity 
and reinforcing the risks of concentration. In many cases the incumbent companies are the 
only participants with sufficient access to advantageous sources of gas and electricity, 
transmission capacity and customers. The Commission has launched a sector inquiry pursuant 
to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC to examine among other the price formation process in 
electricity and gas markets and the effect of high levels of concentration on this process.
22
  
Table 5 Degree of concentration  
 Electricity (generation) Gas (import and production) 
Very highly concentrated  
[HHI above 5000] 
BE, FR, GR, IE, PT, EE, LV, SK, 
SI 
all others 
Highly concentrated  
[HHI 1800-5000] 
DE, IT, ES, LT, CZ,  AT, IE, IT, ES, NL 
Moderately concentrated  
[HHI 750-1800] 
AT, NORDIC, NL, UK, PL, HU UK,  
Source: regulators’ submissions, DG TREN calculations 
As well as concentration at national level, there have been a number of cross border 
acquisitions. In other cases mergers have taken place between incumbent gas and electricity 
companies which may reduce the scope for competition from new electricity producers 
building gas fired power plants. This has the effect of leading to a reduction in the potential 
number of competitors in both markets. It may make it more difficult for potential entrants in 
the electricity sector to get access to gas for supplying a power plant.  
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  Take-or.-pay contracts entail risk sharing with the volume risk taken by the importer and the price risk 
taken by the exporter or producer of gas. 
21
  See Graphs 4.1 to 4.3 in Section 4 and 5.1 -5.3 in section 5. 
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 Cases COMP/B-1/39.172 (electricity) and 39.173 (gas) 
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When assessing such mergers, the Commission and national authorities have to balance the 
beneficial effect of mergers in terms of synergies and economies of scale against the loss in 
competition which is likely to result from the merger Mergers significantly impeding effective 
competition are prohibited, unless appropriate remedies are offered
23
  
4.4 Non discriminatory network access 
As well as a suitable market structure, fair and non-discriminatory access to networks is 
indispensable to properly functioning competition. This comprises not only the level of 
charges for network access but also conditions relating to the flexibility for network users to 
change their contracts, the nomination procedures and the level of information provided to 
network users.  
In the absence of complete unbundling in ownership terms, the necessity for firm regulation 
of all these conditions was unanimously agreed by Member States in the context of the 
Directives, the Regulation 1228/03 on Cross Border Electricity Exchanges, and the 
forthcoming Regulation on Access Conditions to the Gas Transmission Networks. Perceptions 
are important. Companies will not enter new markets unless all avenues for possible 
discrimination are closed off. The legislation already sets out clearly the role of regulators in 
this respect. It is expected that, as regulators become more effective in their dealings with 
network companies, that network tariffs will move in a convergent path in the different 
Member States. The exceptions will be where there are good reasons for difference to persist, 
such as operating environment, taxation differences or accounting treatment. 
Network access tariffs and conditions are already converging for electricity and considerable 
effort has been undertaken to develop a coherent tarification system at European level. For the 
gas sector there has also been some convergence, with the majority of Member States now 
applying entry-exit-systems for tariffs and many also for capacity. However, in contrast to the 
improvements already introduced for electricity including the inter TSO compensation 
mechanism; these systems have not been made compatible across the European market. 
Furthermore where several balancing zones within one transmission system exist, elements 
discriminating against small network users or newcomers have been retained.
 24
  
Similarly in relation to ancillary services provided by TSOs, in particular the settlement of 
imbalances, the increased involvement of regulators under the requirements of the Directives, 
should lead to more satisfactory and compatible methodologies for determining the conditions 
for settling imbalances and for gas, access to storage networks. Currently these vary 
considerably by Member State leading to differences in the exposure of suppliers to 
imbalance penalties. Balancing arrangements, for both electricity and gas, do not always 
facilitate smooth trading, cross-border or inter-TSO transactions. For gas, market based 
balancing systems only exist in very few Member States and some, but not sufficient progress 
has been made with respect to access conditions to storage. Since April 2005, storage 
operators have started to implement the Guidelines for Good Practice for Storage Operators 
agreed in March 2005 on the basis of an ERGEG advice submitted to the Commission. In a 
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the CFI in case T-87/05 of 21 September 2005 – EDP .v. Commission 
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 A transmission system with several balancing or tariff zones necessarily introduces distance-related 
elements which may disadvantage small users not benefiting from a portfolio effect as the incumbent 
company is likely to do. 
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draft report benchmarking the achievements of storage operators, the main shortcomings 
identified concern transparency and secondary markets.   
Finally, a key issue of importance is the necessity to encourage cross border and inter TSO 
flows of electricity and gas. As already noted, concentration is high on an individual Member 
State basis and, although some projects have recently been realised, there is still limited 
prospect for increasing physical cross border capacity. Furthermore, until recently, 
arrangements to allocate capacity were largely ad-hoc and discriminatory and old contracts 
have tended to block capacity. Regulations 1228/03 for electricity and the forthcoming gas 
regulation have been designed to improve this but these have not yet been fully applied in all 
cases and there are still many unsatisfactory arrangements for capacity allocation, which 
remain
25
. The situation is, however, expected to improve, especially for the electricity sector. 
New guidelines on congestion management will set out strict rules to be followed in designing 
market based arrangements and increase the degree of co-ordination including coupling of 
wholesale market. Meanwhile, the recent judgement of the European Court of Justice in Case 
C-17/03 is likely to lead to the removal of priority access for certain old contracts. 
For gas, access to the network is aggravated or not possible due to capacity allocation 
mechanisms that may not comply with the principles of non-discrimination and transparency, 
and congestion, respectively a lack of capacity stemming from long-term contracts including 
transit contracts. These contracts may entail contractual, but also physical congestion in the 
network, and in addition, may restrict newcomers from access to customers. While effective 
use-it-or-lose-it rules as well as efficient secondary capacity trading in some Member States 
successfully address the problem of contractual congestion, it persists in most other Member 
States, in particular where large transit flows are operated. The gas Regulation will lead to 
more consistency between Member States in this respect. 
4.5 Unbundling 
In the Directive, the requirements are legal and functional unbundling for both transmission 
and distribution system operators. This is expected to lead to non-discriminatory network 
access with tariffs which broadly reflect costs. The Directive requires the Commission to 
examine both whether this requirement may go beyond what is necessary, but also whether 
further unbundling measures are needed.  
Information collected from regulators and stakeholders show that the practical 
implementation of legal and above all functional unbundling, in a number of Member States is 
far from what is required by the Directives. Although the provisions of the Directive have 
usually been transposed into national laws, it is not clear that network companies have yet 
modified all aspects of their arrangements to comply with the new laws. The requirement to 
have legally unbundled and independently managed transmission system operators should 
have been implemented by 1 July 2004. More than a year later this requirement has been fully 
and unambiguously implemented in 16 Member States
26
 for electricity transmission but only 
9 Member States for gas
27
. Likewise, distribution companies should have already been 
independently managed sine July 2004. Performance here is even worse; only six Member 
States fully comply with this requirement for electricity and just four do for gas. 
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This lack of separation is often clear in the apparent behaviour of some TSOs which, in 
several cases, remain close to their former supply and trading groups and do not take a 
proactive approach in order to ensure non-discriminatory and transparent access conditions. 
TSOs may also still depend on their parent companies or affiliates with respect to issues such 
as network development, especially where the transmission system operator does not have 
effective control of the assets in the event that they remain the property of the Group rather 
than the TSO. In some countries, there are suspicions that incumbent suppliers may still enjoy 
preferential treatment and confidentiality requirements are not always properly respected with 
affiliate suppliers having privileged access to information. Even more serious shortcomings 
have been reported regarding the insufficiency of current arrangements for distribution.  
These issues have led some Member States, notably the Netherlands, to propose going further 
in their transposition by moving to full ownership unbundling for both transmission and 
distribution. The argument for this is that it solves all potential problems in one single stroke. 
Even in these circumstances however, due attention should be given to any long term capacity 
rights granted to the supply arm of the previously integrated company. 
4.6 Effective Regulation 
The duties of regulators are clearly set out in Directives. It is the obligation of Member States 
to guarantee an efficient surveillance of the gas and electricity markets by regulators, 
including access to all necessary information and means to enforce their competences. 
Compliance with this obligation is tends to be the exception rather than the rule. For some 
issues, regulators only have monitoring powers pursuant to Article 23(1) of the Electricity 
Directive and Article 25(1) of the Gas Directive and the national role of Ministries and 
Competition Authorities can confuse objectives. Some regulators lack resources and 
competences. They may be too reliant on companies for information and may not have 
appropriate access to both technical and financial information. Regulators may also need new 
powers in order to operate more effectively, for example a greater scope for surveillance of 
wholesale markets.  
Consistency between regulators is of high importance in creating a real internal market. 
Incompatible regimes on, for example, balancing and capacity allocation, incentives to 
remove congestion, and on investment will clearly frustrate objectives of a coherent European 
market. Regulators have made this clearing their submission on “regional markets”.  It is 
important therefore, for national regulators to collaborate closely with each other in order to 
ensure proper market compatibility.  This is currently done through CEER and ERGEG and 
through the Regulations which provide for a degree of common action at European level. 
However some arguments exist for making certain issues determined by a European 
Regulator, or alternatively to give regulators more general powers to regulate collectively, 
which currently they do not have. The remit of ERGEG provides one forum for such 
collaboration and could be expanded to work towards greater consistency of regulator 
decisions.  This would contribute to the “better regulation” objective of the European 
Commission and regulators. 
4.7 Development of interconnection infrastructure 
The Directives do not themselves contain comprehensive measures relating to the 
development of interconnection infrastructure. The regulatory framework, for example, is left 
open for the Member States affected to determine. However at the time of the discussions 
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relating to the introduction of the internal market, it was agreed that a certain minimum level 
of interconnection for electricity was needed and Member States agreed to encourage new 
investment with this objective. There is therefore an expectation that a European market needs 
to involve some degree of co-ordination about the construction, development an operation of 
the network. Table 6 below shows that the level of cross border exchanges of electricity 
shows only a modest increase since market opening. Similarly the extent of hub-to-hub 
trading for gas is very poorly developed. 
Table 6 Extent of cross border electricity flows - electricity 
 cross border flows - actual as 
% of consumption 
1995 7% 
2000 8% 
2005 10.7% 
Source: UCTE 
Some Member States have made this an important political objective in their efforts to create 
more integrated markets, often at regional or bilateral level. Examples include the Nordic 
countries, the Iberian market and the all-Ireland initiatives. Lately, investments aimed at 
improving electricity connections between Belgium, France and the Netherlands have been 
advanced. However a number of key projects have not been progressed very rapidly and for 
which little prospect of completion is expected in the near future. This has been highlighted in 
previous reports on infrastructure in 2001 and 2003
28
. 
As well as the physical investment itself, it is also true that a lack of co-ordinated network 
management tends to minimise the extent to which existing capacity can be used. For 
electricity cross border capacity is, too often, defined too narrowly. Greater co-ordination in 
making such calculations would significantly increase capacity while achieving the same level 
of network security. Similarly the use of counter-trading internally could also make a 
significant contribution if TSOs were given suitable incentives.  
Current gas infrastructure reflects very much the historical supply patterns. Some Member 
States are still not connected to the European grid (Finland, the Baltic States, Greece), a 
matter, which on the one hand, remains an economic issue (size of the market, expected 
demand) and on the other may be alleviated by the upcoming  Energy Market on the Balkans, 
where Greece forms an integral part.  
In addition, a number of new supply projects are being constructed or planned, such as  
- the Medgaz pipeline from Algeria to Spain; 
- the Nabucco pipeline, ultimately linking Caspian and Iranian gas resources to the 
European market 
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- the Baltic Sea gas pipeline from Russia to Germany 
- and a number of LNG projects in the UK, Spain, Italy and France. 
Interconnection among Member States is being upgraded, where appropriate (e.g. UK-
Belgium Interconnector) or constructed (BBL pipeline), however some physical bottlenecks 
remain for the time being or will be addressed in the years to come (French transmission 
system).  
Others have looked to create a framework under which private investors are encouraged to 
come forward with new projects by allowing for exemptions from the normal third party 
access regimes. The connection between Finland-Estonia and the BBL gas pipeline between 
the UK and Netherlands are being constructed on this basis. However the granting of such 
exemptions needs to be carefully controlled.  
4.8 Security of Supply 
The Directives place considerable obligations on Member States to monitor security of supply 
developments and to provide a stable framework for investments in the network and in new 
capacity. These requirements have been strengthen by the Gas Security of Supply Directive
29
 
and the forthcoming Directive on Electricity Security of Supply and Infrastructure which will 
be adopted before the end of 2005. These strong measures are required since the introduction 
of competition means that the issue of balancing demand and supply will be determined by 
behaviour of producers and customers in the market. The role of governments and regulators 
should be to provide a stable framework and to closely monitor the outcome and convey these 
results to potential investors. 
In practice such information is collected by transmission system operators and this has been 
helpfully consolidated at European level in reports provided by both the Union for the Co-
ordination of the Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) and the group of European 
Transmission System Operators (ETSO). These indicate that, in general, sufficient reserve 
capacity is available in all Member States and regions of the European Union.  
Concerns about a lack of investment in generation plant have proved to be exaggerated. As 
prices have increased an increasing amount of new projects have been announced, given 
authorisation and are proceeding to the construction phase. In this context it should be 
remembered that since the first Directive entered into force in 1998, any company has the 
right to proceed with an investment in generation capacity. In some areas, such as the UK and 
Ireland, Greece, and to an extent, the Nordic countries the balance is rather tight at present. 
However, this should create incentives to new investment, or for companies to return to 
service plant that has been taken out of service.  
The second key aspect of security of supply for electricity is network operation rules, which 
have been demonstrated to be very important in the 2003 outages, as well as the overall 
performance of transmission and distribution networks. In this context the multi-lateral 
contract between UCTE Members on the Operational Handbook including enforcement 
procedures is a huge step forward. Phase 1 of this far reaching agreement is already in place 
and the remainder should be signed by the end of the year. Certain aspects of such agreements 
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also need the oversight of regulators and their close involvement in this procedure is also to 
be welcomed. 
In principle, the reliability performance of transmission and distribution networks in general 
should not be greatly affected by the introduction of competition. Although regulation of 
networks is a key part of the Directives, the process of deciding how much network operators 
can spend on, for example, maintenance, repair and renewal in order to minimise the chance 
of interruption of customers, has always been a decision that would involve some kind of 
regulatory process. However some gas and electricity network companies have argued that 
regulators have been too eager to impose tariff reductions, which has consequences for the 
degree of investment in the network. This is a possibility against which regulators need to be 
vigilant. Certainly, a situation where network operators are not provided with suitable 
incentives to maintain network performance and the standard of service must be avoided.  
Many regulators have some form of incentive structure for network companies whereby they 
have to make payments to customers if poor service is provided. Alternatively additional 
revenue may be given to those companies which provide the best service. If anything, 
network performance has improved since market opening. For example, in Italy the average 
duration of interruptions per customer per year has fallen from over 3 hours in 2000 to around 
1½ hours in 2004. The need for regulatory frameworks to ensure such a service level 
continues is underlined by the forthcoming Directive on Security of Supply and Infrastructure. 
For gas, security of supply questions largely relate to the need for investments to bring gas 
from external sources to the European Union. Most Member States have sufficient capacity in 
this regard. The clear exceptions are those Member States where gas demand is growing 
rapidly such as Spain and Italy, and those where domestic production is in decline such as the 
UK. In these cases investors have come forward, on the basis of current price signals, with 
projects to enhance suppliers of gas. Both new pipeline projects and terminals for LNG 
imports have been progressed. The recent announcement of the gas pipeline from Russia to 
Germany is another project of this type. Where appropriate and necessary, these projects have 
received the support of regulators and ultimately the Commission in the form of exemption 
periods from the usual rules on third party access.  In granting such exemptions, the impact of 
new infrastructure and new supply sources on the position of established players must be 
carefully assessed to avoid any reinforcement of existing dominant positions.  The 
Commission is particularly supportive of projects bringing new companies into the gas 
market, for example where the rights to existing routes are largely reserved on a long term 
basis. 
Investments in the internal gas network may also be necessary in order to accommodate 
additional flows within safety limits relating to pressure etc. These, however, may be realised 
under regulated third party access and a clear framework should be in place for deciding on 
such investments and ensuring that transmission companies have the funds available to 
undertake such projects in good time. Meanwhile operational security of supply, in particular 
for households, is addressed by Directive 2004/67/EC, which has to be transposed by Member 
States not later than May 2006.  
4.9 Environmental Consequences 
The opening of the electricity and gas market has been undertaken at a time when the 
European Union is seeking to substantially reduce carbon emissions and increase the share of 
renewable energy. These objectives are not inconsistent and many Member States have been 
 EN 27   EN 
able to make significant progress in these areas in the context of a competitive market. Indeed, 
market opening can significantly benefit the take-up of renewables by encouraging suppliers 
to innovate, for example by offering a “green” option or by giving price reductions to 
consumers which are able to moderate their demand at peak periods. The majority of recently 
added generation during the 2000-05 period has been renewable capacity and combined heat 
and power generation (CHP). The introduction of emission trading should also give strong 
incentives for companies to invest in low carbon electricity generation and measures to save 
electricity.  
Differences between national schemes to encourage renewables have in some cases led to 
imbalances in the location of, in particular wind energy, which has led to grid management 
difficulties. This remains a key challenge in the context of a European market since, in some 
cases; the availability of cross border capacity may be affected. Other means to deal with 
unpredictable flows should be encouraged. A more detailed and regular exchange of 
information between TSOs and the introduction of more intraday trading should assist in this 
area.  
Fiscal incentives on customers to reduce consumption are also having an impact. Clearly, if 
Member States choose this route to encourage energy saving,  it is far healthier in economic 
terms that price incentives are brought about through taxation measures rather than high 
prices being the result of a lack of competition. 
4.10 Employment and other Economic Consequences 
Regarding the question of employment, it is evident that the opening of the market has been 
accompanied by restructuring of energy companies. The level of employment in the industry 
has generally reduced. Although this goes hand in hand with increased productivity and wider 
benefits to the overall economy, these trends raise important questions regarding the 
mechanisms used by companies to restructure and any changes in the quality of employment 
that are ongoing as well as the adequacy of qualifications of employees. The Commission 
intends to update the study it carried out in 2000 to examine this question in more detail. The 
social dimension of the implementation of the gas and electricity internal market, including 
the effects on employment will be examined separately and more comprehensively as a 
consequence of this work, and discussed with social partners. 
5 Conclusions and Next Steps 
This summary document sets out the main detailed results experienced to date relating to 
electricity and gas competition, introduced as a consequence of the Directives. It therefore 
provides the background for the Communication of the European Commission alongside 
which it has been adopted. Some action has already been taken to address some of the 
shortcomings highlighted in this report. New guidelines being developed under the Electricity 
Regulation should further improve integration of national electricity markets and result in a 
higher degree of competition. Likewise the entry into force of the Gas Regulation should lead 
to significant improvements in access conditions for gas. 
Several possible initiatives are identified in the main sections below to cover the subjects in 
question. The majority of these can be undertaken within the existing legislative framework, 
wither by Member States, or by Regulators. The following key areas are highlighted: 
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(a) Member States must ensure effective implementation of the new directives 
both in spirit and in practice – notably the unbundling provisions. The 
Commission will take action against Member States which fail in this respect. 
(b) Member States should ensure that Regulators can take sensible decisions in a 
flexible way in order to enhance competition in the market independent of the 
interests of industry. Regulators should have the resources, the information and 
the enforcement powers to fulfil these tasks. If regulators are unduly 
constrained in their freedom to act, the Commission will examine the 
compatibility of these arrangements with the Directives.  
(c) At the same time, Regulators must intensify their efforts in working together 
to solve the key issues in integrating markets, where they already have 
considerable powers to ensure fair and non-discriminatory network access and 
balancing rules. These rules should be made compatible, either via the work of 
ERGEG or formally by the Commission adopting a recommendation of 
ERGEG for inclusion in guidelines adopted under the Regulations.  
(d) Member States are encouraged to take measures to stimulate competition in 
national markets through all possible measures – i.e. divestment, capacity 
release, transparency and disclosure requirements.  
(e) Member States and Regulators should look to enhance the degree of 
available interconnection between Member States through either investment or 
other means. Regulators already have power over methods used to calculate 
cross border interconnection capacity and over general tariffs. They already 
have powers to give TSOs incentives in this respect. 
(f) Member States and Regulators should seek to give adequate protection to 
consumers and stimulate consumer response – by giving the necessary 
structures and incentives for customers to seek to change their supplier. This 
should include a review of the appropriateness of price controls in the context 
of Article 3 of the Directives. 
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1. LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVES  
The legal deadline for the majority of the provisions in the Directives was 1 July 2004. The 
Regulation on Cross Border Electricity Exchanges also entered into force on this date. 
However, many Member States were late in implementing the Directives and the Commission 
was required to take action in order to ensure full transposition. In October 2004, letters of 
formal notice were sent to eighteen Member States which had not yet notified the 
Commission of the measures taken. By March 2005, this list was reduced to ten Member 
States, to which a reasoned opinion was sent. The Commission has now proceeded to the 
Court of Justice in the case of seven Member States as set out in the Table 1.1 overleaf which 
gives a summary of the current state of affairs.  
The role of the Commission is to also ensure that the content of national laws comply with the 
provisions of the Directive and are complete. Infringement actions can be taken as a result of 
the Commission’s own assessment, or in response to a complaint. To the extent that national 
laws are in place and are satisfactory, any complaint against the actions of a particular 
company will be dealt with in national legal procedures. The same applies to any breaches of 
the Regulation, which has direct effect. 
Considering that for many Member States the laws have only recently been implemented, it 
may be too early at present to determine whether there are any difficulties emerging from the 
way in which Directives have been transposed. However this report clearly demonstrates that 
there are many respects in which the Directives have not been implemented in practice and 
that this may stem from shortcomings in the content of national laws transposing the 
Directives. 
Table 1.1 Legal Implementation of Directives 
 Implementing Laws 
 Electricity Gas 
Austria 
Elektrizitätswirtschafts und -organisationsgesetz 
(Electricity Law) and regional Electricity Laws 
(„Länder“), Energie-Regulierungsbehördengesetz 
(Law on the energy regulator) 
Gaswirtschaftsgesetz (Gas Law), Energie-
Regulierungsbehördengesetz (Law on the energy 
regulator) 
Belgium 
Electricité : Loi du 29 avril 1999 relative à 
l’organisation du marché de l’électricité  modifiée 
par la loi du  1 juin 2005  
Gaz : loi du 12 avril 1969  relative au transport de 
produits gazeux et autres  par canalisation modifiée 
par la loi du 1 juin 2005  
Denmark 
Elforsyningsloven  
 
Naturgasforsyningsloven 
 
Finland 
Electricity Market Act (386/1995), Electricity 
Market Decree (518/1995)  
Gas Market Act (508/2000), Gas Market Decree 
(622/2000) 
France 
Loi 2000-108 du 10/2/2000 (électricité), Loi 2003-8 du 3/1/2003 (gaz et électricité) 
Loi 2004-803 du 9/8/2004 (gaz et électricité), Loi 2005-781 du13/7/05 (Loi orientation énergie) 
Germany 
Gesetz über die Energieversorgung (“Energiewirtschaftsgesetz – EnWG”) -  7 July 2005 
 
Greece INFRINGEMENT DEROGATION IN EFFECT 
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 Implementing Laws 
 Electricity Gas 
Ireland 
Electricity Regulation Act 1999, Statutory 
Instruments 511/2005, 287/ 2005, 60/2005, 
632/2003,  328/2003 304/2003, 217/2002, 145/2002, 
445/2000, 49/2000 
INFRINGEMENT 
Italy 
DL 79/1999 is Legislative Decree n° 79 of 16 March 
1999. Law 239/2004 is Law n° 239 of 23 August 
2004.  
DL 164/2000 is Legislative Decree n° 164 of 23 May 
2000. Law 239/2004 is Law n° 239 of 23 August 
2004.  
Luxembourg INFRINGEMENT INFRINGEMENT 
Netherlands Elekticieitswet 1998 as amended Gaswet 2001 as amended 
Portugal INFRINGEMENT DEROGATION IN EFFECT 
Spain INFRINGEMENT INFRINGEMENT 
Sweden Ellag (2005:404)  Naturgaslag (2004:403) 
UK 
Electricity Act 1989, Utilities Act 2000, Energy Act 
2005, Electricity Order (NI) 1992 modified by Order 
335/2005, Energy Order (NI) 2003 
Gas Act 1986 (amended 1995), Petroleum Act 1998, 
Utilities Act 2000, Energy Act 2005, Gas Order (NI) 
1996 
Estonia 
 
Elektrituruseadus  INFRINGEMENT 
Latvia 
 
Elektroenergijas tirgus likums Energetikas likums 
Lithuania 
Electricity Law of 2002, amended in 2004 
 
Gas law of 2001 currently being updated 
Poland 
Prawo energetyczne (“Energy Law”) 10 April 1997, 
latest modification 2005 no. 62 item 552  
Prawo energetyczne (“Energy Law”) 10 April 1997, 
latest modification 2005 no. 62 item 552 
Czech Rep. 
Energy Act no. 458/2000, latest amendment 28 February 2005. 
 
Slovakia 
Act 656/2004 on energy sector,  Act 276/2001 on Regulation of Network Industries 
 
Hungary
30
 
Electricity Act CX of 2001; Governmental Decrees 
180/2002 (VIII.23.), 107/2004 (IV.27.);181/2002 
(VIII. 23.); 183/2002 (VIII. 23.);. 56/2002 (XII. 29.);  
182/2002. (VIII. 23.)  
Gas – Act XLII of 2003 on natural gas supply; 
Government decrees 111/2003 (VII.29); 112/2003. 
(29.07.) 219/2003. (11.12.); 81/2003. (10. 12)  
Slovenia 
“Energy Act”  as modified 23-4-2004  
 
Cyprus 
Legal texts in place Law 122/03, and 2398/04  
 
DIRECTIVE NOT APPLICABLE 
Malta 
Electricity - L.N. 164 of 2003; L.N. 511/2004  
 
DIRECTIVE NOT APPLICABLE 
Electricity has reached a market penetration of 100% in almost all Member States and 
represents a good that cannot be substituted. Contrary to that, natural gas is one of several 
primary energy sources with different market shares in Member States.  
                                                 
30
 The old Gas and Electricity Acts have been substantially modified by a law approved in July 2005 – 
The Government is preparing a Decree for its enforcement 
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Table 1.2 Market share of natural gas in total Primary Energy Supply of Member States  
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This fact is reflected in the Gas Directive by a number of derogations laid down in Article 28. 
These derogations are justified by certain specific features of natural gas markets, such as the 
need for large upfront investments, before natural gas can be supplied the first time 
(“emergent markets”, Greece, Portugal) or because of a missing interconnection with another 
Member State (“isolated markets”, Finland). In addition, two new Member States, Cyprus and 
Malta have not (yet) a natural gas market. For these reasons, the following tables on natural 
gas issues do not always list all Member States. 
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2. ISSUES RELATING TO SERVICE PROVIDED TO CUSTOMERS 
2.1 Background 
Directives 2003/55/EC and 2003/54/EC establish that by July 2004, at the latest, all non 
household gas and electricity customers be declared “eligible” and thus free to choose their 
supplier, and that, as of 1 July 2007, all customers must be in a condition to freely choose 
their supplier. The directives have assigned great importance to protecting consumers (in Art. 
3 and Annex A). In particular, the Directives require that appropriate measures be introduced 
for the protection of vulnerable customers, including measures to avoid disconnections from 
electricity and gas supply and that, in this context, a supplier of last resort may be substituted. 
Furthermore, the Directives state that the most important aspect of protecting customers is the 
transparency of general contract conditions, sufficient information to make it possible for 
consumers to understand and compare commercial offers, and the existence of mechanisms to 
resolve conflicts out of court. These measures are highly important, as they concern customer 
choice of suppliers, such as, for example, the small and average-sized businesses and end 
consumers as well as households in countries where the market is already open. 
The Commission has, as part of the forthcoming 2005 SGEI report, carried out a number of 
investigations into the affordability of these services and surveys relating to customer 
satisfaction. Some of the results of the evaluation for the electricity and gas sectors are 
summarised in this section. 
2.1 Current situation 
2.1.1. Vulnerable Customers: 
The problem of disconnecting electrical service can affect all electricity consumers. Specific 
legislation is very different from one Member Country to the next. The solutions introduced 
for avoiding disconnection from service are varied: a series of calls made to the customer; a 
time limit for paying bills; or a warning notice that service will be discontinued. It is 
necessary to emphasise the differences among customers who cannot pay, meaning between 
vulnerable customers who are not in a condition to pay and those who simply do not want to 
pay or who have forgotten to pay. It is true that as yet a definition of vulnerable clients has not 
been formulated in Europe. However, for example, in Holland and Belgium, legislation 
provides for this differentiation by offering greater protection to customers who are unable to 
pay by making it a condition that social services must be contacted before service is 
interrupted. Rights of vulnerable customers should not differ too much among Member States. 
2.1.2. Social tariffs 
As regards the existence of social tariffs for customers having difficulties to pay for 
electricity, there is no specific legislation in the UK, Germany or The Netherlands, while there 
is in countries such as Belgium, Spain, Italy and France. Finland has a last resort of economic 
assistance. Regarding payments methods accessible to vulnerable customers the pre-payment 
meters tend to be the most expensive ones.  
Graph 2.1 clearly shows that electricity is generally less affordable in the new Member States. 
Seven of them are the EU countries where a higher share of household income is needed to 
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buy electricity with Slovakia (3.82%) at the top of that list. The exceptions are Slovenia -
where electricity is relatively more affordable than in Portugal, Denmark and Germany- and 
Cyprus where citizens enjoy the most affordable electricity service among the EU25. 
Graph 2.1 : Percentage of income spent on electricity by low income consumers 
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Source: European Commission with Eurostat data. No data available for Greece; for Hungary, Malta 
and Luxemburg income data is available only for 2002; incomplete data sets for electricity 
consumption for Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia.  
When analysing the 2002-2004 trend, it can be noticed that, on average, the indices for old 
Member States are changing very little (either upwards or downwards), while for the new 
Member States there is a clear trend for improving affordability (the affordability improved 
most dramatically in Slovakia – over 20%). 
The analysis of affordability of gas services by Member States shows similar trends as in the 
case of electricity. The majority of new Member States have worse indices. Estonia has the 
worst affordability index for gas, followed closely by Lithuania and Slovakia. However for 
these three countries, we can observe a dramatic improvement in affordability over time– 
between 15% and 20% from 2002 to 2004.  
2.1.3. Relations between customers and suppliers and dispute settlement 
Directives 2003/55/EC and 2003/54/EC determine that a wide choice of payment methods 
should be offered to customers. Any difference in terms and conditions shall reflect the costs 
to the supplier of the different payment systems. However, some concerns may give rise to 
unfair costs to customers of different charges of different paying methods. 
Billing seems to be a standard across Member States. Obstacles incur on estimate bills, timing 
and unsuccessful record for customer’s read of their own meter. Consumers should receive 
clear, stated and comprehensible information on each element of their bill. 
It is of fundamental importance that consumers have access to complaint processes that are 
simple and inexpensive.  In many Member Countries, the regulator’s role is a fundamental 
one, such as in Hungary and Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Greece (for electricity). In the UK, 
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suppliers are required to provide their customers with all the necessary information for 
making a claim.  
2.1.4. Consumer satisfaction 
Data on customer satisfaction is also included in the forthcoming 2005 SGEI report. European 
consumers overall find the quality of electrical service high, particularly in Belgium, 
Denmark, Spain and Greece. General satisfaction with electricity supply is around 74% while 
dissatisfaction is at 21%. However, there is a surprising difference between new Member 
States, (97%), and EU-15 where only 88% of consumers say they have an easy access to 
electricity. This figure even falls to 78% in Italy.
31
 
Access to the electrical network is considered fine by most users. Most electricity consumers 
consider customer service from their present supplier to be good, particularly in Latvia, 
Cyprus and Lithuania. The countries with the highest percentage levels of dissatisfaction with 
the customer service are Sweden, The Netherlands, Greece and Malta. 
Significant percentages of consumers are not satisfied with the value for money for electricity 
supply, 36% of EU-15 consumers are dissatisfied and 49% are dissatisfied in the new Member 
States. Figures for satisfaction are respectively of 59% and 44%.  
The ways in which consumer complaints are handled is considered appropriate only by 57% 
of European consumers, 41% say that their complaint was handled badly. It must be noted, 
however, that a rather small percentage of electricity consumers file complaints, only 4% of 
electricity consumers have filed complaints between November 2003 and November 2004. 
Most electricity consumers consider the information they receive from their supplier to be 
convenient, and only a small percentage considers it unsatisfactory. Information is considered 
insufficient (by a small percentage of consumers) in Greece and Sweden.  
2.1.5. Labelling 
Regarding the question of labelling, Table 2.1 below sets out the current status of 
implementation of Article 3(6) of the Directive. This shows that the requirement has, as yet 
only been partially transposed and is not operational in many Member States. 
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  Eurobarometer – Services of General Economic Interest in the EU 25 (fieldwork November 2004, DG 
Health and Consumer Protection) 
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Table 2.1 Status of implementation of the labelling provisions 
 
Summary of progress on labelling 
 
Austria Implemented in July 2002 Eco-electricity Act 
Belgium 
FL: Implemented in regional government decisions in March 2002, modified Sept 
2003, January 2004 
WA: Not yet implemented, BRU: Not yet implemented 
Denmark 
Implemented in Law 494, June 2004 
 
Finland 
Regulation entered into force 1 July 2005 
 
France 
Implemented by Ministerial decree, 30 April 2004 
 
Germany 
Labelling included in new energy law of July 2005 
 
Greece 
No information available 
 
Ireland 
Implemented by statutory instrument number, date. 
 
Italy 
Not yet implemented 
 
Luxembourg 
Not yet implemented 
 
Netherlands 
Article 95 of Dutch energy law, 20 July 2004 
 
Portugal Not yet implemented. 
Spain Not yet implemented. 
Sweden Ministerial Ordinance Sept 2005 
UK Implemented in Statutory Instrument no. 391 in force since 19 March 2005 
Norway no information 
Estonia Not yet implemented. 
Latvia Not yet implemented 
Lithuania Not yet implemented 
Poland Not yet implemented. 
Czech R Implemented in Energy Act, March 2005 
Slovakia Dealt with in main energy law. 
Hungary New legislation in preparation, not yet enforced. 
Slovenia Implemented in law of 11 April 2005 
Cyprus Not yet implemented 
Malta Dealt with in law no 511 of  2004 
source: Draft study “A European Tracking System for Electricity (E-TRACK)” ECN Consulting 
2.2. Views of stakeholders 
Small and medium-sized businesses note that they are looking toward a liberalized market 
giving the opportunity to unite and buy bigger volumes of electrical energy, thus obtaining 
more advantageous tariffs (as promoted in Art. 3.3 of Directive 2003/54/EC). They expect 
that new commercial offers may be differentiated not only by the tariff applied but also by the 
transparency of possible tariff increases, by consumption standards and by the contract period. 
Consequently, proper and clear information provided to consumers who are already free to 
choose their supplier is needed to truly allow them to compare the various advantages and 
encourages them to switch suppliers. Household consumer groups echo the need for 
transparent contract structures. Meanwhile union groups question whether the benefits arising 
from competition exceed the costs of the systems required to enable switching to take place, 
above all for the household sector. 
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2.3. Assessment 
Part of the success of opening the market depends on full application of consumer protection 
provisions established by Directives 2003/55/EC and 2003/54/EC and applied by Member 
States. Furthermore, the clarity, detail and facility of understanding suppliers’ commercial 
offers should grow in a general climate of trust regarding legally acquired rights and 
encouraging them to switch suppliers. 
The Commission intends to investigate all obligations on suppliers relating to public service 
and attain a complete overview, which will make it possible to understand the new rules 
(contractual, operational and commercial) that have already been established or are yet to be 
established by Member States. With this in mind, the Commission is conducting a study 
meant to create a general policy on public service obligations and consumer protection in the 
electricity and gas sector. 
The conclusions of the study will be available in the first half of 2006. Subsequent policy 
formulation will have to address the possible support of public service obligations to 
strengthen a diversified electricity production at local or regional level, how to improve 
transparency in energy services and how to award energy service concessions in an efficient 
manner in the frame of unbundling. In general it needs to be assessed how to translate the 
freedom of choice of local and regional authorities in the provision of electricity and gas 
services. 
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3. EXTENT OF CUSTOMER ACTIVITY 
3.1. Background 
This section reports on the extent of customer activity in the electricity and gas markets. It 
draws on information submitted by regulators. The degree of customers switching is an 
important indicator of the development of energy markets. This does not mean to say that 
customers have to be switching supplier constantly. It is also the case that market opening has 
allowed for many customers to renegotiate tariffs with their original supplier and thereby 
benefit without necessarily switching supplier.  
However, the market for large users has now been open for almost seven years for electricity 
and for five years for gas. Commercial customers might be expected to test the market on a 
regular basis. A low level of cumulative switching in that time, for example less than 50%, 
might be indicative of deeper problems in the functioning of the market, related for example, 
to network access conditions. 
For smaller commercial customers and households, market opening is rather recent or even 
non-existent for household in some Member States since the deadline for full market opening 
is July 2007. In any case, these customers may be less inclined to change as regularly, 
particularly where electricity or gas is not a large part of annual expenditure. However a 
situation where zero or very few customers are changing supplier is likely to be indicative of 
the existence of obstacles to the competitive process. 
The data provided by regulators gives a good picture of the degree of development in this 
area. However, in view of the importance of customer activity as an indicator, the 
Commission has engaged a consultant to investigate more deeply the behaviour of companies 
in this regard and confirm the results. This study will be available in early 2006 and allow for 
the information in this report to be confirmed and updated where necessary. 
3.2. Current Situation: Electricity 
To date, the key trends that can be perceived from the reports received by the Commission are 
as follows as indicated in the Table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.1 show that, in many respects, the extent of customer activity for large electricity 
users is becoming rather mature in many Member States. This includes some of the new 
member States such as Hungary where progress appears to have been rather rapid in recent 
years.  
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Table 3.1 Volume of electricity consumption having switched by group – cumulative 
since market opening 
large and very large 
industrial
small-medium industrial 
and business
very small business and 
household
Austria 29% 29% 4%
Belgium c. 20%
Denmark >50%
Finland >50% 82% 30%
France 0%
Germany 41% 7% 5%
Greece 2% 0% 0%
Ireland 56% 15% 9%
Italy -
Luxembourg 25% 3% 0%
Netherlands - - 11%
Portugal
Spain 25% 22% 19%
Sweden >50% - 29%
UK >50% >50% 48%
Norway >50% >50% 44%
Estonia 0% 0% 0%
Latvia 0% 0% 0%
Lithuania 15% 0% 0%
Poland 19% 0% 0%
Czech Rep. 5% 1% 0%
Slovakia - 0% 0%
Hungary 0%
Slovenia 8% 2% 0%
Cyprus 0% 0% 0%
Malta 0% 0% 0%
source: Regulators data
Notes: 
1. The data for Belgium refer to the Flemish region only (customers leaving regulated tariff: 
     40% industrial, 53% small commerical/household)
2. Ireland, includes switching to ESB (Independent)
3. Italy, Spain includes all customers having left regulated tariffs (i.e. incl. renegotiation)
60%
15%
32%
10%
c. 15%
16%
 
A number of the Member States where customer switching levels have been very low have 
failed to implement the Directive such as Greece. Performance is also somewhat 
disappointing in many others with problems related to network access or a concentrated 
market structure the most likely cause. In general, experience shows that a high level of 
customer activity is encouraged where non discriminatory network access is assured and there 
are enough independent competitors in the market to give a degree of real choice. 
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3.3. Current Situation: Gas 
To date, the key trends that can be perceived from the reports received by the Commission are 
as follows as indicated in the Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2 Summary of customer switching: volume of gas consumption having 
switched by group – cumulative since market opening 
power plants
large and very large 
industrial
small-medium industrial 
and busines
very small business and 
household
Austria 4%
Belgium
Denmark <2%
France 0%
Germany - - - -
Ireland 49% 0%
Italy 3% 1%
Luxembourg - 2% 0% 0%
Netherlands - - - 5%
Spain 2%
Sweden - - - -
UK >90% >85% >75% 47%
Estonia 0% 0% 0% 0%
Latvia 0% 0% 0% 0%
Lithuania 0% 0% 0% 0%
Poland 0% 0% 0% 0%
Czech Rep. 0% 0% 0% 0%
Slovakia 0% 0% 0% 0%
Hungary
Slovenia 0% 0% 0% 0%
source: Regulators data
Notes: 
1. The data for Belgium refer to the Flemish region only (customers leaving regulated tariff: 90%, 
     industrial, 40% small commerical/household)
2. Spain, all customers having left regulated tariffs (i.e. incl. renegotiation)
6%
6%
60%
9%
14%
30%
23%
25%
100%
 
The data collected again shows a mixed picture. For some Member States, the extent of 
customer activity is becoming relatively mature, especially those where there are a number of 
competitors with access to gas in that particular region. Other Member States’ markets have 
not developed, particularly in the new Member States. There are diverse reasons for this lack 
of progress. However, unfair network access arrangements, the lack of opportunities available 
for real competition and the maintenance of price controls all play their part, as for electricity.  
For smaller customers, there appears to be a reluctance to switch supplier in some cases, 
although this may develop further as the market matures. As discussed, the existence of 
unrealistic controls on end user prices may be a constraint on competition for this group of 
customers. This is set out in Table 3.3 below. 
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Table 3.3 Existence of price controls 
Regulated tariffs - 
industrial users
Regulated tariffs - 
small commercial 
users
Regulated tariffs - 
households
Regulated tariffs - 
industrial users
Regulated tariffs - 
small commercial 
users
Regulated tariffs - 
households
Austria N N N N N N
Belgium N N Y N N Y
Denmark Y Y Y Y Y Y
Finland N N Y *
France N* Y Y N Y Y
Germany N Y Y N N N
Greece Y Y Y
Ireland Y Y Y Y Y Y
Italy Y Y Y N N Y
Luxembourg N N Y N N N
Netherlands N N N N N N
Portugal Y Y Y
Spain Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sweden N N N N N N
UK N N N N N N
Norway N N N
Estonia Y Y Y N N Y
Latvia Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lithuania Y Y Y N Y Y
Poland Y Y Y Y Y Y
Czech Rep. N N Y N Y Y
Slovakia N N Y N N Y
Hungary Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slovenia N N Y N Y Y
Cyprus Y Y Y
Malta Y Y Y
source: Regulators data
Notes: 
1. Finland: Y* mean ex-post controls exist
2. Germany: ex-ante approval of dmoesic and SME end-user tariffs by the Lander will remain in force until 1 July 2007.
ELECTRICITY GAS
 
source: Regulators’ submissions 
This table shows that many Member States persist in maintaining the co-existence of a 
regulated end user price for electricity and gas, even for large industrial users.  
3.4. Views of Regulators  
Regulators noted that although switching rates seem broadly encouraging (30-50% in volume 
terms for several countries), an in-depth analysis indicates that there is a significant difference 
between large and small customer markets with small business customers and households 
rather reluctant to use their eligibility. This appears to be true, even in those Member States 
with relatively easy switching procedures. It appears that a long period of experience with 
market opening is necessary for an active market in, for example, households, to develop. 
Regulators consider that some elements of suppliers’ behaviour (inter alia multi-utility 
rebates, fidelity rebates, information policy,…) was found to be also contributing to entry 
barriers, cementing the dominant market power of incumbents in many retail markets.  In 
addition they felt that insufficient unbundling at the distribution level with the possibility of 
cross subsidies between the network tariffs and retail electricity prices create additional entry 
barriers for new entrants.  
Regulators also draw attention to the fact that many countries plan to continue with regulated 
electricity tariffs in a transition phase and even as a long term hybrid model. It is thought that 
these are likely to impede development of retail competition further since in many cases these 
tariffs undercut realistically priced retailers, thereby strangling retail competition. Regulators 
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are of the view that this would not lead to strengthening of consumer confidence as it clearly 
might lead to the misleading conclusion that consumers are better off in a regulated non-
market system. Such controls might also generate security of supply problems. 
3.5. Views of Stakeholders  
The views expressed by stakeholders on the subject of switching covered a variety of topics. 
The established energy companies emphasised their efforts to date to ensure a smooth 
switching procedure although they also noted the costs of implementing the necessary 
systems. At the same time many suggested that customers had achieved benefits even without 
switching since their prices had been reduced through the threat of competition. They also 
argued that many customers had been able to negotiate a better deal without needing to 
switch. Several companies highlighted the negative effect of end-user controls on an active 
consumer market and argued that these should be progressively removed, or at least modified 
to more realistic levels. 
However smaller suppliers and new entrants are of the view that a low level of switching is 
symptomatic of the wider problems in electricity and gas markets. They suggest that real 
competition is, in fact being constrained by a range of obstacles meaning that established 
companies are in a strongly advantageous position in their particular region which, in fact, 
makes it impossible for either new entrants or even incumbents from other areas or Member 
States from successfully competing. The balancing arrangements, in particular, are cited by 
some suppliers as a key obstacle in this regard. Some companies also argue that possibility to 
negotiate charges actually allows incumbents to segment the market between active and 
passive customers. The lack of unbundling between distribution and supply companies is also 
highlighted as a problem. Finally, the large differences between the performance of the gas 
sector compared to electricity in some Member States is thought to reflect the fundamental 
network access problems and the lack of possibilities to move gas flexibly around the 
European networks. 
Some argue that the potential for competition is also restricted by the de minimis rule of 
100,000 customers for legal and functional unbundling. They would consider a threshold of 
20,000 customers would promote more competition, while others advocate maintaining the 
current de minimis rule on the grounds of the specific character of distribution. 
Consumer groups, especially those of large users, go further. They note that that even where 
switching opportunities are available the savings are limited since the offers made by different 
competing companies are negligible. This, it is argued, is a result of the concentrated market 
structure in which only a limited amount of companies are competing.  
3.6. Assessment 
In the view of the Commission, a low level of customer switching in combination with a 
concentrated market structure is usually indicative of a poorly functioning market. It is 
generally easy to predict that those Member States which have failed to implement the 
Directive, or which have long standing obstacles to competition such as insufficient network 
access or a poor market structure, will generally perform poorly regarding this indicator.   
The existence of regulated end-user prices is clearly a key determinant of customer behaviour, 
especially where price controls are maintained at apparently unrealistically low levels. 
Although the retaining of controls may be justified in a period of transition, these will 
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increasingly cause distortions as the need for investment approaches. It is debateable whether 
some of the price controls currently being imposed are consistent with Article 3(2) of the 
Directives where the requirement for “equality of access for EU [electricity/gas] companies to 
national consumers. Member States and Regulators should examine this issue closely. 
Regarding the process of customer switching, it is clear that adequate unbundling of 
distribution system operators is required to ensure a smooth procedure. Unless distributors are 
effectively separated from any supply operations there is a risk that privileged information 
could be passed to the affiliated supply company. This is discussed in more detail in the 
unbundling section below. It is usually apparent that the best performing Member States 
regarding customer switching have already implemented the requirement for legal 
unbundling.  
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4. PRICE DEVELOPMENTS AND COMPETITION ISSUES - ELECTRICITY 
4.1. Background 
In a competitive market it is expected that prices will, over the long term, reflect the 
efficiently incurred costs of supplying the product, including both fixed and variable costs. In 
general the opening of the market should deliver greater efficiency and, over the long term, 
prices should be lower than they otherwise would be. However the current organisation of the 
electricity and gas sector may mean that this objective is not delivered in practice. The energy 
sector, in particular, is capital intensive and has a rather high level of concentration. It shares 
some characteristics with other sectors where an active competition policy has been needed in 
the past; for example chemicals or cement.   
Added to this, the nature of the electricity market, with inelastic demand and supply and large 
variations on demand on an hour by hour basis, mean that the market is particularly prone to 
possible manipulation. For example, at certain times of day, it is often the case that the 
behaviour of a single plant may determine the wholesale price or balancing price. Without 
proper market surveillance the incumbent companies in concentrated markets may not be 
subject to the competitive discipline that would normally be expected and the incentives to 
more efficient operation will be curtailed.  
There is also a dynamic aspect to competition. In this context it needs to be remembered that 
previous Directives have already significantly improved the contestability of the market, by 
ensuring that new generation investments can be realised by any company wishing to enter 
the market. Therefore, even where competitive pressures might appear to be constrained in the 
short term, it is expected that if prices are maintained above the cost of efficient operation for 
a long period this will bring new investors into the market. 
4.2. Current Situation 
4.2.1. Market structure: Production of electricity 
As noted in previous benchmarking reports, the electricity generation sector is characterised 
by a high level of concentration. This is summarised in Table 4.1 below which sets out the 
degree of concentration estimated for electricity generation markets at national, regional and 
European level.  
It must be underlined that the national market remains the most relevant for considering the 
degree of concentration. This is because only limited efforts have been made to integrate 
national markets by, for example, making more interconnection capacity available between 
Member States. Greater integration could be achieved in some regions as, indeed, is already 
the case in the Nordic countries. This serves to significantly reduce problems associated with 
concentration. Market integration would not necessarily imply investment in new 
infrastructure. The application of new methods of calculating available transport capacity, for 
example, has a great deal of potential provided that transmission system operators have the 
correct incentive structure for this.  
There have been only limited changes in market structure in generation in the last five years. 
The Member State making the most progress in this regard is Italy which has followed a 
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deliberate active policy in this respect. In this case the share of Enel, the largest producer and 
former incumbent, has been reduced from over 50% to 39% of installed capacity.  
Neither have there been many new entrants to the electricity market. In most cases 
competition has come from the existing national companies gradually entering other Member 
States through large acquisitions. Although this is often a helpful development, it should also 
be possible for companies to grow organically through direct investment in new plant and in 
signing up customers directly.  
Table 4.1  Wholesale Market Position – end 2004 
Number of companies 
with 5% share of 
production capacity
Share of largest 3 
producers
Liquidity multiple             
spot trading/ total 
consumption
Liquidity mulitple              
term trading/ total 
consumption 
Austria 5 54% 3% -
Belgium 2 95% - -
Denmark 10 40% 42% 450%
Finland 10 40% 42% 450%
France 1 96% 3% -
Germany 5 72% 11% 64%
Greece 1 97% - -
Ireland 2 93% - -
Italy 5 65% 21% -
Luxembourg 1 88% 4% 43%
Netherlands 4 69% 12% 37%
Portugal 3 76% - 16%
Spain 3 69% 92% -
Sweden 10 40% 42% 450%
UK 8 39% 6% 210%
Norway 10 40% 42% 450%
Estonia 1 95% - -
Latvia 1 95% - -
Lithuania 3 92% - -
Poland 7 45% 1% 44%
Czech Rep. 1 76% 1% 206%
Slovakia 1 86% - -
Hungary 7 66% - -
Slovenia 3 87% 2% -
source: Regulators data
Notes: 
1. Data for Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland relate to entire Nordic market  
Such a process is made easier if there exists a liquid wholesale market for electricity since a 
new supplier will inevitably have to source part of its needs from other producers for a period. 
Likewise a new generation investment will not always have an exact match with its customers 
and may need to sell part of its production on the open market. 
Since market opening, wholesale commodity-type markets for electricity have been 
developing, either spontaneously, or sponsored in some form in the regulatory framework. 
Electricity can be bought and sold in such markets by the main generators, suppliers and large 
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consumers. However, liquidity is often low and this can put smaller companies at a significant 
disadvantage since prices may be volatile. The information in Table 4.1 suggests only the UK 
and the Nordic market has a sufficient degree of liquidity in this respect. However, in the UK, 
the multiple term liquidity has recently been declining.  
4.2.2. Market structure: retail supply 
Previous reports have also noted the feed through between conditions in the electricity 
generation market, and that for the supply of electricity to final customers. Although some 
Member States are characterised by a very large number of supply companies, often affiliated 
to with existing distribution companies, it is often the case that these suppliers in turn have a 
close relationship with particular generation companies. Generally speaking, the conditions on 
the wholesale market are usually more indicative of the real degree of competition. 
Table 4.2 shows, in fact that in terms of market share, and the number of major players, there 
is a close correspondence between the generation and the retail market. The data also shows 
that there are, however, new independent entrants which are active in almost all Member 
States which is relatively encouraging. 
Table 4.2  Retail Market position – end 2004  
Companies with market 
share over 5%
Number of fully 
indepdent suppliers 
(no network affiliates)
Market share of 
largest 3 companies 
large industrial users
Market share of 
largest 3 companies 
small/medium 
businesses
Market share of largest 3 
companies very small 
commercial/household
Austria 5 4
Belgium 3 / 2 14 / 6 100% / 92% 100% / 99% 94% / 100%
Denmark - 3 - - -
Finland 5 < 5 -
France 1 5 91% 97% 96%
Germany 4 13 - - -
Greece 1 10 97% 97% 100%
Ireland 3 7 99% 99% 99%
Italy 6 119 33% 12% 93%
Luxembourg 4 4 95%
Netherlands 3 18 - - 83%
Portugal 2 4
Spain 5 11 82% 86% 85%
Sweden 3 -
UK 6 3 65% 66% 59%
Norway 4 5 95% 33% 31%
Estonia 1 0 95% 95% 95%
Latvia 1 0
Lithuania 3 5 100% 100% 100%
Poland 6 20 50% 48% 47%
Czech Rep. 3 0
Slovakia 1 1 86% 100% 100%
Hungary 7 0 7% 43% 51%
Slovenia 6 6 67% 75% 77%
Cyprus 1 0 100% 100% 100%
Malta 1 0 100% 100% 100%
source: Regulators data
Notes: 
1. Belgium data Flanders\Wallonia. No data for Brussels region
2. Norway data from 2003
3. Germany: source for "fully indepdendent suppliers" from the new entrant goup "BNE".
95%
98%
50%
60%
35-40 %
94%
 
In theory there should be room for companies to participate in the market as pure suppliers, 
simply purchasing from wholesale markets and selling the product to customers. In practice, 
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however, a supplier with little or no generation plant of its own is a price taker in the 
wholesale market and may find it difficult to maintain an independent pricing policy for final 
customers since it is reliant on the price it can negotiate with the main producers for part, or 
all of the electricity supplied.  
In practice there are a range of different experiences in Member States in this respect. For 
example, in more mature electricity markets such as the United Kingdom, where most 
restrictions on the wholesale market have been lifted, the supply market has consolidated to 
closely match the structure of the generation market.  The degree of competition is seen as 
acceptable even though the existence of fully independent suppliers has become limited to six 
main companies. 
Similarly in Member States with a large number of municipal suppliers, such as Germany or 
Spain, many of these are linked through ownership or contractual arrangements with one of 
the largest producers in the market. There are, however, efforts from some municipal 
suppliers to increase their degree of independence by consolidation and through investment in 
their own power generation capabilities. New Member States such as the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia also have a system where the main suppliers are rather dependent on a single 
producer. Whereas in Poland and Hungary, the existence of long term power purchase 
agreements between generators and a single power procurement business tends towards a 
similar result.  
A third group of markets remain very concentrated at both generation and supply level as a 
result of the historical development of the electricity sector such as France, Ireland, Greece 
and Portugal. This also applies to the Baltic countries and Slovakia. 
4.2.3. Wholesale Electricity Prices 
Recent increases in wholesale prices have been rather severe, with a rise of 50-75% in some 
markets for a standard annual base load contract. Chart 4.1 shows the development of forward 
electricity prices in the important EEX market
32
. Similarly developments have been seen in 
other continental electricity wholesale markets. The reasons are complex. Underlying factors 
such as primary energy prices and the expected supply demand position are clearly important 
in some cases.  
                                                 
32
  European Electricity Exchange located in Leipzig, Germany 
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Chart 4.1 Prices for calendar year base-load contracts 2004-2006 (EEX Leipzig) 
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Although wholesale prices are increasing, it is important to remember that, as discussed above 
in Table 4.1, only a small part of electricity is actually traded in organised wholesale markets. 
Most electricity at wholesale level is still bought and sold in longer term fixed price contracts 
between generators and suppliers – often within the same group. Wholesale market price 
variations may, therefore, not be reflected in prices to final users since this will depend on the 
overall strategy of the company concerned. There may also be different contract structures 
prevailing whereby consumers can protect themselves against volatile prices. Finally, some 
very large consumers of electricity may have their own production facilities.  
4.2.4. Retail Prices 
However, at least part of the recent increases has fed through into retail prices, which are 
clearly higher than in 2001. Experience varies by Member State. The graphs set out below 
show price developments in individual Member States for, firstly, very large users, and then 
two categories of other non-household users are shown. Member States have been split into 
“high”, “medium and “low” price groupings. Other than the first graph, the source of all the 
other data is Eurostat. All prices shown are without tax 
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Graph 4.2 Electricity prices for very large industrial users [up to 50MW maximum 
demand] 
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source: Eurostat Marker Prices, DTI Quarterly Energy Prices 
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Graph 4.3a Electricity prices for moderate industrial users [24GWh/year] “high” 
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Graph 4.3b Electricity prices for moderate industrial users [24GWh/year] “medium” 
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Graph 4.3c Electricity prices for moderate industrial users [24GWh/year] “low” 
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Graph 4.4a Electricity prices for small commercial users [50MWh/year] “high” 
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Graph 4.4a Electricity prices for small commercial users [50MWh/year] “medium” 
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Graph 4.4a Electricity prices for small commercial users [50MWh/year] “low” 
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The charts above clearly indicate that most Member States have experienced increases in 
prices for large users in recent years, in particular Germany, Ireland and Italy. Meanwhile, 
movements in prices for smaller commercial customers have been constrained despite the 
increased wholesale price. Some Member States have recorded significant price reductions for 
this group in recent years, in particular Austria and Belgium. The resulting differences in 
price levels between Member States are revealing. For the very large users, the price range is 
now relatively narrow, between €40 - €53/MWh. Whereas the range for the moderate group is 
€40-80MWh and for the small commercial group the range is €70 – 150/MWh
33
. 
4.3. Comments of Regulators 
In the view of regulators, the development of competitive electricity markets have been 
hampered by unwillingness to consider structural measures such as divestiture in order to 
tackle initially monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions. Indeed they find that some mergers 
and acquisitions have been permitted by national and EU competition authorities, further 
increasing market concentration in several countries. Regulators note that wholesale market 
prices have increased sharply and that unexpectedly high prices for CO2 emissions 
certificates have been quickly built into forward prices. 
Other area of concern to regulators is the fact that only a very small share of new generation 
projects (with the exception of subsidized renewable generation) were commissioned by 
independent, non incumbent generators, thus further strengthening the market power of 
incumbent generators. This may be indicative of difficulties in getting fair access to networks 
and reasonable conditions for ancillary services such as balancing. Regulators argue that 
ineffective wholesale markets limit retail competition. Most Member States currently exhibit 
very high concentration ratios (CR3) of more than 50% in the supply market and very few 
really independent suppliers have successfully entered the market.    
Regulators emphasise the need for regional integration of wholesale markets of neighbouring 
countries (France-Benelux, Scandinavia, Germany-Austria, etc.) in order to improve market 
structure.  In this context it is noted that, while progress has been made in allocating scarce 
cross border capacity the total amount, commercially and technically available, has actually 
been decreasing in relation to peak load due to changing generation patterns, increasing peak 
load and a big increase of difficult to predict wind dispatch.  
Regulators also highlight the need for improved monitoring and surveillance of the relevant 
markets in the future as they move from national to regional, noting that special oversight 
provisions for the quite complex electricity markets, which pose a high risk of manipulation 
due to market concentration, are in most cases lacking. For example, when a major generation 
plant is not operating for whatever reason, this may have a large impact on the price in either 
wholesale or balancing markets. Unless such information is released at the same time to all 
participants, it may be that the owner of that plant will have a temporary advantage. If such 
events happen frequently, there may be a systematic advantage to those suppliers which have 
privileged access to such information. Regulators’ experience shows that it is not certain that 
ex post control of abusive behaviour will be sufficient to guarantee an adequate level of 
information in the market. Therefore they argue that there is a need for equal access by all 
market participants to all relevant information from generators and/or TSOs as a prerequisite 
for a high level of confidence in the market.  Regulators note that while information access for 
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TSO information has improved, progress for generator information is still insufficient in many 
markets (one major exception being Nordpool). 
Regulators also consider that effective markets, close to real time, potentially increase 
efficiency. Although some countries, as their markets develop, have already introduced intra-
day markets (Spain, France, UK, Scandinavia), these markets are often regionally restricted. 
Further integration of these markets is thought necessary.  
4.4. Comments of Stakeholders 
Consumer groups are particularly critical of the degree of market concentration for both 
electricity and gas at national level. This, in their view, is making a viable level of 
competition impossible meaning that the promised benefits of competition to consumers are 
not materialising. Large users are critical of the trading arrangements that have been 
established in many Member States, which they argue encourage collusion – especially in the 
light of a high level of integration between producers and retail supply companies. They cite 
the significant increase in wholesale prices since 2002, which have been compounded by the 
introduction of emissions certificates, the price for which has been passed directly into the 
wholesale price. Large users are also critical, for example, of measures to allocate capacity by 
auction based methodologies and consider that more effort should be made to reduce price 
differentials between Member States through other means. Public sector unions suggest that in 
the light of these issues, that tight controls should remain on end user prices, especially for 
household users – or even that market opening should be postponed. 
Insufficient transparency and disclosure by dominant market players is a problem cited by 
both consumers and many other respondents including energy traders, smaller suppliers and 
market operators / power exchanges. It is argued that rules similar to those prevailing on other 
financial markets need to be considered. 
The established electricity companies argue that the degree of concentration is reducing in 
some Member States and dominant incumbents are being challenged. They maintain that 
market opening has delivered significant price reductions, although these have often been 
concentrated on small and medium sized businesses which tended to have rather higher prices 
under the previous regulated regime. They see the solution to outstanding issues through the 
development of liquid wholesale markets at regional level, with a high degree of 
harmonisation between the regulatory frameworks across Member States. Some energy 
companies suggest that the required level of harmonisation can only be achieved through 
strong measures at European level on the subject of market design, nomination timetables and 
system operation, and that the current rate of development is not adequate.  
Market operators and exchanges highlight the need for a more active demand side in price 
formation from all users implying more “time of day” charging and sophisticated metering 
arrangements. This would allow consumers to respond more effectively to changes in price 
levels and dilute the potential effect of distortions. They argued for a legal recognition of 
market operators with minimum transparency requirements. Several individually established 
electricity companies also supported stricter transparency measures. 
As already noted, the dominance of established companies in wholesale and balancing 
markets is seen as a significant barrier by smaller companies, traders and new entrants. For 
both electricity and gas, the chance of being exposed to high imbalance charges is seen as a 
clear risk to enter markets and a major obstacle.  Smaller suppliers consider that capacity 
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release through virtual power plant arrangements, or structural measures such as divestment 
as necessary to ensure real competition. The introduction of emission trading is also seen by 
new entrants as having a negative impact on competition. The fact that established energy 
companies were allocated a large quantity of certificates free of charge represents for many a 
large transfer of wealth from the energy using industries to the existing energy producers. 
Others consider that this constitutes a state aid. 
4.5. Assessment  
It is rather difficult to make a general assessment of performance in creating a “complete and 
fully operational internal market” in the manner required by the Directive. It can be stated that 
some competition exists and that customers have seen some benefits as a result. At the same 
time, it would be over optimistic to describe the current situation as “fully operational”.  
In general, it does appear that competition has yielded significant benefits to the EU economy 
in the form of a more efficient electricity sector and somewhat lower price. The study by 
Copenhagen Economics discussed in the forthcoming 2005 SGEI report, reveals that progress 
in market opening is a statistically and economically significant determinant of price 
reductions. In electricity, prices are estimated to be 10-20% lower than they would have been 
without liberalisation. The degree of unbundling of the transmission system operator would 
appear to be one of the most significant statistical determinants of this result. 
However, concerns relating to market dominance have clearly not been resolved and the 
current developments in price levels have led to the behaviour of the main producers and 
suppliers being questioned, particularly by large customers. The suggestion that large users 
are being driven, against their wishes, toward shorter term contracts based on volatile 
wholesale prices, is clearly of concern since it is indicative of a market that does not fulfil the 
basic requirement of responding to customers’ needs.  
In order that consumers have confidence in the market opening process, there must be an 
assurance that prices are being determined through a competitive process without any 
perceived abuses of dominant position or suspicion of any form of collusion between 
producers or between suppliers. This requirement is not being met at present since the way 
that wholesale prices are determined is usually insufficiently transparent.  
As well as the structural measures such as divestment, or capacity release which Member 
States should be encouraged to continue, another key issue is the question of clear rules on the 
adequacy of information that the generator, market operator or TSO should be required to be 
released, on an equal basis to all participants. In wholesale markets which, as already 
demonstrated, are highly concentrated, and which have special features such as the need to be 
consistently in balance, there is a case for arguing that the information provided by market 
participants should be far more detailed for electricity generation companies than other 
markets in order that any suspicion of manipulation of the market can be ruled out. One model 
that could be applied in this context is the system imposed by Nordpool as market operator in 
the electricity sector in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. The sectoral inquiry has been 
set up by the Commission to examine these issues in detail. The results of this work will form 
a key part of future developments of the functioning of electricity markets. 
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5. PRICE DEVELOPMENTS AND COMPETITION ISSUES - GAS 
5.1. Background 
The natural gas market at the European level is characterised on the one hand by a 
considerably growing demand and on the other by declining indigenous production entailing 
rising import requirements. Currently, 45% of European gas consumption is domestically 
produced, while the balance has to be imported from external sources.  
Indispensable prerequisites for a competitive European natural gas market are sufficient 
availability of volumes of gas, as well as non-discriminatory and transparent access conditions 
to the network or, in other words, the complete absence of operational barriers. Liquid hubs 
and inter-regional hub-to-hub trading as well as more and more increasing decoupling of 
physical from contractual flows of gas would also represent constitutional elements of such a 
picture.  
Against this background, the opening up of the European gas market to competition has not 
brought about genuine changes of historical supply patterns or a considerable move towards 
more competition and hub trading allowing free multi-lateral trade of commodity and capacity 
in the market. Hub-to-hub trading for the optimisation of supply and customer portfolios 
across borders as well as effective exploitation of market opportunities does not exist at all. 
With the exception of very few hubs in the North-West of Europe, liquidity at hubs remains 
very limited. Those Member States with a high share of domestic production in overall 
national consumption or alternatively with a high share of LNG imports may benefit from 
more competitive markets provided these features are underpinned by a conducive regulatory 
framework. The growing role of LNG for the European gas supply in the future might 
gradually contribute to further improvements in this respect. 
As for most other Member States, the level of liquidity in terms of commodity remains 
basically unchanged and progress towards competition is moving very slowly, if at all. While 
in most of the new Member States, almost exclusively supplied by only one external supplier, 
the prospects for enhancing liquidity of gas and thus competition may remain slim for the 
time being, the potential for competition on the mature markets of the old Member States does 
not yet seem to be exploited. Full and consequent implementation of the Gas Directive as well 
as complementary legislation, such as the new Regulation on access conditions to the gas 
transmission network finally adopted by the Council on 12 July 2005 might bring about 
improvements in this respect. 
5.2. Current Situation 
5.2.1. Market structure: production/import of gas 
As demonstrated by Table 5.1, the structure of the wholesale market still reveals a high level 
of concentration. In a few Member States, such as Belgium, Italy and France for example, the 
high level of concentration concerns the whole gas supply chain
34
. An exception to this rule 
might be Spain, where the incumbent still holds 43% of the free market, while competing 
suppliers  with 17% and  9% (the latter being a foreign company) present a relatively 
                                                 
34
  The figure in the table for Italy is to some extent misleading, as it does not reveal the fact that the 
market shares lost by the incumbent have been gained by companies which bought their gas outside 
Italy from the incumbent. 
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balanced market structure, if compared to markets in most of the other Member States. In 
Germany and Austria, the historical supply areas have been broadly maintained putting aside 
the entrance of one small newcomer on the German market at the beginning of the 1990s.  
An additional consolidating effect playing in favour of incumbent companies wishing to hold 
their market shares without competing effectively may be seen in the acquisition of equity 
cross holdings. In some Member States, such as Germany and Austria incumbent supply 
companies have acquired stakes in distribution companies thereby securing these companies 
as customers on the wholesale market often through appropriate representation in the board of 
the acquired company. Due to the structure of the national gas markets, such a strategy might 
not be necessary in other Member States, where only one, usually state-owned company, held 
the majority of assets along the whole gas chain, as for example in France.    
Table 5.1 Market Structure in Import and Production of Gas – Position end 2004 
Total consumption 
(bcm/year)
Number of companies 
with 5% share of 
production\import  
capacity
Number of companies 
with 5% share of 
available gas
Share of 3 largest gas 
shippers in wholesale 
market
Liquidity multiple             
spot trading/ total 
consumption
Liquidity mulitple              
term trading/ total 
consumption 
Austria 9 2 4 80% 3% -
Belgium 17 2 2 - 229% -
Denmark 4 2 2 97% - -
France 61 2 2 98% - -
Germany 102 5 10 ca. 80% - -
Ireland 4 5 5 84% - -
Italy 80 3 3 62% - 7%
Luxembourg 1 1 - - - -
Netherlands 48 1 1 85% 5% 175%
Spain 27 4 4 73% - -
Sweden 1 1 5 78% - -
UK 105 7 7 36% 10% 540%
Estonia 1 1 - 100% - -
Latvia 2 1 1 100% - -
Lithuania 3 4 - 92% - -
Poland 8 1 1 100% -
Czech Rep. 10 - - - - -
Slovakia 6,5 1 1 - - -
Hungary 14 2 1 100% - -
Slovenia 1 1 1 100% - -
source: Regulators data  
In many EU Member States, new licenses or respective authorisation for the supply of gas 
have been issued to new suppliers. In some Member States, there are companies from other 
EU or non-EU Member States active on the market. However, with one exception in Germany 
and Spain respectively, their market share remains modest.  
In order to stimulate competition and enhance the liquidity on the market, a number of gas 
release programmes has been carried out in different Member States in recent years. They 
often followed merger decisions or as a consequence of decisions from relevant national 
antitrust or regulatory authorities. The most prominent examples in this respect are gas release 
programmes following the Eon/Ruhrgas merger in Germany, the Econgas merger in Austria, 
the Marathon case dealt with by the Commission in cooperation with the French regulator 
CRE and the Blugas antitrust case dealt with by the Italian competition authority. Another gas 
release programme may be carried out in 2006 in Belgium. In general, however, the overall 
effect of the gas release programmes has been limited for different reasons: sometimes they 
suffer from insufficient access conditions to the network or a lack of capacity to transport the 
gas. In other cases, higher price levels in adjacent markets may have restricted the desired 
effect for the domestic market. However, a rather positive example for gas release 
programmes can be seen in Spain, where suppliers with a market share of more than 50% 
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have been excluded from the bidding procedure. Six companies have been awarded the gas 
released and subsequently stimulated competition on the Spanish market. 
Once liquidity has been improved, trading hubs can play an important role in promoting gas 
trade and competition on the gas market. Apart from the wholesale market in the UK, which 
is based on bilateral trading at the NBP (“national balancing point”), markets on the Continent 
are mainly based on long-term contracts. However, over recent years, some new hubs, such as 
the Zeebrugge hub, and also the TTF in the Netherlands are gradually developing. Other hubs, 
such as the Eurohub,  the Baumgarten hub, the PEG in France or the Virtual Trading Point 
(VTP) in Italy seem still to suffer from a lack of liquidity of either capacity or commodity and 
are not yet sufficiently transparent, in order to create a competitive impact to the markets 
concerned. In some cases, where hub-to-hub trading could develop, specific problems may 
prevent it. An example for this would be the vTn line in Belgium, where gas quality 
specifications do not allow carrying out trading between the adjacent hubs.  
Lack of capacity is likely to constitute an entry barrier to newcomers and thus significantly 
restrict liquidity and the potential for competition on the European natural gas market. Very 
often, long-term supply contracts underpinned by long-term capacity bookings prevent 
newcomers to book the capacity they need in order to successfully enter the market. While 
there might not be a short-term remedy in the case of physical congestion of the capacity 
concerned, contractual congestion seems to exist at many cross-border points and within 
Member States. Ensuring the efficient use of this capacity by applying effective use-it-or-lose-
it rules represents a solution in this respect.  
Against this background and with a view to providing clarification, it is important to note that 
due to the new regime established by the gas Directive a distinction must be made among the 
following types of long-term contracts: 
– long-term supply contracts concluded between a producer/exporter of natural gas on the 
one hand and an importer/wholesaler of natural gas on the other; such a contract might be 
considered an upstream (supply) contract; it does not involve a system operator;  
– long-term supply contracts concluded between an importer/wholesaler of natural gas on the 
one hand and a retailer/final consumer of natural gas on the other hand; such a contract 
might be considered a downstream (supply) contract; it does not involve a system operator; 
– long-term transportation contracts concluded between network users and system operators 
underpinning both upstream supply contracts and downstream supply contracts. 
Transportation contracts always involve system operators on the one hand, while it might 
be subject to the contractual arrangements laid down in the supply contracts, which party 
of the supply contract in question has to contract the respective transportation capacity. 
In addition, the gas Directive establishes the right for a (large) final customer to contract his 
gas directly with the producer/exporter, also on a long-term basis. This possibility should also 
not be neglected when talking about "long-term contracts". Such a commercial arrangement 
would entail at least one supply and one transportation contract. 
The Commission is currently examining the impact and consequences emerging from these 
different types of long-term contracts on the well functioning of the internal market for gas. 
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There is currently evidence that some long-term downstream contracts contain explicit 
contractual arrangements hindering competition. For example, they often contain clauses 
binding the customer to one supplier. Competition authorities, such as the Bundeskartellamt 
in Germany, are currently investigating the foreclosing effect of such contracts. Another case 
is currently pending with the Commission.  
5.2.2. Market structure: retail supply 
The retail market is to a considerable extent characterised by regulated prices. For the small 
commercial and household sector, they exist in 13 Member States, while some Member States 
(Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Spain, France) apply them across the whole retail market, 
i.e. in all customer segments. While in Hungary, Latvia and Poland all customers pay the 
regulated price, only a small minority of industrial users and power plants in Spain did not 
turn yet to the free market (3.4% of power plants and 2% of the large industrial user segment). 
In France, however, only 1% of the eligible customers representing 27% of eligible gas 
consumption have used their right to change supplier. Only five Member States (Austria, 
Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, UK) do not regulate at all end-user prices.  
As a consequence, competition for households based on gas prices could only take place in 
these Member States. However, as for Austria and Germany, albeit 100% open by law, it is 
safe to say that traditional suppliers have almost fully maintained their respective supply area 
and market share or in other words, competition for households does not exist. Competition 
for households does so far only exist in the UK and to a lesser extent in Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Spain, where the number of small customers turning to the free market 
recently has increased. 
Across the European gas market, the level of competition for retail customers is generally 
modest, if measured against the market share of non-incumbent suppliers or newcomers. 
Table 5.2 below shows that despite a number of newcomers on the various national markets, 
the market share of the three largest companies – in most cases incumbent companies – is 
often above 90% or corresponds broadly to the market share pre-liberalisation. Even in the 
UK with the most competitive retail market, the three largest suppliers account for 77% of the 
entire retail market. Corresponding figures in Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands 
and Spain would be in the same order. A remarkable difference, however, can be identified on 
the Spanish market, where 24 suppliers are not only registered, but have acquired a countable 
market share in the free market. As for Germany, the extent of retail competition is not 
entirely clear. According to information submitted to the Commission, there are nine 
independent suppliers active on the market, of which one takes the view to have acquired 
nearly 50% of all customers switching gas suppliers. If this is true, retail competition in 
Germany remains tiny bearing in mind the annual turnover of this company.  
 EN 58   EN 
Table 5.2 Structure of Gas supply market – position end 2004 
Companies with market 
share over 5%
Number of fully 
indepdent suppliers 
(no network affiliates)
Market share of 
largest 3 companies 
power plants
Market share of 
largest 3 companies 
large industrial users
Market share of largest 3 
companies small/medium 
businesses
Market share of largest 3 
companies very small 
commercial/household
Austria 4 6 - - - -
Belgium 3/5 12 / 8 - 100% / 90% 100% / 99% 99% / 100%
Denmark 3 2 100% 92% 100% 100%
France 2 8 - - - -
Germany 1 9 - - - -
Ireland 3 8 91% 100% 100% 100%
Italy 5 110 80% 54% - 33%
Luxembourg 4 1 99% 95% 93% 93%
Netherlands 3 5 - - - 83%
Spain 5 4 - 72% 77% 90%
Sweden - - - - - -
UK 6 8 56% 53% 61% 77%
Estonia 1 1 85% 100% 100% 100%
Latvia 1 0 - 100% 100% 100%
Lithuania 2 0 - 100% 100% 100%
Poland 7 0 100% - - -
Czech Rep. 7 0 - 54% 51% 57%
Slovakia 1 0 100% 100% 100% 100%
Hungary 7 0 95% 77% 76% 79%
Slovenia 6 0 - - - -
source: Regulators data
Notes: 
1. Belgium data Flanders\Wallonia. No data for Brussels region  
5.3. Prices 
5.3.1. Wholesale Gas prices 
Gas prices for both the wholesale market have increased significantly since 2004, as shown in 
graph 5.1.  
Graph 5.1 Development of Wholesale Gas Prices 
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source: Argus Gas Connections 
Subject to further investigations, gas price rises on the Continent might be due to the link 
between oil prices and gas import prices. At the wholesale or import level, usually, the price 
of gas is determined by a price formula embedded in the gas import contracts, in order to 
reflect the competitive situation of gas vis-à-vis other fuels likely to compete with gas. This 
approach is deemed to be a remnant of the time, when gas was introduced to the market and 
had to gain market shares from fuel oil or coal. Today, with a market share for gas amounting 
to approximately 24% of the European primary energy market, the justification of the oil-gas-
price link is less obvious. In view of the physical link between the Continent and the UK 
(UK-Continent Interconnector), continental gas price developments may have influenced the 
gas prices in the UK usually established by the National Balancing Point.   
In the absence of a liquid gas market, characterised by liquid trading hubs, a link between the 
gas price and a potentially competing fuel might always appear at the wholesale market. 
Recent developments, however, have shown that gas suppliers serving end users tend rather to 
reflect rising oil prices, but are more reluctant to pass on decreasing trends in their retail 
contracts with end users. This could possibly also be seen as a proof for a rather monopolistic 
supply structure in the retail market. The extent of these developments, however, may be 
more pronounced in countries with more imports than in countries with more domestic 
production.  
In some Member States, where end user prices are not regulated but fully mirrored the sharp 
rise of oil prices, competition authorities are investigating whether the recent price increases 
for gas would be justified or would represent the abuse of a dominant position. However, it is 
important to note that such investigations would not concern the justification of the link 
between oil and gas prices, but try to figure out whether the price increases to households 
would exceed the corresponding oil price rises or not. Contrary to supply contracts with large 
consumers, the prices of which also reflect prices of competing energy sources, the retailers 
do usually not apply a sliding price formula agreed by both sides, in order to determine the 
price of the gas, but set the price unilaterally in line with what the retailer considers justified. 
In Germany, the cartel offices at federal and regional level are or have been investigating 
more than 110 cases with different outcomes.  
As the example of the UK market has shown, a liquid market may have the potential to 
dissolve the link between oil and gas prices by offering a reference to a competitive gas price, 
as it has been the case in the UK even after the setting up of the physical link to the Continent. 
This presupposes, however, a market that can be characterised as a buyer’s market rather than 
a seller’s market.  
European gas prices may only be de-coupled from oil price developments, once the European 
gas market is liquid enough to provide the necessary incentives to suppliers to sell gas below 
a price determined by or linked to oil. High oil prices would encourage such a move, provided 
the gas can be procured and the necessary regulatory framework allows entering the market 
efficiently.  
5.3.2. Retail prices 
Since increasing during the year 2000, gas prices to end users have followed a relatively 
stable path over the last five years with a further increase in the last year. The graphs below 
set out the main developments by Member State for different consumer groups. 
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Graph 5.2 Gas prices for very large users (selected countries) 
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source; Eurostat data for I5 consumption group - approx 100 million cubic metres (mcm)/year 
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Graph 5.3a Gas prices for large gas users (10mcm/year) “high” 
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Graph 5.3b Gas prices for large gas users (10mcm/year) “medium” 
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Graph 5.3c Gas prices for large gas users (10mcm/year) “low” 
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Graph 5.4a Gas Prices for small commercial gas users (10,000m3/year) “high” 
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Graph 5.4b Gas Prices for small commercial gas users (10,000m3/year) “medium” 
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Graph 5.4c Gas Prices for small commercial gas users (10,000m3/year) “low” 
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One interesting feature is the degree of convergence that now exists for the “very large” and 
“large” user group in almost all Member States. With some exceptions, prices are within a 
relatively narrow range around €13-20/MWh. Larger differences arise for smaller commercial 
users, where the range is €25-40/MWh. 
5.4. Comments of Regulators 
Regulators note that development of the gas market is at a very early stage in most countries 
and that most markets are characterized by a lack of gas supplies for alternative retailers. 
Measures such as developing new sources of gas and initiating gas release programs are 
considered a pre-requisite to effective competition. This is expected to allow for a greater 
range of market participants and the spread of gas trading. Regulators argue that this is 
beginning to be effective in those countries with a significant internal gas supply or with a 
high percentage of LNG with its greater diversity of suppliers; such as the UK, Belgium and 
Spain.  However, European markets are still far away from a situation where, for example, 
independent traders or large gas customers could take advantage of these opportunities to deal 
directly with external gas suppliers. 
5.5. Comments of Stakeholders 
Stakeholders in general do not see any material progress towards the emergence of liquid 
markets. There is a widespread perception that the market in general suffers from a lack of 
liquidity in terms of both commodity and capacity. This is partly attributed to the 
predominance of long-standing contract arrangements favouring the incumbent companies as 
well as consolidation efforts undertaken by incumbent companies acquiring equities of 
customers in order to protect market shares. 
As one of the consequences, newcomers have to buy their gas often at spot markets, which 
according to one company, provide good speculation opportunities for incumbent companies, 
but entails high risks for newcomers. Nevertheless, the spot market often seems to represent 
the only real gas source for newcomers. 
As a possible remedy to the lack of liquidity, many market participants and new entrants 
strongly suggested gas release programmes, as in their view these would contribute to the 
establishment of a liquid wholesale market. Other views call for the establishment of regional 
gas exchanges and restricting the market share of the dominant supplier. 
Beside the lack of access to gas, a number of problems relating to concentration and anti-
competitive behaviour of incumbent companies have been reported and identified as genuine 
obstacles to enter the market. According to some market participants, incumbents would sell 
gas below cost price as a defence measure with a view to keeping competitors out, an 
approach that entails cross-subsidies. If no firm capacity is available, unused capacity is 
offered on an interruptible basis, however, with a prevailing right for the incumbent to use his 
capacity by within-day nominations, attributing an even higher risk to interruptible contracts. 
In single cases, system operators are said to ask for astronomically high penalties if the 
balance is not kept (one example is described in more details below). 
5.6. Assessment 
Those Member States which have been bold in adopting competition have generally seen the 
best results. This is confirmed by the results of the Copenhagen Economics study which 
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suggests that the effect of market opening on prices is highly significant and large for gas. The 
study estimates that prices are 35% lower than they would be in the absence of liberalisation 
for Member States which are well advanced.  
For others, measured against the need of a competitive market to benefit from liquid trading 
hubs including hub-to-hub trading and to see an increasing number of market actors on the 
supply side, a competitive European market is still not in sight. This may be attributed to the 
overall lack of liquidity in terms of gas, but also for transmission capacity. However, as the 
examples of some Member States show a regulatory framework conducive to competition 
could considerably improve the situation,  
As for the European dimension, it is safe to say that historical supply patterns are still very 
much prevalent in most Member States. This goes in particular for those Member States with 
relatively few supply sources, but would also apply to some with a well diversified supply 
portfolio. A development to a more integrated and competitive European market is still far 
from being achieved notwithstanding progress in some Member States. Despite the fact that 
more than 60% of gas in Europe crosses at least one border due to the fact that gas has to be 
transported from the wellhead to the market (transit), cross border trade in the sense of a 
functioning competitive market exploiting opportunities irrespective of national borders has 
not yet become apparent. Remedies might be seen in gas release programmes, provided they 
are properly designed, implemented and underpinned by non-discriminatory and transparent 
network access conditions. They may help to promote liquidity on the wholesale market. 
Similarly, problems with network access and long term transmission contracts should be 
resolved. Member States should impose capacity release or increase the transparency of 
contracts in order to facilitate new entrants. The Gas Regulation will improve conditions in 
this respect by introducing an obligatory set of minimum requirements in this regard.  
Better access and trading conditions to the trading hubs and spot markets would certainly 
encourage direct participation of producers and large consumers and thus enhance liquidity 
and functioning of these hubs. In this respect, the intention of ERGEG emphasising the 
development of hub trading including hub-to-hub trading in the framework of its roadmap 
towards a single competitive European gas market should be welcomed. In this context, the 
sector inquiry launched by the Commission in June 2005 is currently looking into a number of 
key features of the energy price formation. Preliminary findings of this enquiry will be 
published in the first months of 2006. 
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6. EXISTENCE OF NON-DISCRIMINATORY NETWORK ACCESS 
6.1. Background 
Fair and non-discriminatory access to networks is indispensable to a properly functioning 
market. This comprises not only the level of charges for network access but also conditions 
relating to the flexibility for network users to change their contracts, the nomination 
procedures and the level of information provided to network users. In the absence of complete 
unbundling in ownership terms, the necessity for firm regulation of all these conditions has 
been unanimously agreed. Perceptions are important. Companies will not enter new markets 
unless all avenues for possible discrimination are closed off. The Directives already set out 
clearly the role of regulators in this respect. 
Until recently, Germany was the only country where access to the grid was not yet granted on 
the basis of ex-ante regulated tariffs or tariff methodologies. However this will soon change. 
According to the new energy law, which entered into force in July 2005, all network tariff 
fees, including those currently being applied by network operators, require approval by the 
German regulatory authority (Bundesnetzagentur). Network operators must submit an 
application for network tariff approval for the first time within 3 months (electricity) or six 
months (gas) after entry into force of the Network Tariff Ordinances, which specify the 
methodology to be applied. 
Overall, since the technology used for networks is very similar across Member States, it is 
expected that differences, in for example, network tariffs could be clearly explained by 
obvious differences in operating conditions, or by fiscal or accounting technicalities. Similarly 
it is expected that there would not be significant differences in the terms for provision of 
ancillary services, particularly the imbalance prices used by transmission system operators. 
Regarding cross border transactions, Regulation 1228/03 also sets out compulsory rules to be 
followed by transmission system operators for electricity in setting charges for flows across 
borders. Non compliance with these rules can be challenged by network users in the form of 
direct legal action. Unless congestion exists, it should be as easy to transport electricity 
between Member States as it is within a Member State. Even with the existence of congestion, 
it should be possible for network users to expect capacity allocation to be carried out in a fair 
and predictable way which allows for them to manage the risks associate with cross border 
trade effectively. Similar rules for gas will be embodied in the Gas Regulation which enters 
into force next year. 
6.2. Current Situation: Electricity 
6.2.1. Use of network charges 
Ongoing examination of national network charges since market opening suggests that network 
tariffs are on a reasonably convergent path in the different Member States and that regulators, 
in general, have sufficient powers over this item. Table 6.1 below shows that some Member 
States still appear to be outside the normal levels and this needs to be examined closely by 
regulators.  
The isolation of network charges from other vertically integrated business in order to remove 
cross subsidies remains a key focus of the work of regulators in this respect. The degree of 
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separation of costs in order to avoid cross subsidies should improve further now that national 
regulators have taken up their duties in all Member States. 
Table 6.1  Network Access: Electricity
35
 
Number of regulated 
transmission 
companies
Number of regualted 
distribution companies
Approx network tariff 
large users
Approx network tariff 
low voltage 
commercial
Approx network tariff 
low voltage household
Austria 3 133 10 51 53
Belgium 1 26 11 - 51
Denmark 10 120 19 25 48
Finland 1 91 10 26 37
France 1 161 12 40 48
Germany 4 950 9 53 62
Greece 1 1 8 - -
Ireland 1 1 - 48 50
Italy 1 173 9 41 67
Luxembourg 2 10 7 62 72
Netherlands 1 12 - - 40
Portugal 3 13 4 39 37
Spain 1 308 69 34 33
Sweden 1 184 10 17 40
UK 3 17 5-12 11-23 17-34
Norway 1 170 11 25 -
Estonia 1 42 11 31 40
Latvia 1 8 - - -
Lithuania 1 2 6 23 42
Poland 1 14 13-26 48-88 37-50
Czech Rep. 1 327 3 - 36
Slovakia 1 3 6 17 37
Hungary 1 6 2 48 30
Slovenia 1 5 8 38 31
Cyprus 0 1 - - -
Malta 0 1 - - -
source: Regulators data
1. General: data excludes levies related to, for example PSOs and renewables or CHP promotion.
2. Germany: the category Ib is not typical of commerical customers of this size (annual load 1000 hours)
3. In Italy there are 10 companies owning a share of the national transmission network.  
6.2.2. Cross border and inter-TSO arrangements 
A key issue of importance is the necessity to encourage cross border flows of electricity. As 
already noted, concentration is high on an individual Member State basis and, although some 
projects have recently been realised, there is still limited prospect for increasing physical 
cross border capacity. Until recently, arrangements were largely ad-hoc and discriminatory. 
The regulation was supposed to change this and market based mechanisms were to apply from 
1 July 2004. This has not happened in all cases.  
In particular during 2005 it was expected that all congested interconnectors would have 
introduced non-discriminatory market based mechanisms for the allocation of capacity. Many 
delays have been recorded and not all Member States complied with this deadline. However 
significant improvement is expected for 2006 and all EU interconnectors are expected to have 
compliant mechanisms by this date. 
                                                 
35
 Charges are estimated excluding all taxes and levies. Both transmission and distribution charges are 
included 
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This does not mean that the congestion management will be optimal and much will still need 
to be done to increase efficiency, especially greater co-ordination of capacity calculations and 
allocation, as well as the introduction of better methods to allocate capacity close to real time 
such as implicit auctions. The forthcoming revision of the congestion management guidelines 
will allow further progress in these areas. Finally, the recent judgement of the European Court 
of Justice suggests that the reservation of capacity, with a priority right, relating to some 
existing supply contracts is not compliant with the rules of the Directives or the Regulation. 
This may allow for additional cross border capacity to be made available to other users. 
6.2.3. Balancing 
Previous reports have examined the extent to which network users have fair access to 
balancing energy. Imbalance pricing is partly a network issue but also a competition issue 
since indirectly, the electricity concerned is being purchased from other generators. 
Furthermore, any excessive balancing charges may affect adversely the development of the 
market. The Directive recognises the need for ex-ante regulation of this issue and requires 
national regulatory authorities to approve the methodology used by transmission system 
operators to determine imbalance charges. Any market participant who cannot easily match its 
generation portfolio to the characteristics of its customers may find itself exposed to the 
difference between the price at which the TSO will sell imbalance energy, and the price at 
which it will buy back excess production. These prices may either be directly imposed by the 
regulator on the TSO; or alternatively a market based mechanism will be used in which the 
price is determined by bids from other producers to regulate their production upwards or 
downwards. A summary of current practice is set out in Table 6.2. below. 
Table 6.2  Electricity Balancing 
 Market or 
fixed 
prices  
Gate closure Average TSO 
sell price 
 
Average TSO  
buy price 
Spread 
Austria market day ahead 51 24 27 
Belgium hybrid “ex-post” 56 12 44 
Denmark market ½ hour 36 27 9 
Finland market ½ hour 32 27 5 
France market 6 during day  50 45 5 
Germany market 3 during day 70 2 68 
Greece fixed day ahead 44 44 0 
Ireland hybrid day ahead 69 60 9 
Italy market day ahead 102 23 79 
Luxembourg fixed  - - - 
Netherlands market 1 hour 69 28 41 
Portugal fixed 2 during day 58 23 35 
Spain market 2¼-3¼ hrs - - 0 
Sweden market 1 hour 32 28 4 
UK market ½ hour 55 39 16 
Norway market 1 hour 29 29 0 
Estonia n.k. day ahead - - - 
Latvia n.k. 2 hours - - - 
Lithuania n.k. 2 hours - - - 
Poland market day ahead 37 24 13 
Czech R market 1½ hours 51 0 51 
Slovakia n.k. day ahead - - - 
Hungary market day ahead 40 0 40 
Slovenia market day ahead - - - 
Source: Regulators’ data, DG TREN analysis of TSO websites 
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As noted in previous reports, a key difficulty for small market participants arises where there 
is the risk of a large spread between the buying price from the TSO and the selling price. This 
occurs in a number of Member States and is likely to be detrimental to the development of 
competition. A high spread may be indicative of an insufficient level of competition in the 
balancing market which may be dominated by only one or two main generators. Such 
difficulties are made worse where network users are unable to adjust their positions close to 
real time. Greater integration of both intraday and balancing markets would significantly 
improve this situation. 
6.3. Current Situation: Gas 
6.3.1. Use of network 
As shown in Table 6.3, in many Member States, access to the network is based on regulated 
entry-exit tariffs, even if in some Member States the necessary legislation has just recently 
entered into force.  
Table 6.3.  Access Conditions to Gas Transmission networks 
Tariff regime Capacity regime Capacity allocation Anti-hoarding
Austria entry-exit entry-exit fcfs, cgwc UIOLI
Belgium entry-exit entry-exit/ptp fcfs UIOLI
Czech Republic postage ptp fcfs pro rata
Denmark entry-exit entry-exit fcfs na
Estonia na na fcfs na
France entry-exit entry-exit fcfs, Cgwc UIOLI
Germany entry-exit entry-exit fcfs, Cgwc UIOLI, auction
Hungary entry-exit auction na
Ireland entry-exit ptp fcfs na
Italy entry-exit entry-exit pro rata
Latvia na na na na
Lituania postage na na na
Luxembourg na na na na
Netherlands entry-exit entry-exit open season UIOLI
Poland na na fcfs na
Slovak Republic entry-exit na fcfs na
Slovenia na na na na
Spain postage fcfs UIOLI
Sweden na na fcfs na
United Kingdom entry-exit entry-exit auction na
na not availlable/not applicable
fcfs first come, first served
cgwc capacity goes with customer
UIOLI use-it-or-lose-it
ptp point to point
 
 
Transmission
 
source: Regulators’ submissions 
The overall situation has not very much changed compared to the CEER monitoring report 
published in July 2004 at the Madrid Forum. In many Member States, existing entry-exit 
systems have been further developed and adapted to the needs of the market. For example, the 
exit zones in France have been reduced by one, a further reduction by eliminating the physical 
bottlenecks is expected. Belgium has introduced the legislative framework for genuine entry-
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exit tariffs meaning that the various entry and exit points entail different tariffs reflecting as 
close as possible the underlying costs of the physical flows involved at the respective points
36
.  
It is important to note that entry-exit systems have to be consistent, in order to really 
guarantee non-discriminatory access to the systems. This means that not only entry-exit 
tariffs, but also entry-exit capacity systems have to be set up
37
, although it may require some 
time to overcome physical obstacles contained in the various systems as a result of the 
historical development of the systems. It would also mean that the split up of a TSO system 
into several entry-exit zones has to be avoided to the extent possible, as otherwise it cannot be 
excluded that discriminatory elements are introduced through the backdoor. Capacity 
allocation mechanisms are often based on the first-come-first-served principle (FCFS). Only 
TSOs in the UK and Hungary apply an auction mechanism. Although authorities are getting 
increasingly involved in capacity allocation with a view to ensuring non-discriminatory and 
transparent capacity allocation rules, this might not yet be achieved across the whole market 
and is sometimes considered in- transparent and possibly discriminating. A similar 
observation applies with respect to transparency on available capacities. The application of 
the new Regulation on access conditions to the gas transmission network and its practical 
implementation may help to bring about further improvements in these areas by creating a 
consistent European framework in this respect. 
A clear problem with respect to access to the system is contractual congestion
38
. It exists in a 
number of Member States, in particular with well-developed gas markets. While in some of 
them, such as Spain and the UK, effective secondary trading and anti-hoarding mechanisms 
successfully tackle these problems, the necessary mechanisms are not (yet) fully effective or 
prove to be less efficient in other Member States. Secondary capacity markets could also help 
to eliminate or at least alleviate the problem of contractual congestion. So far, however, with 
the exception of the UK and the Netherlands, secondary capacity trading is not transparent 
and only little utilised. Where it is generally possible, for example at the Title Transfer 
Facility, a virtual trading hub in the Netherlands, the procedural requirements for capacity 
trading seem to be quite burdensome. In some Member States, secondary capacity markets are 
not yet permitted by law, but this is said to improve in 2006. 
6.3.2. Transit 
Unlike the 1
st
 Internal Gas Market Directive, Directive 98/30/EC, the 2
nd
 Directive does not 
acknowledge a regime different from transport on the basis of regulated and ex-ante approved 
tariffs. However, pursuant to Article 32(1) of the 2
nd
 Directive,  
…contracts concluded pursuant to Article 3(1) of Directive 91/296/EEC…shall 
continue to be valid and to be implemented under the terms of the said Directive. 
As a consequence, contracts falling under Article 3(1) of Directive 91/296/EEC and which 
had been concluded before the entry into force of Directive 2003/55/EC will continue to be 
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 So far, Belgium applies the same tariffs for all entry and exit points (postage stamp system) 
37
 In a point-to-point capacity system allowing no changes of the exit points, a small shipper faces some 
disadvantages vis-à-vis the incumbent company. He may find it difficult to resell eventually unused 
capacity, since it is bound to certain entry and exit points, while the incumbent company could perform 
internal swaps and enjoys, due to its large customer base, a considerably higher degree of flexibility, 
which would also allow exploiting market opportunities at short notice.  
38
 Contractual congestion implies that not all capacity contracted or reserved is actually used. Albeit not 
necessarily, it might be an indication for capacity hoarding.  
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valid and implemented under the terms applied at the time of their conclusion. Against this 
background, it becomes obvious that for a certain transition period, namely until the expiry of 
these contracts, gas transportation under any of the contracts covered by Article 32(1) of 
Directive 2003/55/EC continues to be executed under negotiated, rather than regulated terms. 
As for all other contracts, it does not matter, whether they concern transportation to domestic 
customer or transportation to non-domestic customers, i.e. transit, they would all fall under 
the new access regime based on ex-ante approved tariffs.  
Member States with transportation flows across the country for non-domestic consumption 
(“transit”) are likely to be Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, France, 
Italy, Netherlands, Poland and the Slovak Republic. This list however might not be 
exhaustive. Current practice in most of these countries shows that this kind of transportation 
continues as business as usual, i.e. under negotiated terms, the only exemption to the rule 
being Poland, where transit tariffs are approved by the regulatory authority. This might be due 
to the fact that there have not been any new contracts concluded since the entry into force of 
the Directive (or at least the Commission is not aware of them) or, due to some specific 
arrangements actually circumventing regulated tariffs
39
, the contracts are considered to be 
legally compatible with the new regime.  
In several Member States, there may be a gap in the legal provisions implementing the 
Directive, since often regulatory authorities setting up tariffs for domestic transportation do 
not have the competence for tariffs concerning gas transportation for non-domestic use or 
transit. Obviously, there are cases where this has led to problems with respect to access to the 
“transit” pipelines, since often incumbent companies control transit pipelines upstream their 
domestic markets, which means that they also control access to the domestic market. Due to 
the currently prevailing regulatory uncertainty with respect to transit matters, they may 
succeed in preventing new entrants from entering their markets, although access to pipelines 
principally is regulated. 
At the last meeting of the EU Gas Regulatory Forum in Madrid on 15-16 September 2005, 
Member States, regulators, TSOs and network users acknowledged the importance of this 
problem  and agreed to conduct an in-depth discussion in the next meeting of the Madrid 
Forum. Against this background, the Commission also pointed out that relevant provisions of 
the recently adopted Regulation on conditions for access to the gas transmission network and 
the 2
nd
 Internal Gas Market Directive also apply to existing contracts (including transit 
contracts). 
In Austria, a considerable number of the requirements identified in the Guidelines for Good 
TPA Practice for Transmission System Operators of September 2003, are implemented for 
most of the Austrian transit pipelines, despite the fact that these pipelines are not subject to 
regulation. 
6.3.3. Use of network charges 
The level of tariff regulation is quite good: almost all Member States have set up access on the 
basis of ex-ante determined regulated tariffs, which have taken effect in all, but one. The role 
and involvement of regulatory authorities, however, is quite different and ranges from setting 
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 In Belgium, all transit contracts are operated and marketed by Distrigaz, which is not the TSO, but has 
contracted all transit capacity on the primary market from the TSO. Consequently, Distrigaz sells the 
capacity on the secondary market, actually under negotiated terms. 
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the tariffs to proposing them. In the latter case, it is usually the respective Ministry, which has 
to approve tariffs or methodologies respectively. Network tariff levels for national network 
uses are reported in Table 6.4 below. These show some rather wide variations which 
regulators will need to monitor.  
Table 6.4  Regulated companies and access charges 
Number of regulated 
transmission 
companies
Number of regulated 
distribution companies
Approx network tariff 
large users
Approx network tariff 
medium commercial
Approx network tariff 
small commercial/ 
household
Austria 5 19 n.a. 8 12
Belgium 1 19 2 6 12
Denmark 1 4 4 13 13
France 2 22 5 9 14
Germany 23 686 - - -
Ireland 1 1 - 19 20
Italy 2 480 2 9 12
Luxembourg 1 4 1 6 7
Netherlands 1 12 - - 5
Spain 9 25 3 12 23
Sweden 2 7 - - -
UK 1 8 2 5 6
Estonia 1 20 1 5 5
Latvia 1 1 - - -
Lithuania 1 6 4 6 6
Poland 2 62 5 11 11
Czech Rep. 1 134 - - -
Slovakia 1 1 - - -
Hungary 1 11 3 4 7
Slovenia 1 17 2 - -
source: Regulators data  
Another important factor in the creation of a European market is the need for tariff regimes in 
adjacent Member States to facilitate cross-border trade and for this reason, to show a certain 
degree of consistency.  
The structure of charges for gas and the flexibility on which terms are offered are also 
important factors affecting network users. This issue has been covered in previous reports in 
the context of the Guidelines for Good practice (GGP) for transmission system operators. The 
forthcoming Regulation will make many of the requirements in the GGP compulsory for 
network operators. The evaluation of compliance will be updated at this point. 
6.3.4. Balancing 
Pursuant to Article 25(2)b of Directive 2003/55/EC, regulatory authorities shall be 
responsible for fixing or approving prior to their entry into force, at least the methodologies 
used to calculate or establish the terms and conditions for the provision of balancing services. 
This provision takes fully into account the importance and role of balancing for non-
discriminatory access. It is for this reason that balancing is laid down in the Directive as a 
regulated business, in the same manner and to the same extent as tariff setting. 
The terms and conditions of balancing regimes could have an immediate impact on the 
capability of a network user to carry out his business successfully or to fail. In some cases it is 
considered that TSO rules still include considerable scope for discrimination, for instance by 
applying strict balancing rules to some but not all network users. Network users subject to 
these balancing rules would be seriously compromised in their competitiveness in comparison 
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to those that do not fall under these balancing rules. Non discrimination is a requirement of 
the Directive and its full application with respect to balancing is therefore indispensable. 
In acknowledging the importance of unbundling rules, the European Regulators Group for 
Electricity and Gas recently drew up an ERGEG discussion paper for public consultation on 
“Gas Balancing” with a view to developing more detailed guidelines for good practice for gas 
balancing. Table 6.5 is taken from this paper. 
It shows the existing differences of balancing regimes in Member States. These differences 
may to some extent reflect the underlying physical and technical features and conditions of 
the systems concerned. They also point to possible inconsistencies and incompatibilities if it 
comes to cross-border trade. For example, in the event that a supplier from the Czech 
Republic with a daily balancing period intends to serve a customer in Germany where an 
hourly balancing period prevails, additional measures rendering the deal more complicated 
must be taken by the parties concerned, in order to allow the supply to happen. A 20% 
tolerance band in France cannot be fully enjoyed, if the upstream side in Belgium only allows 
10%. 
While the decision on the most appropriate balancing system might be a trade-off between 
costs and benefits due to the inherent differences and needs of the systems concerned, 
compatibility of adjacent balancing systems should be aimed at to the extent possible, to 
facilitate the free flow of gas including possible hub-to-hub trading. The consideration of the 
relevant national regulatory authorities and active cross-border cooperation between the TSOs 
concerned would have an important role to play in this respect and could be an area for further 
voluntary agreements or guidelines to be adopted under the forthcoming gas Regulation. 
In several Member States, for example in Belgium, France, Germany, there are multiple 
balancing zones, sometimes within the system of one TSO. Whilst it should not be excluded 
that the underlying reasons are well justified, TSOs and regulatory authorities should strive to 
overcome them and aim at reducing balancing zones appropriately.  
Market based balancing systems, as already in place in some Member States, appear to avoid 
excessive balancing charges sometimes imposed upon system users in non-market based 
systems. In that respect, but also with respect to transparency requirements, market based 
balancing systems are generally deemed to entail less problems and therefore seem to be 
preferred by system users. 
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Table 6.5 Gas Network Access Conditions: Balancing Arrangements 
 Balancing period Conditions set by: Tolerance bands pooling/trading allowed 
Austria Hourly market no ex-post 
Belgium Daily regulator\TSO 10% ex-ante only 
Denmark Daily regulator\TSO 15%/5% of daily quantity ex-ante only 
France Daily Regulator 20% ex-ante only 
Germany Hourly TSO various various 
Ireland Daily regulator\TSO 3% ex-post 
Italy Daily Regulator 8% ex-post 
Luxembourg Daily regulator\TSO 5%/3% ex-ante only 
Netherlands hourly/daily Regulator 13% hourly/ 2% daily ex-post with penalty 
Spain Daily Ministry\TSO no ex-ante only 
Sweden Daily regulator\TSO no ex-post 
UK Daily market no ex-post 
Estonia Daily TSO yes none 
Latvia Hourly TSO 10% none 
Lithuania Daily TSO yes none 
Poland Daily TSO no ex-post 
Czech R Daily TSO yes none 
Slovakia Daily TSO 5% yes 
Hungary Daily regulator\TSO 2-8% none 
Slovenia Daily regulator\TSO yes ex-ante only 
 Source: CEER document submitted to 10
th
 Madrid Forum 
6.3.5. Storage 
In March 2005, in the framework of the Madrid process, ERGEG submitted an advice to the 
Commission on Guidelines for Good TPA Practice for storage operators. These voluntary 
guidelines have been accepted by storage operators, which agreed to implement them from 1 
April 2005. The Commission has asked ERGEG to monitor the implementation of the 
Guidelines and report back to the next Madrid Forum. ERGEG submitted a preliminary report 
which gives a quite complete picture on the state of play with respect to access to storage, as 
required by Directive. 
Pursuant to Article 19 of Directive 2003/55/EC, access to storage facilities may be regulated 
or negotiated. As a consequence, access regimes in Member States vary widely, as shown by 
table 6.6. 
Table 6.6  Access regimes to storage facilities in Member States 
Regulated access conditions Partly regulated access 
conditions 
Negotiated access conditions 
BE, IT, SP CZ, UK, HU, LV, PL AU, DK, FR, GE, NL 
The tables on compliance with the GGPSSO represent only a small part of the overall picture, 
but deliver a snapshot of the current state of play. 
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Graph 6.7  Compliance with GGPSSO in % of SSO 
Compliance with GGPSSO in % of SSO
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
No
n-
di
sc
rim
in
at
io
n
Co
nf
id
en
tia
lity
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
Us
e 
of
 c
ap
ac
ity
Ac
ce
ss
 c
on
di
tio
ns
Bu
lle
tin
 b
oa
rd
TP
A 
se
rv
ice
s
Se
co
nd
ar
y 
m
ar
ke
ts
full compliance
partial compliance
non-compliance
 
It can be seen  that the overall level of compliance is not really disappointing bearing in mind 
the brief time since start of implementation and start of the monitoring exercise. However, it 
has to be noted that in particular with regard to some aspects on transparency, such as the use 
of capacity, but also secondary markets, improvements are required.  
Graph 6.8  Compliance with GGPSSO in % of capacity 
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In general, the rate of compliance seems to be higher in countries where access to storage is 
regulated (for example Italy, Spain, Belgium) compared to a negotiated regime as applied in 
most of the other countries.  
6.4. Comments of Regulators 
Regarding electricity, regulators have few major comments. They consider that the 
implementation of new guidelines on congestion management will considerable improve the 
framework for cross border transactions. For gas, regulators report that non discriminatory 
access to physical transport infrastructure is regularly mentioned as a major problem. Those 
companies which have inherited long term transport capacity, pre-dating market opening, 
appear to be at an unfair advantage. Their view is that restrictions should apply to the use of 
long-term transmission contracts with strict use it or lose it rules. These measures would help 
bring about a liquid secondary trading market and preventing hoarding of unused capacity. A 
higher degree of transparency, as set out in the recently adopted Regulation on conditions for 
access to the gas transmission networks is expected to yield improvements in this area.  
Regulators view gas storage as an important component of a competitive market. Fair and 
non-discriminatory access to storage is crucial if the EU gas market is to function efficiently.  
They consider it questionable that the market for storage and flexibility is competitive and in 
many countries there are not significant alternatives to storage as a tool for flexibility.   
6.5. Comments of Stakeholders 
Electricity transmission system operators consider that, in general, network access conditions 
are fair; although they suggest the cross border arrangements could certainly be improved. 
Some, however, suggest that more consistent rules for balancing mechanisms and associated 
charges are needed. 
Established companies also underline the need for further harmonisation of rules, especially 
for cross border exchanges in electricity. This includes the development of a common 
structure for the intra-day market and compatible balancing arrangements to facilitate trade. In 
their view, this should take place at national, regional and European level according to an 
agreed road-map implemented through the Florence Forum process and with modifications to 
the guidelines as and when necessary.   
Companies trading electricity note the incomplete application of the existing Regulation, 
especially the congestion management guidelines. They underline their support for revision of 
these guidelines to encompass a high degree of consistency and greater flexibility including 
the incorporation of intraday trading. They underline the need for both explicit auctions of 
longer term capacity rights alongside implicit auctions at the day-ahead stage. 
Smaller suppliers and consumer groups agree with the need for greater consistency of network 
access arrangements across Member States. Some suggest this could be better dealt with 
through the establishment of a single European system operator setting tariffs and access 
conditions and managing capacity allocation. Some individual companies, including large 
European market participants suggest that a single TSO with a single regulatory framework is 
needed as that a common market design should be imposed. Some energy traders agreed with 
this assessment. 
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On the gas market, stakeholders’ main concerns with regard to effective TPA to the network 
relate to the lack of transparency and capacity. Very often, it is unclear to network users when 
at least interruptible capacity or short-term firm capacity would be available. While long-term 
capacity contracts are usually not questioned in principle, it has been stressed that they must 
not constitute any kind of discrimination in terms of getting access, as they tend to favour the 
incumbent companies anyway. There is a clear role for regulators to ensure non-
discrimination and transparency in this respect. The operators admit that many challenges 
with respect to non-discriminatory, transparent and fair access to the grid remain, since the 
rules in many Member States are still under development. Access to conversion capacity and 
relevant information also has to be improved.  
Many stakeholders underline that effective third party access is key for a competitive market 
to develop. They identified a number of indispensable requirements, such as effective 
regulators, a sufficient level of transparency, effective UIOLI rules in order to avoid capacity 
hoarding and practical, less burdensome capacity booking regimes.  
Generally, secondary capacity markets are not yet well developed or facilitated by TSOs; in 
one case, for instance, registration of secondary market trade can take up 10 days; it has been 
said that this also goes for lending, i.e. use of unused capacity. 
Capacity allocation systems qualifying as first-come-first-served or similar are said to be 
discriminating. With respect to auctions, it has been highlighted that they entail a number of 
incalculable commercial risks, in particular in markets with lack of liquid capacity markets, 
since often the contract with the customer is concluded before the necessary transport 
agreements are signed. For this reasons, smaller companies entering the market would be 
clearly disadvantaged. 
It is also argued that tarification systems have to be adequate and bring about adequate 
financial compensation for both TSOs and DSOs. Cost reductions emerging from utilisation 
of infrastructure must be balanced with maintaining service quality and reliability as well as 
network integrity. 
There are many complaints about inconsistency of entry-exit systems in some Member States, 
as these systems would be more in line with point-to-point rather than entry-exit systems
40
. 
Principally, tariffs should be based on costs and not entail any cross subsidies, as this is 
usually the case with large postage stamp systems including transmission. In some Member 
States, the postage stamp tariff applied by DSOs is considered excessively expensive, in one 
Member State occasionally amounting to 70% of overall transportation costs, while a 
reasonable figure was said to be 40-50%. In the same Member State, published DSO tariffs 
are said to remain unchanged since 5 years and to exceed distribution tariffs in other Member 
States by 500%. 
Many stakeholders take the view that hourly balancing is deterring new entrants and 
complicates cross-border trade with daily balancing on the other side of the border. They 
advocate moving towards harmonised balancing regimes including daily balancing periods, 
improved information to shippers on their balancing positions and transparent imbalance 
charges reflective of efficiently incurred costs. Market based balancing should be an objective 
and the incumbents should act as market makers. 
                                                 
40
 See point 6.3.1. 
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Some single cases of excessive balancing charges have been reported to the Commission, one 
of them resulting in penalties amounting to € 20,000/hour and € 90,000/per month for a 
transportation contract worth € 3,200/month. 
In general, there are widespread complaints about lack of transparency and effective TPA to 
storage as well as the unbundling rules applying to storage operators. In addition, it is stressed 
that in some cases, flexibility is only available to incumbents, which refuse to sell it on a 
stand-alone basis and thus create major obstacles for newcomers to enter the market. Also 
long-term storage arrangements set up by the incumbent are a matter of concern. Access to 
storage also often creates a problem at the level of DSOs, where also the pricing is considered 
inadequate. Storage users highlight the need for fair access to flexibility also for new entrants, 
as otherwise the incumbent would enjoy a dominant position in the provision of flexibility, 
which cannot be offset by newcomers. Negotiated TPA to storage should only be allowed in 
case of effective competition; otherwise regulated access should be set up. The Guidelines for 
Good Practice for Storage Operators (GGPSSO) should be turned into legally binding rules. 
6.6. Assessment 
Network access conditions are still not demonstrably fair and non-discriminatory across all 
Member States. Indeed in almost all Member States there is at least one aspect of network 
access which is unacceptable for either gas or electricity. These shortcomings, which 
sometimes may appear minor, are nevertheless important since each one creates a perception 
among potential market entrants that they will not be fairly treated in certain circumstances. 
This becomes a severe disincentive to new entrants over time and will be damaging to 
competition.  
Cross border and inter TSO arrangements are still deficient in a number of cases. For 
electricity some arrangements currently breach of European law and companies are acting 
illegally in persisting with systems which do not comply with the Regulation. The same goes 
for regulators which endorse such practices in their decisions.  
The complete absence of operational barriers to enter and exit gas systems including cross 
border is not yet in place. Sometimes, leftovers of the pre-liberalisation period are still 
hindering progress and have to be addressed rapidly and efficiently. While arrangements for 
gas are still being developed, it is clear that, at present, gas cannot easily be moved around the 
European network in a flexible manner. A fundamental requirement of the Directive, namely 
non-discriminatory and transparent access to the network is therefore still missing in many 
Member States. This needs to improve rapidly. Furthermore, the new Gas Regulation brings 
in additional requirements from July 2006 and will need to be applied quickly. 
The two Directives and two Regulations give significant powers to Regulators on all the 
issues discussed in this section; network tariffs, balancing mechanisms, congestion 
management and capacity allocation. This suggests that all the outstanding issues should be 
resolved through the actions of regulators themselves. This may either be done through the 
procedures defined in the Regulation for the adoption of legally binding guidelines. 
Alternatively regulators may enhance the degree of co-operation between themselves and 
each adopts compatible approaches which will maximise the degree of competition. 
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7. EXPERIENCE WITH INDEPENDENCE OF SYSTEM OPERATORS 
7.1. Background 
In the Directive, the requirements are legal and functional unbundling for both transmission 
and distribution system operators. Unbundling is considered necessary for a variety of 
different reasons. As well as the need for fair network tariffs, which do not lead to cross 
subsidies, network operators also play a very important facilitating role in the development of 
the market.  
Transmission system operators have a market operator role in that they provide a default 
market place for electricity to be traded. This is either a formal arrangement whereby the TSO 
itself operates a day ahead power exchange, or through its balancing responsibilities. As 
already demonstrated, the way that wholesale markets are structured has a large impact on the 
success or otherwise of competition. Secondly, TSOs also have control over a great deal of 
market sensitive information. Without strict unbundling in functional terms there is the 
possibility that such information may be distributed unfairly among market participants. 
Finally TSOs also are responsible for safe operation of the system which involves questions 
such as allocation of capacity and determination of the quantity of interconnection available 
for example. These decisions are also likely to affect the development of the market. 
Distribution system operators likewise have an important role closer to consumers. The 
collection of metering data, and the managing of exchange of information in order to enable 
customers to switch supplier, is their responsibility. As for TSOs, the possibility that market 
sensitive information is supplied to affiliate companies needs to be avoided and the switching 
process must be managed in a cost effective and user-friendly manner if competition is to 
succeed. 
The Directive requires TSOs to be set up as separate legal entities and fully independent in 
operational and functional terms. The overall objective of these provisions is to create the 
necessary pre-conditions for non-discriminatory treatment of any party requesting access to 
the network. It is obvious that only a company operating independently of any supply or 
trading interests can be considered to be in the position to guarantee the necessary non-
discrimination, i.e. equal treatment of all network users, including the incumbent, which – in 
the absence of ownership unbundling – often remains linked to the network operator via a 
holding company or a similar construction. 
As for DSO serving more than 100,000 customers, the unbundling requirements of the 
Directive are slightly different. Pursuant to Article 33(2) of the Gas Directive and Article 
30(2) of the Electricity Directive, Member States can postpone the implementation of the 
legal unbundling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) of the Gas Directive and in Article 
15(1) of the Electricity Directive until 1 July 2007. This notwithstanding, functional 
unbundling has to be carried out by these DSOs in the same manner and to the same extent as 
for TSO: i.e. by July 2004. DSOs with less than 100,000 customers, however, can be fully 
exempted from the application of legal and functional unbundling requirements. This decision 
is left to Member States.  
There are a number of features which could reasonably be expected to apply once a network 
operator is unbundled in legal and functional terms complying with the requirements of the 
Directive in particular: 
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• a separate headquarters for the system operator, or at least a restricted area of the 
building, 
• a separate corporate presentation including a separate website, distinctive company 
name implying a network business, 
• separate accounts compiled according to the requirements of the regulatory authority 
responsible for network access and the removal of cross subsidies which are separately 
audited with these objectives in mind, 
• a separate board of Directors, the members of which have has no involvement with 
other parts of the vertically integrated business, 
• removal of situations whereby network companies have an shareholding in supply 
trading, generation or gas production or wholesale businesses. 
The European Commission has asked a consultant to examine a sample of both transmission 
and distribution companies across Member States in order, in particular to ascertain the 
effectiveness of functional unbundling. This study is ongoing and will be completed early in 
2006. In the meantime data has been provided by regulators on a variety of aspects of 
unbundling which are summarised in the Tables below. 
7.2. Current Situation: Electricity  
Table 7.1 Unbundling of Network Operators: Electricity Transmission 
Legal unbundling implemented? Separate Headquarters (Y/N)
Separate corporate 
presentation (Y/N)
Unbundled regulatory 
accounts with 
guidelines (Y/N)
Audit of unbundled 
accounts (Y/N)
Publication of unbundled 
accounts (Y/N)
Separate board of Directors 
without Directors from other 
group companies? (Y/N)
Total rating 
out of 6
Austria yes partly Y N Y Y Y 5
Belgium yes Y Y Y Y Y N 5
Denmark yes and ownership Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Finland yes: state overlap Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
France yes: state overlap Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Germany yes N N Y Y N Y 3
Greece yes: state overlap Y Y N Y N N 3
Ireland yes: state overlap Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Italy yes and ownership Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Luxembourg yes N partly N Y Y N 3
Netherlands yes and ownership Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Portugal yes Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Spain yes and ownership N Y Y Y N N 3
Sweden yes: state overlap Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
UK yes and ownership Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Norway yes: state overlap Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Estonia yes Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Latvia yes Y Y Y Y Y N 5
Lithuania yes: state overlap Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Poland yes: state overlap Y Y N Y Y Y 5
Czech Rep. yes: state overlap N N Y N N N 1
Slovakia yes: state overlap Y Y N N N N 2
Hungary yes: state overlap N N N Y Y N 2
Slovenia yes: state overlap Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Cyprus no Y N Y N N N 2
Malta - - - - - - - -
Total Compliance / 26 24 20 21 19 22 19 16
source: Regulators data
Notes: 
1. Greece: Accounts for the TSO in are available for 2002 and 2003
2. UK: Network ownership in Scotland remains integrated with Scottish Power and SSE
3. Spain: the TSO is partly involved in the cross border sale of electricity
4. "State overlap" where the state owns the TSO and also has a shareholding in one or more suppliers  
Table 7.1 shows relatively good compliance with the legal and functional unbundling 
requirements. Indeed many Member States have moved to ownership unbundling, although in 
some of these cases it is the state which is both a major shareholder of both the TSO and some 
production and supply companies. Other Member States, for example Ireland and Hungary 
have a system where the system operator is a separate company but where the assets are 
owned by a vertically integrated incumbent. This system requires close supervision of the 
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development of the network. Similarly, some unbundled TSOs still do not have an 
independent management board which is a requirement of functional unbundling.  
Table 7.2 Unbundling of Network Operators: Electricity Distribution 
Legal unbundling implemented? Separate Headquarters (Y/N)
Separate corporate 
presentation (Y/N)
Unbundled regulatory 
accounts with 
guidelines (Y/N)
Audit of unbundled 
accounts (Y/N)
Publication of unbundled 
accounts (Y/N)
Separate board of Directors 
without Directors from other 
group companies? (Y/N)
Total rating 
out of 6
Austria no N partly N Y Y partly 3
Belgium yes Y Y Y Y Y N 5
Denmark yes partly partly Y Y Y partly 4
Finland yes N N Y Y Y N 3
France no N N N N N N 0
Germany no N N Y Y N Y 3
Greece no N N N Y N N 1
Ireland no N Y Y Y Y N 4
Italy see note N N Y Y N N 2
Luxembourg no N N N partly partly N 1
Netherlands yes N Y Y Y Y N 4
Portugal see note Y N Y Y Y N 3
Spain see note N Y N N N N 1
Sweden yes N N Y Y Y N 3
UK yes partly partly Y Y Y partly 5
Norway yes N partly Y Y Y N 4
Estonia yes Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Latvia no N N Y Y N N 2
Lithuania yes Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Poland no N N N N N N 0
Czech Rep. no N N Y N N N 1
Slovakia no Y Y N N N N 2
Hungary see note N N N Y Y N 2
Slovenia no N N Y Y Y N 3
Cyprus no N N Y N N N 1
Malta no N N in progress N N N 1
Total Compliance 9 7 11 17 19 15 6
source: Regulators data
Notes: 
1. In Spain, Italy, Portugal and Hungary, the distribution company is also the default supplier. However suppliers to non-regulated customers must be legally unbundled  
Table 7.2 shows a rather less encouraging situation for distribution. Although legal 
unbundling is not required until 2007, it would appear that less than half many Member States 
have failed to implement the basic requirements of management and account unbundling that 
are already required. 
7.3. Current Situation: Gas 
On the basis of the information provided to the Commission by August 2005, legal 
unbundling requirements of TSOs are laid down in the respective transposition laws in 12 
Member States (Austria, Denmark, Germany, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, UK). Some of them have already anticipated legal unbundling in 
the preceding years (Austria, Italy, Spain), while in others, the corresponding laws have 
entered into force not before summer 2005 (France on 1/7/05, Germany 13/7/05).  
In Belgium, the transposition law requiring legal unbundling of system operators will enter 
into force in 2006. However, since functional unbundling has already been embedded in the 
existing law, companies already anticipated legal unbundling on a voluntary basis. 
In seven Member States (Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak 
Republic, Sweden), legal and functional unbundling has not yet been established by law, 
while another five Member States enjoy derogations or are not yet supplied by natural gas 
(Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg, Finland, Greece).  
In some Member States, governments are considering going a step further and implement 
ownership unbundling (Italy) or apply already certain provisions that restrict the ownership of 
network operators (Belgium, Spain) by companies active in the competitive part of the natural 
gas market. Three Member States have already implemented full ownership unbundling of 
network companies (UK, Denmark, Netherlands). 
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Table 7.3  Unbundling of gas transmission system operators 
Legal unbundling 
implemented?
Separate 
Headquarters (Y/N)
Separate corporate 
presentation (Y/N)
Unbundled regulatory 
accounts with 
guidelines (Y/N)
Audit of unbundled 
accounts (Y/N)
Publication of unbundled 
accounts (Y/N)
Separate board of Directors 
without Directors from other 
group companies? (Y/N)
Total rating 
out of 6
Austria yes Y Y N N N Y 3
Belgium yes Y Y Y Y Y N 5
Denmark yes and ownership Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
France yes: state overlap N N Y Y N N 2
Germany partly N N Y Y N Y 3
Ireland no N N N N Y N 1
Italy yes and ownership Y Y Y Y N Y 5
Luxembourg no N N Y Y N N 2
Netherlands yes and ownership Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Spain yes N Y N Y Y N 3
Sweden yes and ownership Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
UK yes and ownership Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Estonia no N N Y N N N 1
Latvia no N N N Y N N 1
Lithuania no N N Y Y N N 2
Poland yes Y Y N Y Y N 4
Czech Rep. no N N Y N N N 1
Slovakia no N Y N N N N 1
Hungary yes Y partly N Y Y Y 5
Slovenia no N Y Y Y Y Y 5
Total Compliance / 20 12 9 12 13 15 10 9
source: Regulators data
Notes: 
1. Germany: not all TSOs are yet legally unbundled, although the largest 5 are  
As Table 7.3 shows, the basic unbundling requirements, legal and functional unbundling 
stipulated by the law, are in place in 9 Member States accounting for a large proportion of 
total EU gas consumption. The gas consumption of those Member States without the 
necessary rules in place would only amount to less than 8.5% while the remaining Member 
States would not have a gas market or enjoy derogation under Article 28 of the Directive. On 
paper and bearing in mind the core markets of the EU, such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands and the UK, the picture would look promising 
with respect to a successful implementation of a fundamental requirement of the Directive.  
However, going more into details, as demonstrated by the remaining columns of table 7.3., the 
picture appears less bright. A majority of TSOs do not seem to run headquarters separate from 
the remaining branch. Only very few TSOs are managed without involvement of Directors 
from other group companies. This raises concerns on whether non-discrimination, equal 
treatment of third parties and confidentiality requirements can be considered guaranteed.  
This impression has been confirmed by the contributions the Commission received from 
stakeholders during the preparation of this report. In some important gas countries, such as 
Germany and the Netherlands, some incumbent suppliers seem still to enjoy preferential 
treatment, for example detailed information, compared to third parties, i.e. other network 
users implying that confidentiality requirements of TSOs are not always met.  
Another example, possibly constituting considerable discrimination of third parties are 
nomination procedures. While third parties have to nominate on the basis of the contracted 
capacity the gas they inject and take off the system on behalf of their customers, this is not 
always the case for the incumbent suppliers. As a consequence, third party shippers may be 
subject to more burdensome procedures implying more costs than their incumbent 
competitors. They may also run into imbalances (input unequal off-take), which in the day-to-
day gas business can never be avoided, resulting in balancing charges which in a similar 
situation the incumbent company would never incur due to the fact that the TSO 
automatically balances the input and off-take of the incumbent.   
While it is difficult to say from the Commission’s point of view, whether such behaviour 
would represent the exception to the rule, it is likely to infringe the requirements of non-
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discriminatory access to the network and confidentiality of the TSO, as laid down in the 
Directive.  
Table 7.4 Unbundling of gas distribution system operators 
Legal unbundling 
implemented?
Separate 
Headquarters (Y/N)
Separate corporate 
presentation (Y/N)
Unbundled regulatory 
accounts with 
guidelines (Y/N)
Audit of unbundled 
accounts (Y/N)
Publication of unbundled 
accounts (Y/N)
Separate board of Directors 
without Directors from other 
group companies? (Y/N)
Total rating 
out of 6
Austria yes partly partly N no audit by N partly 2
Belgium yes Y Y Y Y Y N 5
Denmark yes N partly Y Y Y Y 5
France no N N N Y N N 1
Germany no N N Y Y N Y 3
Ireland no N N N N Y N 1
Italy yes N N Y Y N N 2
Luxembourg no N N N partly N N 1
Netherlands yes N Y N N Y N 2
Spain see note N Y N N N N 1
Sweden no N N Y Y Y N 3
UK yes and ownership Y Y Y Y Y Y 6
Estonia no N N Y N N N 1
Latvia no N N N Y N N 1
Lithuania no N N Y Y N N 2
Poland no N N N N N N 0
Czech Rep. no N N Y N N N 1
Slovakia no N Y N N N N 1
Hungary no N N N Y Y N 2
Slovenia no N N N N N N 0
Total Complaince 6 3 7 9 11 7 4
1. In Spain, the distribution company is also the default supplier. However suppliers to non-regulated customers must be legally unbundled  
It becomes obvious from table 7.4 that unbundling of DSOs is generally lagging significantly 
behind of what has been achieved by TSOs. The reason for that may be found in the Directive 
allowing postponement or exemptions, as explained above. 
Several Member States (Czech Republic, France) intend to implement legal unbundling of 
DSOs not before July 2007, while many Member States fully apply the de-minimis rule .  
It is also doubtful whether the de-minimis rule with a threshold of 100000 customers has to be 
considered appropriate, as a large part of eligible customers are not likely to enjoy the benefits 
of proper unbundled networks providing fair, non-discriminatory and transparent access 
conditions. Few Member States, such as Austria, have lowered the exemption threshold from 
100,000 to a smaller figure, e.g. 50,000. 
As already mentioned, in some Member States (e.g. Austria, Germany), incumbent companies 
hold large, sometimes only minority shares in many of the DSOs. It cannot be excluded that 
influence is exerted by the incumbent on the distribution companies with a view to 
maintaining market shares for the incumbent. 
7.4. Comments of Regulators 
In the view of regulators, effective unbundling is certainly necessary at both the level of TSOs 
for a dynamic wholesale market, and at DSOs level for enabling an undisturbed retail 
competition. Regulators considered that DSOs, which play an essential role concerning 
information exchange and access to the retail market, are still too closely linked to 
incumbents´ supply business in many countries. It is also thought that “soft factors” might at 
least be as important as the traditional formal unbundling issues such as possible confusion of 
small consumers regarding logos, abbreviations etc.   
Many regulators explicitly found insufficient unbundling as a main impediment to dynamic 
competition and that it contributed significantly to the disappointing results in the small 
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customer retail markets. In short, regulators find that in many cases the goal of independent 
and non discriminatory operation of the grid has not been reached yet.  
7.5. Comments of Stakeholders 
Transmission system operators for the electricity sector maintain that, in general, unbundling 
of transmission is compatible with the Directive. However it is acknowledged that Article 10 
of the Directive has been interpreted differently by Member State. They argue that greater 
consistency would improve competitive conditions. Several vertically integrated companies 
argue that the current Directives, if properly and fully implemented, are sufficient. However, 
Nordic TSOs suggest that ownership unbundling has a number of advantages. 
However some network users, especially independent companies and smaller suppliers 
suggest that this assessment is too optimistic, especially for TSOs. In their view, many 
network operators do not comply with the Directive’s requirements. They argue for a strict 
enforcement of the Directives in this regard. Insufficient unbundling of distribution 
companies was seen as problematic and the 100,000 limit was questioned by some companies, 
particularly energy traders. 
Many participants in the gas market have highlighted the importance of effective functional 
and legal unbundling. It would lead to a structure of interests of the TSO geared towards 
offering transport capacities in a non-discriminatory manner, in order to maximise its 
revenues. Against this background, one would assume that a TSO fully unbundled in 
functional and legal terms, would take a proactive approach when it comes to making capacity 
available to shippers. Many shippers, however, take the view that this is very often not the 
case. They advocate explicit obligations on the implementation of legal and functional 
separation involving separate sites and systems for transporters as well as a clear code of 
conduct. 
Some have taken the view that ownership unbundling has to be considered, if inherent conflict 
of interests continues. They argue that ownership unbundling would be best to ensure 
effectively regulated TPA and avoids conflict of interest of the TSO. Without ownership 
unbundling, effective compliance and Chinese wall separation were essential, however such 
measures imposed costs, which would disappear in the case of ownership unbundling and 
would then be more efficient for the TSO. 
Operators underline the need for a clear definition of roles and responsibilities under the new 
market environment. From their point of view, the provisions of the Gas Directive and other 
requirements, such as the voluntary Guidelines on Good Practice for Transmission System 
Operators are adequate to ensure effective independence, while authorities need to take a 
pragmatic view to ensure that cost/reward balance is correctly struck. 
In general, however, there seem to be more problems with DSOs. Albeit required to unbundle 
in operational and functional terms, some network users seem to consider them a further 
serious hurdle for a competitive natural gas market. In general, unbundling requirements 
between DSOs and their supply arms are thought to be insufficient. Network users often 
complained about the difficulties to overcome the last kilometre to the customers: excessively 
high balancing charges, obvious cross subsidisation paid by household customers, network 
subsidies going to the sales department do not support the view that non-discriminatory TPA 
to distribution systems is working properly in all Member States. 
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As for both DSO and TSO, there is a general complaint that compliance reports, as required 
by the Directive are not drawn up and published. As a consequence, network users may show 
a lack of confidence about the level of compliance by DSO and TSO in implementing 
separation and other anti-discriminatory measures.  
Since DSOs very often operate the last kilometre to the eligible customer, the fact that many 
of them are completely exempted from legal and functional unbundling requirements is likely 
to compromise the potential benefits for eligible customers.  
In view of the fact that a considerable proportion of households would not be able to fully 
benefit from a free natural gas market, because many DSOs with less than 100,000 customers 
would not need to be unbundled and would thus be able to prevent competitors from 
successfully entering their market, some market participants consider the threshold of 100,000 
customers for DSOs too high, while DSOs underline its importance, as otherwise costs would 
be un-proportionately high. They estimate the costs of unbundling at €3-10 million one-off for 
undertakings with more than 100,000 customers and in addition, increased operational 
expenditures by 10-15%. 
7.6. Assessment 
The tables above, as well as the comments of regulators and stakeholders suggest that 
unbundling is currently not being implemented in a sufficiently robust manner across all 
Member States. In many Member States, it seems as if network operators are still closely 
working with and for the incumbents. A necessary precondition of a competitive market to 
develop and a fundamental requirement of the Directives, namely system operators with a 
structure of interests geared towards offering transportation services is thus still missing in a 
number of Member States. It is doubtful whether these Member States comply with the 
Directives in this respect, even for transmission where the deadline for legal and functional 
unbundling was July 2004. This contrasts with the attitude of many others that have clearly 
decided that they need to go further than the Directive towards ownership unbundling, or at 
least, as a hybrid solution, to have a fully independent system operator with decision making 
powers over investments, even if the ownership of the network remains in a vertically 
integrated group. 
The implementation of functional unbundling for distribution companies, also required by 
July 2004, remains highly deficient in practice. Very few Member States have established 
management unbundling as required by Article 15(2) of the electricity Directive and Article 
13(2) of the Gas Directive. Again, these shortcomings in some Member States contrasts with 
those taking bold measures to ensure competition, notably the Netherlands, which favour full 
ownership unbundling for both transmission and distribution. Arguably this solves a number 
of issues discussed above in one single stroke. Unless Member States take stronger measures 
in this regard, so that the requirements that they chose to put on vertically integrated 
companies are fulfilled, the Commission will be obliged itself to take action. 
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8. EFFECTIVE REGULATION 
8.1. Background 
The existing electricity and gas Directives are the first to introduce a compulsory element of 
ex-ante regulation of networks via the establishment of a sector specific regulator. All 
Member States have now established such an authority. The minimum roles and 
responsibilities of the regulatory authority are clearly set out in the Directives.  
However the current Directives allow for a wide degree of interpretation. More than one 
regulatory agency is permitted, for example. It is also possible for the Ministry to take over 
most or all the regulatory functions and for the nominated regulatory agency to play only a 
minor advisory role. However, at the same time, Article 3(1) of the Directives require that 
Member States to ensure “on the basis of their institutional organisation… that electricity 
[gas] companies are operated with a view to achieving a competitive….market in electricity 
[gas].”  
A final set of issues relates to access to information. Regulators may find themselves over 
reliant on the companies that they regulate for information. It is not always clear that they 
have appropriate access to both technical and financial information.  
8.2. Current Situation 
As a result of this flexibility, a high degree of variability exists in the extent to which 
regulators can exercise their functions. From the submissions of regulators and examination of 
current practice it is possible to identify a list of possible shortcomings in the arrangements 
from the point of view of effective regulation of the electricity and gas sectors. The following 
circumstances are seen as potentially problematic in this regard: 
(a) regulators do not directly set tariffs or tariff methodologies and instead only 
have an advisory role to the Ministry, 
(b) regulators are not responsible for setting tariff methodologies for distribution 
companies below a certain threshold with this being done by local government, 
(c) regulators do not directly set balancing methodologies and instead only have an 
advisory role to the Ministry, 
(d) regulators are not responsible for control of access to gas storage, 
(e) regulators do not have the competence for upstream gas production and 
pipelines in terms of surveillance and setting rules on transparency and 
disclosure, 
(f) regulators do not have responsibilities for the surveillance of wholesale 
electricity markets in terms of transparency and disclosure for producers and 
transmission system operators and/or market operators/power exchanges, 
(g) regulators are not responsible for setting end-user regulated tariffs resulting in 
unrealistic levels, 
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(h) regulators are not entitled to ask for basic information on the functioning of the 
market in order to fulfil their reporting duties under the Directive, 
(i) regulators are not entitled to specify clear rules for cost allocation in the 
preparation of unbundled accounts, 
(j) regulators may be unable to allow for incentives to TSOs to make available 
more cross border connection capacity, either through investment or 
operational techniques such as counter trading 
(k) regulators have no input into conditions applied to companies seeking to merge 
– for example the imposition of capacity release for gas or electricity, 
(l) regulators may have limited input into decisions to authorise new generation 
plant or gas infrastructure and on the terms and connections for connection to 
the network, 
(m) regulators may have no say on public service obligations imposed on 
companies especially those that give a selective obligation on an individual 
company that also requires compensation payments or levies, 
(n) regulators may have insufficient ability to enforce their decisions through 
sanctions. 
All these issues create the potential for dilution of a functioning electricity and gas market to 
the extent that decisions taken by authorities other than the nominated regulatory body are not 
fully in line with this objective. Taken individually, these issues may not necessarily imply 
and infringement of the Directive or lead to particular problems. However if several of these 
apply and the consistency of overall regulation of the electricity and gas sector is damaged, 
the requirements of Article 3(1) of the Directives may not be met. The possibility of 
inconsistent regulation between Member States is also an obvious potential obstacle to the 
objective of a single European market. The more government agencies that are involved in 
such decisions, the more likely it is that such inconsistencies are likely to arise and to persist. 
8.3. Comments of Regulators 
Regulators themselves stress the fact that their own independence might be compromised by 
the fact that many energy companies are also owned by public authorities. The fact that 
regulatory decisions have an impact on another branch of government activity often 
compromises their effectiveness in fostering competition. They note the possibility that 
decisions taken by regulators could be overruled by public administrations. In addition some 
of the competences required by regulators in the Directives are in fact taken by another public 
authority, i.e. the government (federal ministry, provincial or local authority) itself. 
Furthermore many regulators’ budgets are part of the state budget and have to be negotiated 
with the relevant ministries. This might imply a regular dependence of regulators on 
ministries’ good will and therefore undermine independence. 
Regulators consider that there are several countries where either independence or 
competences of regulators is/are still insufficient, especially in the area of effectively 
enforcing compliance (i.e. penalties, enforcement). Many regulators say they either do not 
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have the rights to provide sanctions, or that penalties are so low that a cost-benefit analysis for 
companies normally would indicate that non-compliance is very profitable. 
In many countries (exceptions are The Netherlands, Spain, UK) regulators note that market 
surveillance is somewhat blurred by the fact that two authorities (general competition 
authority and sector regulator) are monitoring and controlling parts of the market. There is no 
guarantee that the whole market is covered in that system and regulatory gaps might exist. 
Better formal co-operation on competition issues (clearly set up in national laws) seems 
necessary to use the most efficient instruments to foster competition. Finally it is thought that 
regulatory gaps emerge when dealing with cross border problems. As regional integration 
makes progress, co-ordinated surveillance across the border and also the necessary legal basis 
to close gaps are essential. 
8.4. Comments of Stakeholders 
Transmission system operators in the Nordic region argue that with sufficient unbundling, the 
TSOs themselves can fulfil an important role in proactively encouraging competition and 
monitoring the market. This can allow for a lighter handed regulation. 
Consumer groups in some Member States argue that the powers of regulators are insufficient. 
They suggest that stronger incentive based regulation needs to be introduced so that network 
companies reduce their costs. 
8.5. Assessment 
Most, although not all of the issues identified above are not fully addressed by the Directives 
specifically, although Member State the requirements in Article 3(1) imply the need for a 
certain minimum standard of regulatory independence. As a minimum, regulators should have 
clear powers of the issues covered by the Directives, and with independence from industry 
and government, especially where the state retains a large shareholding in energy businesses. 
Arrangements which fall short in terms of regulatory independence may be inconsistent with 
the Directive. Regulators may also need new powers in order to operate more effectively, for 
example a greater scope for surveillance of wholesale markets.  
Consistency between regulators is of high importance in creating a real internal market. 
Incompatible regimes on, for example, balancing and storage, incentives to remove 
congestion, and on investment will clearly frustrate objectives of a coherent European market. 
Regulators have made this clearing their submission on “regional markets”. Regulators should 
already posses most of the powers that they need to make these objectives a reality. They 
should under the legislation be in a position to deal with, directly or indirectly, network access 
arrangements, balancing, capacity allocation and congestion management. Regulators should 
make maximum use of the powers that they do have in this respect. 
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9. INTERCONNECTION  AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE 
9.1. Background 
Development of a European single market for electricity and gas requires there to be an 
energy network that can easily allow for exchanges between Member States. However 
electricity, and to a lesser extent, gas networks have usually been developed only with 
national requirements in mind. Furthermore, capacities in those interconnections that do exist 
are often the subject of contractual arrangements which predate the introduction of 
competition. This has led to a situation whereby the electricity sector is the only one where 
transport of the product is a serious barrier to the development of a real internal market. 
Furthermore, the construction of new infrastructure is often a very time-consuming process. 
As well as the financial and regulatory issues, there would appear to be more opposition for 
aesthetic and environmental reasons to the construction of new electricity lines and LNG 
terminals than for other large infrastructure projects. It would be over-optimistic to expect this 
situation to be changed quickly. It is therefore of crucial importance to make the maximum 
possible use of the interconnection and infrastructure that does exist through better 
management of operations, greater co-ordination and through strict use-it-or-lose-it 
procedures and  other anti-hoarding measures. 
9.2. Current Situation: Electricity 
Currently the availability of electricity network capacity for cross border transactions is not 
satisfactory either in terms of new investment or in the way existing capacity is allocated. 
Lack of co-ordinated network management is damaging the integrity of the internal market 
and this is clearly limiting the scope for competition and in particular the liquidity of 
wholesale markets as discussed in previous sections. In particular, at present, the network is 
not being planned or operated on a European basis or even regional basis in most cases. This 
often reflects a regulatory gap in that no requirement is placed on authorities to encourage a 
more integrated approach. Certain regions such as the Baltic countries, the Iberian peninsular, 
Great Britain and Ireland all remain rather isolated from their neighbours in terms of 
interconnection. Although some new interconnection projects have been realised over the past 
five years, many of the so-called “key” projects supported by the Commission as highlighted 
in previous reports on infrastructure [2001 and 2003], not all have been realised as set out in 
Table 9.1 below. 
 EN 89   EN 
Table 9.1  Member States with low levels of interconnection  
 
 
Installed  
generation 
capacity 
(GW)
41
 
Import 
capacity 
NTC
42
 
(GW) 
Import 
capacity as % 
of installed 
capacity 
Projects to improve 
interconnection 
Current Status  
Italy 80 6.0 8% San Fierano- Robbia 
 
complete 
 
Portugal 12 0.8 8% Balboa-Sines 
Duroro internacional 
Minho 
Algarve 
complete 
in progress 
proposed 
proposed 
Spain 56 2.2 4% Balboa-Sines 
Baixas-Bescano 
complete 
delayed 
UK 80 2.3 3% UK-NL DC link proposed 
 
Ireland 5 0.3 6% second ROI-NI  
GB-ROI DC link 
agreed 
proposed 
Poland 34 3.4 10% Poland - Lithuania no progress 
Baltic States 
(collectively) 
 
 0.0  0% Estlink 
Poland - Lithuania 
in progress 
no progress 
Source: ETSO data on available interconnection capacity 
A more general problem, applying to all Member States, is that existing capacity is not really 
used effectively. Many of the larger countries, in particular, do not have a sufficient amount 
of capacity made available for cross border transactions, especially those with a rather 
unfavourable national market structure. This situation is improving however, and the 
introduction of new congestion management guidelines, requiring a higher degree of co-
ordination, should imply that more capacity will be made available. Transmission system 
operators are already working towards this objective, in particular by restating available 
capacities to take account of loop flows in the network. The recent judgement of the European 
Court of Justice may improve this situation by making available some capacity that was 
previously reserved to certain network users on the basis of agreements pre-dating market 
opening. 
9.3. Current situation: Gas  
Regarding the gas sector, the degree of interconnection between Member States is usually 
relatively high, but is depending on historical supply patterns. Some Member States, such as 
Spain are relatively badly connected to the European network due to the fact that most of its 
supplies are delivered from the Maghreb region both by pipeline and LNG. But also the Baltic 
States and Finland are not yet connected to the European grid, a fact that is likely to be 
improved, once economic conditions allow. As for Greece, another Member States without 
any gas pipeline connection to EU Member States, the situation may improve once the energy 
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 UCTE July 2003 forecast, Nordel winter 2003-4 forecast, NGCand ESBNG 7 year statement. 
42
 Based on ETSO Winter 2004-05 NTC data, includes capacity from Switzerland and South East Europe, 
excludes Morocco Ukraine and Russia  
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market on the Balkans becomes a reality. Table 9.2 provides a more detailed overview of 
projects currently planned, envisaged or under construction. 
Table 9.2 Key Gas Infrastructure Projects 
Project bcm/yr
Pipeline/LNG Operator new capacity by comments
Connection WAG
TAG ENI yes 6,5 2007
WAG 4,0 2011 planning
Nabucco OMV/MOL/Bulgargaz/Transgaz/Botas 2011
Storage Haidach RAG 2,4 2007
new entry point at Zandvliet Fluxys yes 2 mcm
LNG terminal Zeebrugge Fluxys yes 4,5
Interconnector compressor station IUK yes 15,0 2006/2007
Baltic Gas Interconnector yes na under approval
NOGAT pipeline - Dutch system yes 5,4 2004 commissioned in July 2004
Compressor station Cuvilly GdFT 2009 merger of balancing zones
Euscadour: Interconnection Spain-France TIGF na
Fos Cavou LNG terminal GdF/Total yes 8,3 2007
Increased capacity at Obergailbach GdFT yes na 2008
Interconnector Greece-Turkey yes 6,0 2008
LNG terminal Revythoussa yes 2,4 2008
IR 2nd Interconnector UK-Ireland 2006
TAG ENI yes 6,5 2007
TTGP (Tunesian stretch) ENI yes 7,0 2007
TAG ENI yes 6,5 2011
TTGP (Tunesian stretch) ENI yes 7,0 2012
Brindisi BG Group yes 8,0 2007-2008 authorised
Rovigo Edison-Exxon Mobil - Qatar Petroleum yes 8,0 authorised
Rosignano Edison - BP - Solvay  yes 3,0 modification requested
Toscana offshore OLT LNG terminal yes    3 - 4 at approval stage
Trieste Zaule Gas Natural yes  8 procedure not yet started
Trieste offshore Endesa yes   8 - 12 preliminary stage
Gioia Tauro Società Petrolifera Gioia Tauro yes  4 - 8 modification requested
San Fernandino LNG Med gas Terminal yes  6 - 12 modification requested
Taranto Gas Natural yes 8 procedure not yet started
Porto Empedocle Nuovo Energie yes 8,0 procedure not yet started
Priolo - Augusta - Melilli Erg Power&Gas - Shell Energy Europe yes  8 - 12 procedure not yet started
Dutch Interconnector Gasunie/Eon/Fluxys yes 15,0 2006/7 under construction
Pipeline between Midwolda and Oude Statenzijl 2005 under construction
Pipeline between Noordbroiek and Tripcompagnie 2005 under construction
Pipeline between Grijpskerk and Wieringermeer 2007 under construction
Connection of the Polish and German transmission system na
Wloclwek - Gdynia pipelins under construction
Czeszów - Weoclaw pipeline na
Nowogard - Ploty - Karlino - Western Pomerania na
Lubliniec - Czestochowa pipeline na
Barcelona LNG terminal Enagas yes 5,2 2009 several project under construction
Cartagena LNG terminal Enagas yes 2,6 2006
Huelva LNG terminal Enagas yes 3,9 2006
Mugardos LNG terminal Reganosa yes 7,0 2006
Sagunto LNG terminal Sagunto Regasification plant yes 6,6 2006
Gran Canaria regasification plant Canarias gas transporter yes 1,3 2009
Larrau connection Enagas yes 2008
France-Spain Interconnection Sociedad de Gas de Euskai 0,5 2005
Medgaz pipeine 8,0 2008
Baltic Gas Interconnector Sydkraft Gas et al yes na na authorised, but no decision taken yet
extension of Swedish network Sydkraft, Fortum yes na na planning stage
IUK Zeebrugge - Baction IUK yes  7 - 8 2005/6 under construction
Langeled (Ormen Lange) OL Partners yes 25,0 2006/7 under construction
FLAGS - Statfjord Gassco yes 4,0 2006/7 connection project to be completed
Dutch Interconnector Gasunie/Eon/Fluxys yes 15,0 2006/7 under construction
Isle of Grain LNG terminal NGT yes 4,4 2005 commissioning
Isle of Grain LNG terminal NGT yes 10,5 - 14 2008 open season
Milford Haven Dragon LNG Petroplus/BG/Petronas yes 6,0 2007/8 TPA exemption secured
Milford Haven South Hook LNG Qatar Petroleum/Exxon Mobil yes 10,5 2007/8 TPA exemption secured
Storage projects yes 3,8 -2010 various
Member 
State
expansion
AU
BE
DK
FR
ES
SW
UK
HE
IT
NL
PO
 
It is often said that over 60% of gas used in the European Union crosses at least one border. 
While this may be true, it gives, however, a very misleading impression of degree of 
integration of the European market since often the transport routes in question are reserved for 
only one or two network users. Network users have limited flexibility to change their 
traditional pattern of flows in the network and therefore limited opportunity for competition 
between the main companies. The same applies to the prospect for new entrants who find that 
there are only a few points in the network where capacity can be made available.  
9.4. Comments of Regulators 
Regulators argue that TSOs need to be incentivised to ensure that available cross border 
capacity is utilised, and expanded, where necessary.  Gaps in the current arrangements will 
need to be addressed to ensure that required cross border investment takes place and that the 
costs of such investment is appropriately reflected onto those who will benefit from such 
investment.  In addition, they note that closer TSO co-operation and co-ordination, for 
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example in areas such as system planning and emergency operation, will provide clear 
benefits but will need to take place under an appropriate regulatory framework.  Regulators 
argue that changes to the current legislative framework may be required, for example, to 
permit compatible planning standards and shared funding arrangements for cross-border 
infrastructure investment. 
9.5. Comments of Stakeholders 
Transmission system operators noted the long timescale that is needed to carry out investment 
in overhead high voltage lines. Although they point to some progress in recent projects, they 
also stress the need to be realistic about how quickly such projects can be put into practice. 
They also note that price differentials that exist today are unlikely to be a permanent feature 
and that investment which might appear beneficial on the basis of current condition could end 
up being superfluous. A clear demonstration of cost effectiveness is needed in their view. 
TSOs also note that the internal market is bringing new challenges to network management 
and that there is often little incentive for TSOs to make available an increased amount of cross 
border capacity from existing infrastructure. Indeed, they argue that considerable additional 
risks are placed on TSOs under the current regulatory framework.  
Nordic TSOs suggest that the potential for increasing cross border capacity through counter-
trading is not fully exploited at present. Most companies trading electricity strongly agreed 
with this assessment. Many electricity companies also highlighted the need for co-ordinated 
network planning, at least at regional level. 
Gas transmission companies note that large parts of the existing European network were 
constructed on the basis of long-term arrangements with huge upfront investments. They 
consider that these existing contracts must not be challenged and, moreover they consider that 
future projects should be undertaken on a similar basis through the use of exemptions from 
third party access.    
Other stakeholders challenge these views in differing degrees. Many argue that the lack of 
incentives on TSOs to invest may come from an insufficient degree of unbundling from 
associated supply companies. They suggest, for example, it can hardly be expected that a 
TSOs would invest in a connection that would bring more competition to its affiliated 
company. Some stakeholders also criticise the idea of using exemptions, especially for gas 
infrastructure. They note that exemption that have been allowed for are damaging the liquidity 
of the gas market in particular and will discourage or block new entrants. The suggestion of 
many smaller companies and consumer groups for an independent European grid co-ordinator 
is also relevant in this context. The technical limits to the use of interconnection are not 
usually threatened and there is rarely a need to constrain the freedom of network users as 
regards their nominations to transport gas. Instead the difficulties in transporting gas more 
often arise from the failure to use capacity effectively.  
9.6. Assessment 
As discussed above, there remains something of a regulatory gap on issues relating to cross 
border investments. This has only been partially addressed by the Directive on Security of 
Electricity Supply and Infrastructure. It is clear that the degree of market integration could be 
improved significantly, even without any new investment taking place. This would require 
TSOs to be given suitable incentives to change their operating practices in order to make more 
cross border capacity available. It also requires tighter regulation of the treatment of existing 
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capacity reservation for both gas and electricity. The recent judgement of the Court of Justice 
may have implications in this respect. Meanwhile, the construction of new infrastructure is 
likely to continue to develop relatively slowly without a high degree of political commitment.  
One area which could develop more quickly is the development of improved methodologies 
for calculating capacity available for electricity. Regulation 1228/03 gives the Regulators 
powers of approval for capacities and a coordinated approach to give incentives to TSOs to 
increase their level of co-operation and to make more capacity available could be 
implemented under current legislation. Regulators are encouraged to work towards this 
objective. 
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10. SECURITY OF SUPPLY SITUATION 
10.1. Background 
In a competitive market, generation capacity for electricity and production and import of gas 
will, normally, no longer be planned and implemented as a result of regulatory decisions. It is 
therefore necessary, instead, to monitor closely the trends in supply and demand for electricity 
and gas. This is a requirement of the Directive. Close monitoring is necessary since 
competitive markets inevitably have somewhat tighter margins. Indeed avoiding expensive 
over-investment is one of the benefits of introducing competition. Such a situation is not 
necessarily problematic provided that there is enough flexibility to respond to unexpected 
events.  
As well as these issues, the question of operational network security is also a key feature of 
the new market arrangements. Transmission system operators are now required to interact 
more closely to ensure that network flows can be handled in a secure way as part of their 
regulated activities. Networks, both distribution and transmission, also need to be maintained 
and renewed in order to ensure an ongoing high level of customer service in this respect. 
10.2. Current situation: Electricity 
10.2.1. Supply Demand situation 
The most recent data show that the supply demand balance position is, in fact, developing 
favourably in most Member States. It is not the case that companies are failing to invest in the 
competitive market and the situation in Member States such as Spain and Italy are much 
improved on two years ago. Table 10.1 overleaf summarises the information contained in the 
most recent ETSO and UCTE reports. The important indicator is the figure for “remaining 
capacity” which sets out the extent to which reliably available capacity exceeds a forecast for 
maximum load. The figure for “reliably available generation removes intermittent generation 
plus a proportion for outages, maintenance and system reserve.  
Although some Member States show negative figures, such as Belgium, this situation is not of 
concern provided there are neighbouring Member States with sufficient spare capacity and 
sufficient transmission lines are available. There is no reason why individual Member States 
need to be 100% self-sufficient at all times although, as demonstrated in previous incidents, 
enough reserve capacity needs to be available to deal with some disruption of the network.  
This table demonstrates improvements in the supply demand position which has taken place 
since 2003 during which a number of difficulties were recorded relating to supply-demand, 
particularly during the heatwave in central Europe that summer. Construction of new capacity 
in, for example, Italy means that the degree of reserve capacity is now substantially better. 
Some improvement is also expected in the Nordic region. Data for 2007 at regional level 
show that a reasonable margin is being maintained in most areas well in excess of the 5% 
figure recommended by UCTE for example. Meanwhile regions such as the UK and the 
Nordel system can either served by imports from outside the EU, or through the return of 
“mothballed” capacity. 
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Table 10.1  Electricity Security of Supply 
MW Peak demand 
recorded (date) 
 
 
A 
winter/ 
summer 
peak 
 
b 
Total 
generation 
capacity 
 
c 
“Remaining 
capacity” 
UCTE 
definition 
2006 
forecast 
“Remaining 
capacity” 
UCTE 
definition 
2007  
forecast 
Austria
43
 8 962 (16/12/04) W 18 300 55%  
Belgium 13 708 (20/12/04)  W 14 600 -5%  
Denmark 6 480(?) W 12 710 -  
Finland 14 040 (02/01/03) W 16 488 -  
France 86 000 (21/02/05) W 112 900 13%  
Germany 77 200 (16/12/05) W 114 800 10%  
Greece 9 510 (02/08/05) S 11 000 -3%  
Ireland 4 528 (20/12/04) W 6 400 - 3% 
Italy 54 100 (28/06/05) S 90 800 13% 6% 
Luxembourg 994 (18/11/04) W 1 700 75%  
Netherlands 15 601 (21/12/04) W 21 100 5%  
Portugal 8 261 (09/12/05) W 11 800 17%  
Spain 38 980 (21/07/05) S 64 800  18%  
Sweden 27 000 (22/01/04) W 33 551 -  
UK 54 100 (13/12/04) W 75 700 - 3% 
Norway 23 050 (05/02/01) W 28 327 -  
Estonia  1 475 (?) W 2 200   
Latvia  1 234 (?) W 2 164    
Lithuania  2 000 (?) W 5 000   
Poland 21 146 (23/12/04) W 32400 30%  
Czech R 10 157 (16/12/04) W 16 300 29%  
Slovakia 4 319 (16/12/04) W 7 700 2%  
Hungary 6 012 (15/12/04) W 7 800 6%  
Slovenia 2 006 (25/11/04) W 2 900 6%  
Cyprus - S    
Malta - S    
      
NB:  REGIONAL DATA    
UCTE main     10% 
Spain+Port     10% 
Centrel     16% 
Nordel     2% 
      
      
Source: ETSO, UCTE and Nordel Power Balance forecasts 
10.2.2. Network performance electricity 
The performance of the network is a key factor affecting the quality of service as perceived by 
final customers and should, therefore, be a high priority. Since regulators set the framework 
for network tariffs, the monitoring of performance is a key part of their activities. The 
information provided in Table 10.2 below sets out the current level of performance reported 
by regulators in this regard. 
Performance clearly varies quite significantly with the average duration of interruptions 
varying between half an hour per customer per year on average, to up to five hours in some 
cases. Of course the level of interruption that can be tolerated is very much the decision of 
                                                 
43 High levels of reserve capacity reported result from inclusion of storage plant capacity of some 6,4 GW.  
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individual Member States. However it would seem to be important that the regulatory 
framework for network operators should not preside over any significant deterioration in this 
regard. 
Table 10.2 Interruptions from the distribution network 
 Average duration 
of interruption per 
customer per year 
(minutes) 
Austria 30 
Belgium - 
Denmark 30 
Finland 103 
France  
Germany - 
Greece - 
Ireland 162 
Italy 180 
Luxembourg - 
Netherlands 27 
Portugal 300 
Spain - 
Sweden 123 
UK 68 
Norway - 
Estonia - 
Latvia - 
Lithuania 190 
Poland 300 
Czech R - 
Slovakia - 
Hungary - 
Slovenia 138 
Cyprus  
Malta  
Source: regulators’ submissions 
10.3. Current Situation: Gas  
10.3.1. Supply Demand Issues 
Table 10.3 below summarises similar information for gas that has been collected from 
national regulatory authorities  and complemented by latest figures from the IEA. The table 
demonstrates that overall natural gas demand in the EU is steadily growing accompanied by 
declining domestic production. Most Member States are eager to diversify their supply 
portfolio, in order to enhance security of supply. LNG is likely to play an important role in 
this respect. 
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Table 10.3 Gas Security of Supply 
Total con-
sumption 
in bcm in
2004
Dom. 
Production 
in bcm 2004
in % of
total 
consumpt
ion
Imports 
from EU
in 2004
in % of
total 
consumpt
ion
Imports 
from Non-
EU in
2004
in % of
total 
consumpt
ion
Import 
capacity 
bcm/yr
LNG 
capacity 
bcm/yr
Austria 8,6 2,0 23% 0,0 0% 7,1 83% 38,7
Belgium 18,1 0,0 0% 6,9 38% 10,0 55% 72,8 4,5
Czech Republic 9,0 0,2 2% 0,0 0% 8,7 97% 54
Denmark 4,2 10,9 260% 0,3 8% 0,0 0% 11,2
Estonia 0,8 0,0 0% 0,0 0% 0,8 95% na
Finland 4,6 0,0 0% 0,0 0% 4,9 107% 6,6
France 45,6 1,4 3% 8,7 19% 34,9 77% 54 15,5
Germany 103,0 19,5 19% 19,4 19% 61,9 60% 192
Greece 2,5 0,0 1% 0,0 0% 2,6 104% 3 1,4
Hungary 14,5 2,2 15% 1,1 8% 10,3 71% 18,7
Ireland 4,3 0,9 20% 3,4 80% 0,0 0% 10,3
Italy 80,2 13,0 16% 8,1 10% 59,4 74% 77,9 3,32
Latvia 1,6 0,0 0% 0,0 0% 1,6 100% na
Lituania 3,0 0,0 0% 0,0 0% 3,0 101% na
Luxembourg 1,4 0,0 0% 1,4 97% 0,0 0% 3,7
Netherlands 47,2 74,7 158% 11,9 25% 0,0 0% 29,1
Poland 15,7 4,5 29% 0,4 3% 9,5 61% 2,2
Portugal 3,8 0,0 0% 0,0 0% 3,8 100% 2,9 5,5
Slovak Republic 6,7 0,2 2% 0,0 0% 6,9 103% 87,2
Slovenia 0,8 0,0 0% 0,0 4% 0,8 94% 4,9
Spain 27,4 0,6 2% 0,0 0% 27,0 99% 11,5 33,6
Sweden 1,1 0,0 0% 1,0 89% 0,0 0% 2,2
United Kingdom 104,7 101,2 97% 3,4 3% 6,5 6% 57 4,4
European Union 508,9 231,2 45% 66,1 13% 259,7 51% 739,9 68,22
import capacity on basis of a load factor of 8300h/yr
 Source: regulators' survey response, GIE website, IEA
 
Figures are only indicative and do not fully match due to inconsistent statistical approaches 
Security of gas supply implies long and short term aspects. Long-term aspects of security of 
supply relate very much to the long-term character of the business. Large upfront investments 
are needed in order to explore, produce and eventually transport the gas to the market, a 
pattern which applies to both pipeline and LNG supply. The new regulatory framework 
emerging from Directive 2003/55/EC requires separation of the network operator from the 
rest, in particular the supply branch of the company. With respect to long-term security of 
supply and the necessary investments to be undertaken, new arrangements may need to be set 
up, in order to ensure the necessary infrastructure investments to be launched, even if the 
operator of the network cannot be the user anymore. The question arises how the network 
operator can make sure that the necessary capacities are available when needed and how can 
they be offered in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner to the market.  
Regulators, system operators and network users would have a role to play in this respect. 
Their roles and responsibilities would need to be accurately defined and adopted to meet the 
relevant security of supply standards. Investment decisions should be determined through 
market signals or, where appropriate, through long-term planning processes. A predictable, 
stable and commensurate environment is also important in this context. 
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While the procedures to arrive at a certain investment decision might now be more formalised 
and might involve more parties not being part of the same undertaking than the network 
operator, they already proved their efficiency. Network operators would be required to 
organise open seasons or similar procedures in order to get the commitments of the future 
users of the infrastructure in question. On the basis of these commitments, which usually 
concern firm contracted capacity, the funds could be raised and the investment launched. This 
may be done under an exemption granted on the basis of Article 22 of Directive 2003/55/EC 
or not. Experience shows that Article 22 may facilitate the necessary investments and 
investment decisions, thereby contributing significantly to the long-term security of gas 
supply. However the strict criteria in the Directive must be fulfilled.  
On the other hand, other examples show that Article 22 exemptions are not indispensable, 
when it comes to increasing existing or building new capacity. Table 9.2 above provides an 
overview of all projects currently planned, considered or under construction as reported by 
regulators. Although only a proportion of these projects may be realised as a function of 
demand and market developments, the projects listed seem to demonstrate that the scope of 
regulators may be sufficient to allow the investments happening. Most of the projects under 
construction or authorised cannot be exempted from TPA rules under Article 22 of Directive 
2003/55/EC, but may enjoy higher rates of return granted by the relevant regulatory authority. 
It is also worth mentioning that most Member States with domestic natural gas reserves strive 
to provide incentives to the industry to invest in exploration and production. These incentives 
may, among other things, include tax reductions and facilitating administrative procedures.  
Short term security of supply refers to operational security of supply and means the ability of 
suppliers to ensure supply of their customers under any predefined circumstances. Because of 
the legal and functional separation of the network from the supply business under Directive 
2003/55/EC, Member States are required to define roles and responsibilities for the different 
actors along the gas chain, in order to guarantee security of supply also under extreme 
circumstances, in particular to those customers who do not dispose of the necessary means to 
protect themselves (households, small commercial consumers etc). Directive 2004/67/EC set 
up the necessary framework, in order to ensure security of gas supply to small consumers in a 
liberalised and competitive environment. It has to be transposed into national laws until May 
2006, from which onwards Member States will have reporting duties on security of supply in 
addition to those (and supplementing them) laid down in Article 5 of the 2003/55 gas 
Directive. 
In February and March 2005, some Member States experienced a sharp decline of 
temperatures and as a consequence, the need to maintain security of supply for certain 
consumer segments, such as households and small commercial consumers, required additional 
measures. Where appropriate, interruptible contracts were interrupted and where available, 
strategic gas reserves used for immediate consumption. Arbitrary supply interruption, 
however, could be avoided. In view of the increasingly tighter supply-demand situation in 
some Member States, arrangements have been introduced or are being introduced with a view 
to setting up a supplier of last resort and/or long-term planning. By these means, possible 
security of supply problems are anticipated and addressed.  
As mentioned above, a number of projects are planned and ongoing, in order to make gas 
supply matching gas demand also in the future. Nevertheless, Europe is likely to face new 
challenges in terms of security of supply mainly attributed to the growing role of LNG for the 
European and global gas supply. While currently, LNG imports amount to approximately 45 
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bcm/yr, their share may go up to between 100 and 150 bcm in the years to come. However, in 
order to bring these volumes to the European market, Europe is likely to face competition 
from other gas consuming countries, such as the United States, which face a similar change to 
their supply portfolio, too.  
As a consequence, since natural gas markets are gradually turning into wider than regional 
markets and ultimately may also be linked into a global market, investments decisions will be 
measured against each other on a global scale. This means that in the future investors may 
take their decision in the light of the expected rate of return compared to other markets. As a 
consequence, European security of gas supply may also depend on the ability of the European 
market to deliver competitive returns.  
Keeping the European market attractive by enabling gas to flow freely and thus allowing 
investors, suppliers and producers to exploit the business opportunities of this market seems 
to be the most promising answer to this issue. 
10.4. Comments of Stakeholders 
Established energy companies are of the view that a stable framework is needed to ensure that 
investments are made. The allocation of roles and responsibilities is important in this regard. 
Transmission system operators agree with this statement and welcome, in particular the 
outcome of the Security of Supply Directives for Electricity and Gas. As for electricity, 
however some argue for a more harmonised approach and stress the need to encourage a 
demand side response. For many companies, the arrangements for security of supply should 
form part of a common market design at regional level. 
TSOs consider that although the current supply-demand position is acceptable, significant 
new generation investment are very likely to be needed in the next 5-10 years in most parts of 
the European Union. Distribution companies point to the increased penetration of distributed 
generation and note that additional resources are needed to accommodate these investments.  
Gas producers point out that the investments needed in order to bring the gas to the European 
market requires sophisticated funding from banks; therefore, regulatory and fiscal stability is 
indispensable. In their view, the application of regulation and their enforcement should be 
seen to strike the right balance between the objectives of securing future gas supplies, 
building new infrastructure and developing a competitive market. 
Gas companies and transmission operators also underline the need for long term agreements 
along the supply chain to ensure the realisation of investment in infrastructure to import gas to 
the European Union, in particular in the light of growing dependence on imports from non-EU 
sources. They welcome the willingness of regulators and the Commission to allow for 
exemptions from third party access in this respect.  
10.5. Assessment 
The Commission has already produced a number of initiatives relating to the need to assure 
security of supply in the context of a competitive market. There are now two pieces of 
additional legislation to address this issue in the form of the gas security of supply Directive 
which will has to be implemented by May 2006 as well as the forthcoming Electricity 
Infrastructure and Security of Supply Directive. The latter has been agreed on the basis that 
market mechanisms will respond to price signals and new projects will come forward on that 
basis. However they also acknowledge the possible need for interventions in the market, for 
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example to avoid a possibly volatile cycle of prices and investments. Such interventions must, 
however be transparent, stable and predictable since uncertainty will clearly undermine 
investment. 
Regarding the question of network management, there would not appear to be any evidence of 
a systematic decline in service standards in terms of continuity. For example, regarding 
transmission, most outages appear to have been the result of isolated one-off occurrences 
usually due to human error or unforeseeable combinations of events. Similarly the 
performance of the distribution network has generally improved in recent years as a result of 
regulatory initiatives.  
The security of supply situation in gas is not problematic at present although clearly new 
investments are needed and prices are beginning to reflect the scarcity of gas (e.g. in UK 
markets). On the basis of the information available to the Commission and in the light of 
ongoing and planned investments, long-term security of supply seems to be ensured. Article 
22 of Directive 2003/55/EC has proved its effectiveness, but is has also been demonstrated 
that it is not in all cases indispensable, provided competences of regulatory authorities allow 
to fully take into account the prevailing investment environment.  
On the operational side, there may still be need to adapt the legislative and regulatory 
framework to the new requirements of the market. The legislative framework in this respect is 
defined by Directive 2004/67/EC, which Member States have to transpose into national law 
not later than May 2006. In the light of the implementation measures of Member States, a 
more in-depth analysis may be required.  
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11. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
11.1. Background 
The opening of the electricity and gas markets to competition takes place in the context of 
clear commitments by the European Union to achieving reductions in carbon emissions. 
These include the promotion of renewables energy as well as measures to promote energy 
efficiency. The Commission’s Green Paper on Energy Efficiency  “Doing More With Less” 
examined the possibility of further improvements in these areas across a range of energy uses. 
Energy taxes clearly have an important influence on the use of energy and can provide 
incentives for customers to make savings as well as being an important source of government 
revenues.  
11.2. Current Situation 
11.2.1. Fiscal Policy 
The fiscal framework for electricity consumption is reported in the graphs below, which 
concentrate on households. This shows that energy taxes can have a large impact on the final 
price being paid by consumers, e.g. Denmark, and this may help deliver an improved energy 
efficiency performance. Taxation may be differentiated, where appropriate, for instance to 
take account of the energy intensiveness of businesses. 
Graph 11.1 Composition of final post tax electricity prices (household) 
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11.2.2. Electricity from Renewable Sources 
As well as measures aimed at reducing the level of demand, a key objective of the 
Community is an increase in the proportion of electricity generated from renewable sources. 
Table 11.1 below gives an update of performance in this regard since the last report. As with 
previous years, these results are encouraging for the development of renewables and CHP 
plant since this again forms the majority of new net additions to generation capacity. A range 
of incentives are successfully being used to give a supportive framework for renewable 
energy, including fiscal measures. 
Table 11.1 Environmental Policy Framework: Electricity generation 
 Net addition to generation 2004 (MW) 
 main RES support mechanism net new 
coal/oil 
net new 
gas 
net new 
RES/CHP 
Other (e.g. 
nuclear) 
Austria feed in tariff (terminated) 0 +100 +500 0 
Belgium green certificates - - - - 
Denmark fixed premium -300 0 +100 0 
Finland tax incentives 0 0 +190 0 
France feed in tariffs/tendering     
Germany feed in tariff +60 0 +2550 +530 
Greece feed in tariff/ investment incentives - - - - 
Ireland tendering 0 0 +200 0 
Italy green certificates     
Lux feed in tariff - - - - 
Netherlands feed in tariff 0 0 +1000 0 
Portugal feed in tariff/ investment incentives -50 +390 +650 0 
Spain feed in tariff 0 +4000 +2000 0 
Sweden green certificates - - - - 
UK green certificates - - - - 
Norway n.k. 0 0 +250 0 
Estonia feed in tariffs - - - - 
Latvia green certificates 0 0 +1000 0 
Lithuania feed in tariffs 0 0 0 -1300 
Poland green certificates -65 +8 +145 0 
Czech R feed in tariffs +50 +50 0 0 
Slovakia feed in tariff/ investment incentives - - - - 
Hungary feed in tariff/ other incentives -60 +180 +5 0 
Slovenia feed in tariffs - - - - 
Cyprus investment incentives     
Malta tax incentive     
Total 
(approx.) 
 -350 +4700 +8500 -800 
source: Regulators’ survey responses,  
Commission 2005 Communication on Renewables (forthcoming) 
 
 
11.3. Comments of Stakeholders 
Renewable suppliers argue that significant subsidies have, in fact, also been provided to 
conventional sources. They consider it unlikely that the European Union will meet the targets 
set out in the Renewable Directive under current conditions.  
A particular problem cited by producers and suppliers of wind power is that their access to the 
network was often constrained and that connection agreements had sometimes been unfair. 
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Many renewable producers argued that they, as small new entrants to the market, were facing 
the same obstacles relating to network access and that unfair conditions and an insufficient 
level of unbundling are damaging both competition and sustainability objectives. Renewable 
producers also emphasise the need for a stable framework of support for their investments in 
order to build credibility of Member States’ commitment to renewables and encourage 
investment. 
Small distributors/suppliers strongly criticised over centralised schemes to support renewable 
energy and argue that it would be more effective if green energy was sold directly to final 
customers.  
Although recognising the significant progress in developing renewable generation in the 
European Union, many stakeholders, especially transmission system operators, expressed 
concerns about the compatibility of existing support mechanisms with a competitive market. 
The lack of harmonisation in this regard was seen as a distortion and the resulting uneven 
development, particular of wind energy, is thought to create severe network management 
problems. It is argued that this results in constraints on possible use of cross border 
connection capacity. Many network users including the main established electricity 
companies and traders argued for a European system of tradable certificates to promote 
renewable energy. 
11.4. Assessment 
There is no reason at all why the opening of the electricity market should have any negative 
environmental consequences provided that the framework for producers and consumers is set 
in an appropriate way. The Community is working hard to ensure that this is the case and a 
range of measures have been adopted and are being implemented with this in mind. 
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12. EMPLOYMENT AND OTHER ECONOMIC ISSUES 
12.1. Background 
Market opening also takes place in the context of the social and employment objectives of the 
European Union. As well as the issues relating to vulnerable customers, the restructuring of 
the industry that may accompany market opening also leads to a need to consider the 
arrangements put in place to manage such changes smoothly. 
The Commission has examined the more general economic and social effects of reforms in all 
network industries as part of the work evaluating the performance of network industries 
providing services of general economic interest. The forthcoming SGEI 2005 report contains 
a large range of analysis in this regard including a study by Copenhagen Economics on the 
general macro-economic impact of the introduction of competition in different sectors. 
12.2. Current Situation 
Clearly reforms of electricity and gas markets have coincided with restructuring of energy 
companies in many cases which has had an impact on employment in the sector. The graph 
below, taken from the horizontal evaluation referred to above, sets out estimates of changes in 
employment in the utilities sector as a whole.  
Graph 12.1 Development of Employment in the Gas Electricity and Water Sector  
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Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, February 2005, http://www.ggdc.net  
Several reports have concluded that productivity per hour has increased in all network 
industries throughout the 1980s and 1990s and the average growth of productivity has 
outpaced the average performance of the economy as a whole. In addition, several sectors 
such as air transport, telecommunications and inland transport showed both increases in 
employment and in productivity, indicating that there is not necessarily a trade-off in the long-
term.  
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12.3. Comments of Stakeholders 
Employment issues are seen as particularly important by European Public Sector Unions. 
They argue that the reduction in employment in the sector has also been accompanied by 
deterioration in the quality of employment and the level of training. It is argued that this 
threatens security of supply. 
12.4. Assessment 
The employment trends in the energy industry merit wider attention in view of the high level 
of European legislation that now affects this sector. Although it is not the job of the 
Commission to decide what level and how many employees, the right incentives need to be in 
place for companies to maintain their assets and have a sufficient level of qualified 
employment. 
In view of these questions, the Commission has decided to upgrade the study on employment 
in the energy sector which was first performed in 2001. The Commission has therefore asked 
consultants to assess the impact on employment in EU-25 of the opening of electricity and gas 
markets and of other key EU directives in the field of energy. 
The study will examine the impact of liberalisation and also other EU legislation 
(cogeneration, renewable directives among others) on the number of jobs, including how 
different categories of workers are affected and on quality in work. Social partners will be 
represented in the steering committee for this work. 
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ANNEX 
SUMMARY REPORTS ON INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES 
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: AUSTRIA 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts 
 
 
Elektrizitätswirtschafts und -organisationsgesetz (Electricity Law) and 
regional Electricity Laws („Länder“) 
Gaswirtschaftsgesetz (Gas Law) 
Energie-Regulierungsbehördengesetz (Law on the energy regulator) 
Unbundling TSOs are unbundled in legal terms; the process of unbundling of DSOs 
is ongoing with regional governments being responsible for 
implementation. 
Regulator In Austria two regulatory authorities exist: Energie-Control GmbH and 
Energie-Control Kommission. Energie-Control Kommission among other 
approves general terms and conditions for grid access, determines use 
of system tariffs and other tariffs according to the Article 25 of the 
Electricity & Gas Laws, etc. Energie-Control GmbH duties include 
among others preparation of all necessary works for the decisions of the 
Energie-Control KOmmission, creation of framework conditions (market 
rules, codices, market design), monitoring, settlement of disputes, 
statistical works, etc.   
Interconnection The electricity interconnector capacity of Austria with neighbouring 
countries amounts to 14000MVA line rating. Apart from the connections 
with Germany and Switzerland, congestion occurs frequently. Austria is 
an important transit country for both electricity and gas. In gas, around 
70% of the Austrian import capacity is used for transit purposes.  
Security of Supply The Austrian electricity system has approximately 18.700 MW installed 
capacity while peak consumption is around 9200 MW. Reliable reserve 
margins have been sufficient in recent years. New projects amounting to 
in total around 2000 MW are in the pipeline and supposed to be 
implemented by 2010. In aDcition, around 1300MW from renewable 
sources of energy will be is supposed to be aDced by 2010.  
In gas, 19% of internal consumption are covered by own production, the 
remainder is imported.  A sharp raise in gas demand of around 10% in 
2008 and 9% in 2009 is expected, as a result of new, gas-fired electricity 
plants.  
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  There are 5,12 million electricity customers in Austria. The electricity 
market was opened 100% in October 2001. General consumer 
protection legislation applies to electricity. In addition, specific 
consumer protection rules for electricity are under preparation.   
In Austria there is no regulation of end-consumer prices. There is no 
supplier of last resort. 
Switching Customers can change supplier without charge, on the basis of 
standard rules and the process of changing lasts without objection 
from involved parties 5 weeks and with objection up to maximum 8 
weeks.  Around 25% of large consumers, 7% of SMEs and around 3% 
of households have changed supplier since market opening. 
Competition The wholesale market is currently based on bilateral trading (largest 
part) and trading in the Austrian electricity exchange (EXAA) a bilateral 
trading market between generators and suppliers. Five companies 
have a share in overall production capacity of more than 5%, the 
largest three companies have a share of around 54% of total 
production capacity.  In 2004, four newcomers to the market 
independent from network operators existed.  
Prices Electricity end-consumer prices in Austria are characterised by a 
relatively low component for energy and a relatively high component 
for network access charges.   
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
AT price  47 94 95 
EU average 56 101 96 
Network Access Network charges are approved ex-ante by the regulator. They are 
relatively high compared to European average levels.  On 1 January 
2006 an incentive based system of network access regulation will be 
introduced. During the first 4-years period of incentive regulation, 
quality regulation will be prepared and introduced at latest in the 
second regulatory period. 
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GAS 
General / Customer Service  In 2004 overall as consumption in Austria amounted to around 8,6 
Billion m³. All customers have been eligible since 1. October 2003. 
General consumer protection legislation applies to electricity. In 
aDcition, specific consumer protection rules for electricity are under 
preparation.   
In Austria there is no regulation of end-consumer prices.  
Switching Customers can change supplier without charge, on the basis of 
standard rules and the process of changing can last maximum 8 
weeks.  Switching rate in 2004 amounted to 4,7%, expressed  in 
proportion to overall consumption of gas.  Switching differed 
significantly between regions and is much more developed for 
commercial customers than for households, where the rate was below 
1%.   
Competition The main obstacle for new entrants to the Austrian gas market is 
insufficient available network capacity. Trades are for this reason often 
refused access to final customers. Management of capacity is 
currently not transparent. A gas release programme, operated by one 
Austrian gas supplier following a merger procedure, has had little 
impact on the liquidity of the Austrian market since more than 90% of 
the released gas has been bought for consumption in Italy.   
In 2004, one newcomer to the market independent from network 
operators existed.  
Prices Gas prices in Austria are slightly above the European average. 
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
AT price  - 28 44 
EU average  17 27 40 
Network Access Network access charges are approved by the Austrian regulator and 
are based on the “postage stamp” principle without any distance 
related component.  
 
 EN 109   EN 
COUNTRY SUMMARY: BELGIUM 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts 
 
 
Electricity : Loi du 29 avril 1999 modified by the loi du  1 juin 2005 
(Moniteur belge du 14 juin 2005) 
Gaz : loi du 12 avril 1969  modified by la loi du 1 juin 2005                      
(Moniteur belge du 14 juin 2005). 
Unbundling Legal separation of both transmission and distribution system 
operators for electricity.  
For gas, the legal separation will be enforced in the law in 2006 but 
this has already been carried out on a voluntary basis by the company. 
Regulator CREG regulates network access tariffs for both transmission and 
distribution. Under the new law these tasks are shared by the regulator 
and the relevant Ministry. The CREG is made up of 6 Commission 
Members and is separate from the government.  
The new law has also transferred some regulatory competences 
regarding security of supply from the CREG to the federal government. 
There are 3 regional energy regulators, one for each region on 
Belgium.  
Interconnection New electricity interconnection projects have recently been completed 
between France and Belgium. Work is underway on a second line at 
380 KV which will be completed during 2005. 
Security of Supply Total electricity consumption was 83.6 TWh during 2004 which peak 
load of 13.7GW. There is around 15.7GW of installed generation 
capacity in Belgium.  
Regarding gas, the transport network is used for both national 
consumption and transit. In 2004 43.2 bcm was transported on the 
Belgian network of which 17.6bcm was destined for consumption or 
storage nationally. The network is heavily loaded according to the 
regulator and could be overloaded in the event of a severe winter.  
The CREG has recommended additional investment in the gas 
transport network for this reason. 
Other Issues Additional investments in generation capacity of 532MW have taken 
place in the last year. 
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ELECTRICITY 
General / Customer Service  In the Flemish region, 100 % of final customers are eligible to choose 
their supplier. In the other regions, non households are eligible in 
Bruxelles-Capitale since July 2004 while in Wallonia, clients connected 
to the distribution network can chose supplier on request of the 
distribution company. Customer protection measures have been 
implemented and a series of measures are included in the energy law 
to this effect, particularly to protect vulnerable customers. 
Switching According to CREG data, 53% of all electricity clients in the Flemish 
region have changed supplier with around 20% moving to a totally new 
company. Full data is not available in the other regions but the 
Walloon regulator (CWAPE) estimates that 270 clients have entered 
into a contract with a supplier other than the default company. 
Competition Only 2 producers Electrabel et SPE, have a market share above 5%. 
Electrabel itself owns over 70% of production capacity. The wholesale 
market is based on bilateral contracts between producers and 
supplier. There is currently no liquid trading. However the proposed 
Belpex power exchange will be created in 2006.  
Electrabel has been required to release some capacity - 1200 MW - in 
the form of VPP ( virtual power plants auctions). 
Prices Electricity prices in Belgium are slightly above the European average 
at present, but have fallen since market opening, particularly for small 
companies. 
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
 
BE   62 115  110 
EU average   56 101 96 
Network Access Network access charges for both transmission and distribution have 
been progressively lowered between 2003 et 2005, especially for 
industrial companies. 
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GAS 
General / Customer Service  In the Flemish region, 100 % of final customers are eligible to choose 
their supplier. In the other regions, non households are eligible in 
Bruxelles-Capitale since July 2004 while in Wallonia, clients with a 
consumption level above 0.12GWh can choose supplier.  
Total market opening will be completed in 2007.  
Switching In the Flemish region, CRE report that 11% of large industrials 
changes supplier in 2004, bring the cumulative total to over 90% since 
market opening. For the smaller commercial companies and 
households, the switching level is estimated at 45%. No data is 
available from other regions. 
Competition In the Flemish region, 3 companies have a market share above 5% 
and they cover over 90% of customers. 12 companies are active in the 
Walloon market and 4 have a market share above 5%. The three 
largest have 63% of customers. 
Prices Gas prices in Belgium are below the EU15 average.  
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
BE  16 32 52 
EU average  17 27 40 
The CREG estimates that prices have fallen by around 5% for smaller 
commercial and resident customers in the last two year. Those for 
large companies have, however, increased by around the same 
amount. 
Network Access  
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: CYPRUS 
COMMON ISSUES 
LEGISLATION: Electricity: Legal texts in place Law 122(I)/2003, and 239(I)/2004. The new 
electricity Directive is not transposed into national law. Cyprus qualifies as 
an “isolated” system and has requested derogation for market opening. 
UNBUNDLING: The TSO is unbundled in terms of management. The EAC accounts are not 
yet unbundled.  
REGULATOR: The Cyprus Regulatory Authority (CERA) was established in mid 2003. The 
Board consists of three Commissioners with a six years mandate. The Board 
is appointed by the Council of Ministers and reports to the President of the 
Republic. Overlapping jurisdictions have been identified between CERA and 
the Cyprus Competition Authority.  
INTERCONNECTION: No plans. 
SECURITY OF SUPPLY: 
 
Heavy Fuel and Diesel dominate the energy portfolio. Plans to diversify the 
fuel resources to include renewable and natural gas have started. 
  
The installed capacity is 988 MW with a recorded maximum demand of 854 
MW (July 2005). The annual consumption in 2004 was 3.742 GWh. The 
average estimated demand growth up to 2008 is 5%.  
 
It is expected that a 130 MW power plant will be commissioned in November 
2005. CERA has issued 12 licenses for existing and new power generation 
stations which amount to a total capacity of 1693,5 MW. 
OTHER ISSUES:  
 EN 113   EN 
ELECTRICITY 
GENERAL/CUSTOMER   The Electricity Market Law of 2003 covers adequately the provisions 
of Article 3 of the Directive 2003/55. The market is open by 35%. 
The consumption threshold is 350,000 KWh/year. 
COMPETITION: Competition in the generation and supply side may arise in the island. 
However, there is no other supplier currently than the incumbent (EAC). 
 
SWITCHING: None 
 
Prices:  EURO/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
EU15 average 56 101 96 
CYP prices 92 98 201 
Network access: Proposals on use of system and connection charges are being considered. 
Trading and Balancing rules are in the process of adoption and allow a 
retail market to operate for participants that owe and operate enough 
generation capacity to cover their customers’ needs. Market participants 
having capacity above of 50 MW can also provide ancillary services. The 
balancing interval is 60 min. Production must balance within 10% if 
customers demand. The difference between total supply and demand is 
settled through the balancing market. Settlement of imbalances will be 
arranged on a monthly basis. 
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: CZECH REPUBLIC  
COMMON ISSUES 
Primary Legislation  
 
Energy Act no. 458/2000, latest amendment 28 February 2005. 
 
Unbundling The transmission system operator has been established as a separate 
state owned company, independent of CEZ, the main producer. For 
gas the TSO is not yet separated from other businesses.   
Functional and legal separation of distribution companies will take 
place in 2006 for electricity and in 2007 for gas.  
Regulator The regulator, ERO, is independent and has various competences 
including the setting of network tariffs and conditions and also fixing 
end user price controls.  
Interconnections   
 
Security of supply Peak consumption of electricity is 10,2 GW compared to installed 
capacity of 17,4 GW.  
 
Other questions  
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ELECTRICITY 
General/ Customer Service  The electricity market will be fully open to competition from 2006. 
A default supplier is appointed in each region via a tender process. 
This supplier is obliged to serve all households at regulated prices and 
any SMEs which request the regulated price.  
Switching 2460 customers have changed supplier representing around x% of the 
market. These are mainly multi –site customers which have grouped 
their consumption to a single supplier.  
Competition CEZ is the main generator and has 73% of national production 
capacity. Other generators are all much smaller with none more than 
3% of the total. Wholesale trading takes place in the OTE power 
exchange. VPP capacity auctions will take place for 400MW during 
2006 and 2007.  
The main suppliers are now CEZ and EON which together serve 85% 
of the market. 
Prices Regulated tariffs will apply until the end of 2005. These are rather 
lower than the EU15 average. 
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
Czech Rep.  50 79 73 
EU average  56 101 96 
Network access All Network tariffs are fixed by the ERO. 
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GAS 
General/ Customer Service  The market will be totally open to competition in 2007.   
As for electricity, a default supplier will be appointed in each region via 
a tender process. 
Switching To date, no switching has taken place.  
Competition The transmission system is not yet unbundled and relevant information 
is not yet provided to potential market participants other than 
Transgas. Trasngas also controls storage. This makes any new entry 
very difficult.  
Furthermore all gas available in the Czech Republic is purchased by 
Transgas from Gazprom.   
Prices Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
Czech Rep.  18 20 30 
EU Average  17 27 40 
Gas prices are currently below the EU15 average. 
Network access Network access conditions are fixed by the Regulator. However for 
storage, access is negotiated and the regulator does not have any 
competence in this respect.  
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: DENMARK 
COMMON ISSUES 
 
Main Legal Texts 
 
 
Elforsyningsloven  
Naturgasforsyningsloven 
Unbundling A new electricity and gas transmission system operator Energienet.dk, 
owned by the Danish state, was established 1 July 2005. Distribution 
companies have been ownership unbundled already in the past, 
functional unbundling is required with the new law for companies with 
more than 100.000 customers. Legal and functional unbundling is 
required for all gas network companies. 
Regulator Energitilsynet is an independent authority under the Competition 
authority. Energitilsynet regulates network tariffs and has a number of 
other tasks related to energy markets.  
Interconnection Interconnection capacity of Denmark is about 5.200 MW with Norway, 
Sweden and Germany. A further increase of 600 – 800MW with 
Norway has been planned.  
Security of Supply The Danish system has about 10.300 MW installed capacity while the 
highest peak consumption in 2004 was about 6.200 MW. Reserve 
margin is high in Denmark, it contributes in an important way to the 
reserve capacity of the whole Nordic area. 
 
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  The electricity market was fully opened in 2003. The market is 
characterised by vertical integration of distribution and retail business. 
There are 120 distribution companies and 40 last resort suppliers. 
There are important public service obligations regarding the supply of 
wind and CHP electricity. 
Switching No reliable figures on switching exist yet.  The household market has 
been open only since 2004. Household electricity prices in Denmark 
are high due to taxes and public service obligations, which reduces the 
scope for competition on prices.  
Competition The wholesale market is integrated to the Nordic power market. It 
consists of a bilateral trading market between generators on one hand 
and suppliers and industrial companies on the other hand, and of a 
voluntary Nordic power exchange Nordpool which has a spot market 
and a forward market.  The market share of Nord Pool Spot AS in 
2004 was 42 % of the physical delivery in the Nordic countries. The 
wholesale market in Denmark has been largely dominated by two 
producers, Elsam end Energi E2. The Competition authority is 
preparing two cases concerning Elsam’s abuse of dominant position. 
Prices Electricity prices have been rising slightly as a result of increased fuel 
prices and emission trading costs.  
Euro/MWh44 Ig Ib Dc 
DK price  - 73 96 
EU average 56 101 96 
Network Access Network tariff are regulated with a price-cap regulation. Network tariffs 
and the tariff methodology vary considerably depending on the 
company. 
 
                                                 
44 Eurostat categories, without taxes 
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GAS 
 
General / Customer Service  The Danish natural gas market is characterised by production in the 
North Sea, with long term take-or-pay contracts with DONG, the state 
owned gas company. There are four distribution companies and 
several supply companies.  
Switching No studies have been made on customer switching on the Danish gas 
market.  
Competition For household and smaller industrial customers there is competition 
on the Danish market. Big customers, especially power plants, are 
almost exclusively supplied by DONG. A reason for this could be that 
the storage capacity is owned and operated by DONG. 
Prices Gas prices have ???  
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
DK price  17 44 44 
EU average  17 27 40 
 
Network Access Distribution tariffs are approved ex-ante by Energitilsynet through a 
four year income-cap. For transmission the regulator is assessing 
whether the tariff is reasonable.  
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: ESTONIA 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts 
 
 
Elektrituruseadus  
Maagaasiseadus  
Unbundling The electricity transmission system operator OÜ Põhivõrk is a 
company in a vertically integrated group of Eesti Energia. OÜ 
Jaotusvõrk also belonging to the same group is the largest distribution 
company with 90% market share. There are 42 distribution companies 
altogether. Unbundling is required for companies with more than 
100.000 customers. In Gas market Eesti Gaas is the transmission 
company, importer and the major distribution and supply company. 
Additionally, there are 20 small distribution and supply companies in 
Estonia. 
Regulator Energiaturu Inspektsioon is an independent agency under the Ministry 
of Economy and Telecommunications. It regulates end-user prices and 
network tariffs and has a number of other tasks related to energy 
markets.  
Interconnection Interconnection capacity with Latvia is about 1000 MW. A connection 
with Finland through a 350 MW sea cable should be in operation in 
2007.  
Security of Supply The Estonian system has 2.200 MW installed capacity while peak 
consumption is about 1.500 MW. Reserve margin is sufficient 
regarding Estonia. However, as all the Baltic states are connected to 
the Russian system, the region should be considered as a whole from 
the security of supply point of view. Closure of Ignalina power plants 
reduces capacity in the region. 
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  The electricity market is opened 15% in January 1997. Estonia has 
derogation until 2012 regarding opening of the market to household 
customers. Prices for non-eligible customers remain regulated. The 
electricity for the non-eligible customers must be produced in an 
Estonian oil-shale power plant bigger than 500MW, or be produced by 
small hydro or CHP plants. 
Switching There is one industrial customer who changed supplier before Estonia 
joined the EU.  
Competition There is in practice no competition on the Estonian market. 
Prices Electricity prices in Estonia are low, but they have been rising slightly 
in recent years. The prices are significantly below the EU average. 
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
EE price  37 56 60 
EU15 average 56 101 96 
Network Access Energiaturu Inspektsioon approves the network tariffs as well as the 
end-user prices on a yearly basis based on RPI-X methodology.  
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GAS 
 
General / Customer Service  The Estonia natural gas market is very small with a pipeline 
connection to Russia and Latvia.  The Natural Gas Market Act 
amendment has not yet been approved by the Parliament.  
Switching There is hardly any switching yet in Estonia.  
Competition There is one dominant supplier Eesti Gaas. Enduser prices remain 
regulated.  
Prices Estonian gas price is well below the EU average. 
Euro/MWh  I4  I1  D2 
EE price    9  13  18  
EU average  17  22  40 
Network Access Regulation of transmission and distribution tariffs is based on RPI-X 
approach.  
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: FINLAND 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts 
 
 
Electricity Market Act (386/1995), Electricity Market Decree (518/1995)  
Gas Market Act (508/2000), Gas Market Decree (622/2000) 
Unbundling The electricity transmission system operator Fingrid is a company with 
ownership unbundling although part of the ownership remains within 
vertically integrated groups. For distribution companies unbundling 
requirements increase stepwise depending on their size. For gas 
Finland applies a derogation regarding unbundling based on isolated 
market. 
Regulator EMV is an independent agency under the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. EMV regulates network tariffs and has a number of other 
tasks related to energy markets.  
Interconnection Interconnection capacity of Finland is about 3.800 MW with Sweden, 
Norway and Russia. A further increase has been decided, 600 – 
800MW with Sweden and 350 MW with Estonia.  
Security of Supply The Finnish system had 16.488 MW installed capacity in 2004 while 
peak consumption was 13.570 MW. Reserve margins have been 
relatively low in the Nordic market in recent years but they are still 
considered sufficient. The market is supposed to provide necessary 
investments in time without Government intervention. 
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  The electricity market was opened 100% in January 1997. There are 
today 70 electricity retailers having the obligation to supply within at 
least one distribution network area of responsibility. The prices of 
electricity offered within the obligation to supply system do not have to 
be approved by the regulator before the supplier takes them into use. 
The Energy Market Authority may investigate either on the basis of a 
complaint received from a customer or at its own initiative the pricing 
of electricity. 
Switching The network operator may not charge a customer for the change of 
supplier unless the time elapsed from the previous change of supplier 
is less than 12 months. In the Finnish electricity retail supply market 
about 11% of household customers have changed the supplier by the 
year 2004. The share of electricity sold by non-local supplier or by the 
local supplier according to the negotiated contracts was in 2004 for 
household customers 30% and for small and medium-sized 
commercial users 82%. 
Competition The wholesale market in Finland is integrated to the Nordic power 
market. It consists of a bilateral trading market between generators on 
one hand and suppliers and industrial companies on the other hand, 
and a voluntary Nordic power exchange Nordpool which has a spot 
market and a forward market.  The market share of Nord Pool Spot AS 
in 2004 was 42 % of the physical delivery in the Nordic countries. 
Prices Electricity prices have been rising slightly as a result of increased fuel 
prices and emission trading costs. The prices are significantly below 
EU average. 
Euro/MWh  Ig  Ib  Dc 
FI price   47  64  78 
EU15 average  56  101  96 
Network Access The EMV both sets the methodology for tariff calculation, with a four 
year regulatory period. Network charges are broadly in line with 
European average levels for small customers and significantly lower 
than average for large customers.  
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GAS 
 
General / Customer Service  The Finnish natural gas market is relatively isolated with a pipeline 
connection only to Russia. Thus Finland has an exemption allowed by 
the Gas Directive. Following this, the natural gas market has not been 
opened for competition.   
Switching There is no switching as there is only one supplier.  
Competition There is only one supplier: Gasum Ltd. Enduser prices remain 
regulated. However, the Gas Market Act provides large-scale 
consumers buying at least 5 million cubic metres of natural gas per 
year with the possibility of mutual secondary market trading. A market 
place, operated by Gas Exchange Ltd, has been established for 
trading on the secondary market. 
Prices There are no price caps, but the prices have to be reasonable. 
Regulation of transmission and distribution tariffs is based on rate of 
return approach. There is only a limited number of household 
customers.  
Euro/MWh  I4  I1  D2 
FI price   18  -  - 
EU average  17  27  40 
Network Access Regulation of transmission and distribution tariffs is based on rate of 
return approach.  
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: FRANCE  
COMMON ISSUES 
Main legislation 
 
Loi 2000-108 du 10/2/2000 (électricité). Loi 2003-8 du 3/1/2003 (gaz et 
électricité). Loi 2004-803 du 9/8/2004 (gaz et électricité). Loi 2005-781 
du13/7/05 (Loi orientation énergie) 
Unbundling The TSOs RTE-EDF, GRTgaz, TIGF are legally unbundled and are 
100% subsidiaries of vertically integrated groups EdF, GdF and Total. 
Distribution companies will be unbundled by July 2007. 
Regulator The regulator, CRE: 
- is an independent body composed of 7 Members. They are 
nominated for 6 years which cannot be revoked nor renewed ;  
- regulates transport , distribution and access to LNG terminals; 
- approved the annual investment programme of the electricity TSO,  
- proposes network access tariffs for transport et distribution for both 
gas and electricity, as well as LNG installations for approval by the 
Ministry,  
- settles disputes for eligible clients; 
- judges cases relating to access to storage;  
- has shared competences with the national competition authority for 
wholesale electricity markets (including Powernext) including 
supervision of wholesale and cross border trade; 
- the regulator is not responsible for end user tariffs controls,  which 
are set by the government.   
Interconnections France is reasonably well connected with neighbouring countries. In 
2004 it began to import significant quantities from both Germany and 
Switzerland. Two new interconnectors with Belgium have been 
undertaken and will be operational during 2006. Despite the need for 
improved connections between France and Spain, little progress has 
been made on key projects 
For gas, new interconnection projects including pipelines (Euskador) 
and LNG terminals in the south (Fos Cavaou) will increase security of 
supply and improve competitive conditions.  
Security of supply The forecast peak consumption, expected in one year out of ten, is set 
at 90600 MW for 2006 et de 93000 MW en 2008. Installed capacity in 
France is 116000MW. The TSO estimates that an additional 1000MW 
per year will be needed after 2009 
Other questions New wind capacity of 1000MW has been constructed on the base of a 
tender process.  
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ELECTRICITY 
General/ Customer Service  There are 33.5 million electricity consumers in France. All business 
clients and « collectivités territoriales » (68% of consumption and 4.5 
million sites) are eligible to choose their supplier since July 2004. 
Considerable consumer protection measures are in place, especially 
for low income customers. Many prices remain regulated. 
Switching  59,200 consumers had changed supplier by June 2005, representing 
13% of the total volume of eligible consumption and 1.3% of the 
number of clients. Many other had negotiated a new contract with the 
incumbent supplier while leaving the regulated tariff.  
 
Competition EdF retains around 90% of installed production capacity. VPP (virtual 
power plant) auctions have released capacity of 42 TWh (6000MW) to 
other suppliers. 
The power exchange (Powernext) traded volumes of 14.2TWh for day-
ahead exchange and 12.9TWh of futures in 2004, altogether 5.6% of 
consumption in France.  
26 alternative supplies were active in France during 2005 of which 5 
have production capacity in France. 
Prices Most customers are subject to regulated tariffs in France. These are 
considerably below the EU15 average prices.  
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
France  48 84 89 
EU15 average 56 101 96  
This regime is expected to continue at least until the end of 2007. 
Network tariffs Tariffs are proposed by the CRE for transmission and distribution 
networks. These have to be approved by the Ministry within two 
months. 
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GAS 
 
General/ Customer Service  The gas market in France is open to all non households. A system of 
supplier of last resort is being set up. There are 11 million gas 
customers in France 
Public service obligations exist relating to low income and 
disadvantaged households. A contract has been concluded with GDF 
to deliver a series of other PSOs linked to vulnerable customers.  
Switching  475 sites have already (until 1/8/2005) changed supplier out of 
640.000 eligible clients. This represents 17% of eligible consumption.  
Competition The two main suppliers, GdF and Total, have around 95% of import 
capacity and control of the wholesale market. Six other companies are 
active in the market. There are also 21 companies potentially 
supplying eligible customers which are independent of network 
companies.  
Gas release programmes has been put in place for 48,3 TWh during 3 
years from the end of 2004.  
Prices Regulated tariffs remain in place for non-eligible clients and those 
which have not changed supplier. These will be in place until the end 
of 2007. They are generally higher than the EU average 
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
France  21                 29              50 
EU average  17 27 140 
Network tariffs The CRE proposes the network access charges which are based on 
an entry-exit model. It also approved conditions for access to LNG 
facilities. The government must approve these within 2 months.    
Access to storage is by negotiation but the CRE settles any litigation.  
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: GERMANY 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts The Electricity and Gas Supply Act – Energy Act (Gesetz über die 
Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung – Energiewirtschaftsgesetz [EnWG])   
entered into force on 13 July 2005.  
Unbundling Most of the electricity and gas network operators are already legally 
unbundled. The process of unbundling of DSOs is not yet finalised. 
Germany has many (around 800) rather small DSOs, of which the 
largest part will be exempted from legal and functional unbundling in 
application of the 100.000 customer rules.  
Regulator The Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railways (Bundesnetzagentur) is 
designated as regulatory authority for electricity and gas networks in 
the Energy Act. It shares this competence with regulatory authorities 
established by the Federal States (Länder). The Energy Act gives the 
Federal Network Agency primary responsibility for transmission 
systems, as well as for distribution systems that cross at least one 
federal state boundary or to which more than 100,000 customers are 
connected, either directly or indirectly. It also discharges all duties that 
are not expressly assigned to another authority. 
The Federal Network Agency is at the same time responsible for 
regulating telecommunications and posts as well as access to railway 
infrastrucures (from 1 January 2006). 
Interconnection In electricity, Germany disposes of an interconnection capacity 
amounting to 14,4 % of installed capacity.   
Security of Supply The German system has approximately 114900 MW installed 
electricity capacity while peak consumption is 77200 MW. In 2004 
installed capacity increased by around 3000 MW, of which 2180 MW 
were renewable projects.  
Other Issues There has been considerable growth in the use of renewable energy 
sources. Around 16.600 MW of wind capacity is in place. An obligation 
exists on network operators to purchase electricity from renewable 
resources for which it is compensated through a charge on network 
users.   
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  The electricity market has been open 100% since 1998. Consumer 
protection rules are contained in specific legislation for household 
customers and in general consumer protection rules. Special tariffs for 
vulnerable customers do not exist – protection is provided by means of 
general rules under the Federal Social Assistance Act.  
Supplier of last resort in a given network area is the supplier having 
the highest number of customers.  
Switching Switching rates are 41% for large industrial customers, 7% for 
commercial customers and 5% for households.  
Competition The wholesale market in Germany is currently largely a bilateral 
trading market, even if an increasing share of overall trade (around 
10%) is done at the German power exchange (EEX). Around 70% of 
total generation capacity is owned by four companies, of which the 
largest two (E.ON and RWE) are considered by the German 
competition authority to maintain together a dominant position.  At the 
moment the number of newcomers on the market amounts to around 
13.  
Prices End-consumer prices for households will continue to be regulated 
(price caps) until 1 July 2007. Prices are above EU-average.  
Euro/MWh  Ig  Ib  Dc 
DE price  71  155  135  
EU average  56  101  96 
Network Access Individual network access charges have to be approved ex-ante by the 
Regulator.  Charges have to be calculated on the basis of a 
methodology outlined in government ordinances. The current 
methodology is “cost+” but the Federal Network Agency is charged 
with preparing, by July 2006, a report on introducing incentive 
regulation to the Federal Government. The Federal Government may 
then adopt an Ordinance on incentive regulation. 
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General / Customer Service  The electricity market has been open 100% since 1998. Consumer 
protection rules are contained in specific legislation for household 
customers and in general consumer protection rules. Special tariffs for 
vulnerable customers do not exist – protection is provided protection is 
provided by means of general rules under the Federal Social 
Assistance Act.  
Supplier of last resort in a given network area is the supplier having 
the highest number of customers.  
Switching Reliable information on customer switching activities in gas is not 
available.  
Competition The share of the three largest suppliers in overall gas supply amounts 
to 80%. In general, the German gas markets suffer from a lack of 
liquidity, i.e. access of alternative gas suppliers to gas production. 
Furthermore, long-term supply contracts between the incumbent 
companies and distributors prevent access of new suppliers to 
customers. The competition authority has launched recently an 
initiative aimed at an adaptation of such long-term supply contracts to 
ensure compliance with competition law. The impact of new entrants 
on the structure of the German gas markets has been thus far 
negligible. The competition authority has also launched an inquiry into 
the current practice of gas supplier to justify price increases with the 
oil-gas price link. 
Prices End-consumer prices are not regulated. Gas prices have risen 
significantly since the second half of 2004 and are higher than the EU 
average  
Euro/MWh  I4  I1  D2 
DE price  22  33  55 
EU average  17  37  40 
Network Access Individual network access charges have to be approved ex-ante by the 
Regulator.  The system has thus far been “point-to-point” and will in 
future be replaced by an “entry-exit-scheme”.  
Charges have to be calculated on the basis of a methodology outlined 
in government ordinances. The current methodology is “cost+” but the 
Federal Network Agency is charged with preparing, by July 2006, a 
report on introducing incentive regulation to the Federal Government.  
The Federal Government may then adopt an Ordinance on incentive 
regulation. 
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COUNTRY SUMMARY : GREECE 
COMMON ISSUES 
Legislation: Legal texts in place Law 2773/99, and 3175/2003. The 2005 Grid and Power Exchange 
Code on Electricity will be implemented progressively from this October. The new 
Electricity Directive is yet to be transposed into national law. Gas, Greece has been 
granted a derogation as an emerging gas market regarding the implementation of the 
Directive 2003/55/EC until November 15, 2006. 
Unbundling: Electricity, a separate company, the “Hellenic Transmission System Operator” S.A. 
(“DESMIE” or HTSO), established by Ministerial Decree 328/12.12.2000 is the 
Transmission System Operator. 51% of the HTSO is state owned and 49% is owned by 
the generators. The Public Power Corporation SA (PPC) is the only power generator in 
the Greek territory, therefore PPC controls 49% of the shares of the HTSO and appoints 
members to the Board of Directors of HTSO. Most of the employees of the HTSO are 
coming from PPC, and are members of PPC’s trade union.. The ownership of the 
transmission network is with the incumbent company (PPC). Legal unbundling has not yet 
been implemented for the Distribution System Operator. PPC, the exclusive owner of the 
Distribution Network, is appointed as the Distribution System Operator under the 
legislation in force.. PPC is the single distributor in Greece. 
Regulator:  The Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) is an independent administrative authority. 
RAE’s Board consists of five Members. According to a Law recently enacted by the 
Parliament, two more members will be added to the Board, and the number of Vice-
Presidents will be increased to two, while the President and the Vice-Presidents are 
appointed by a Decision of the Cabinet of Ministers acting on a proposal of the Minister of 
Development and following the simple opinion of the competent Parliamentary 
Committee.. RAE has mainly an advisory role to the Minister of Development. The full 
competences of the Regulatory Authorities laid down in Articles 23 and of 25 of the 
Electricity and Gas Directives, respectively, have not been accorded to RAE.  
Interconnection: Electricity, for the year 2004 the total net transfer capacity of the Northern interconnectors 
is 600 MW in each direction. The net transfer capacity of the undersea interconnector 
between Greece and Italy is 500 MW for imports to Greece and 300 MW for exports to 
Italy. There are plans to build new interconnection capacity, notably with Turkey and 
Bulgaria and upgrade interconnection with FYROM.. Gas, Two infrastructure projects are 
in the pipeline with Turkey and Italy.  
Security of Supply:
  
Electricity, the total installed capacity in the interconnected system is 11.350 MW. The 
total installed capacity in the non-interconnected islands is 1.605 MW. The peak demand 
on July 12th 2004 (when a brown out occurred) reached the 9.600 MW. A 400 MW CCGT 
power plant is under construction (owned by Hellenic Petroleum) and expected to be 
commissioned before the end of the year. Another 400 ΜW gas fired CCGT power plant 
is currently under construction by PPC S.A., scheduled for its initial synchronous 
operation by mid 2006. This plant shall substitute equal capacity from old PPC plants that 
will be retained as cold (emergency) reserve. Finally the gas-fired peaking power station 
(147 MW) of IRON THERMOILEKTRIKI in Viotia is in operation under a contract with 
HTSO for the provision of ancillary services.. According to a baseline scenario of the 
HTSO and an average annual demand increase of 3,9% it is therefore estimated that 400 
MW of additional capacity should be built every year to cover the demand of the 
interconnected system until 2008. Further capacity needs will be met from market 
participants and it is a challenge that the Greek electricity market has to cope. The new 
Grid and Power Exchange Code and the anticipated new law on electricity could provide 
a stable regulatory framework conducive to new investments. 
Other Issues: Greece has delayed to comply with the Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC. A new Law 
which fully transposes the provisions of this Directive into the Greek legal order is 
expected to be approved until the end of 2005. Competition is not developed in the Greek 
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market. It is necessary that the market environment improves and provides incentives for 
new investments to meet increasing demand. 
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ELECTRICITY 
General/Customer   The electricity consumption is split as follows in the various customers’ 
categories:  Industrial sector 29%, commercial, agricultural and public sectors 
36% and domestic sector 34%. There are no specific provisions on Public 
Service Obligations. Families with more than three kids, consumers in the 
agricultural sector and PPC employees enjoy discount retail tariffs. 
Switching: Practically, all customers connected to the medium and low voltage system 
are supplied by PPC. A few licensed suppliers operating in the retail market 
supply small amounts of electricity (via imports) to commercial and light 
industrial sectors’ customers. In 2004 this amounts to 398 GWh thus 0,78% of 
the overall consumption in the interconnected system. 
Competition: The 2005 Grid and Power Exchange Code allows for the development of an 
organized daily wholesale market, where all electricity generated and 
consumed in Greece will be transacted. The HTSO has the task of Market 
Operator. The 2005 Grid and Power Exchange Code also introduces a 
generation capacity assurance mechanism with the view to increasing the 
security of supply. This mechanism is designed to reduce business risk of the 
investors of the new power plants, by providing guarantees for covering part 
of their capital cost. On the other hand, by the same mechanism suppliers can 
ensure restricted volatility of the wholesale prices. There no real-time market 
balancing arrangements. The whole balancing mechanism is based on the ex-
post, administrative settlement of imbalances among the market participants. 
Since 2001 12 generation licence have been granted to anticipated gas-fired 
non-PPC producers for a total capacity of 4.153 MW. However, only two have 
proceeded in investments. Investment in renewable is promising.  RES 
producers are under a protected regime. 
Prices:  Electricity prices increased by an average of 3,5% in 2005. Prices are still 
among the lowest in the EU, especially for households. 
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
GR 54 95 64 
EU average 56 101 96 
Network access: Network tariffs are calculated on the basis of the annual system cost, which is 
defined as the sum of the annual barter owed by the HTSO to PPC SA (i.e. 
the sum of the annual depreciation of the assets of the Transmission System, 
its operational and maintenance expenses and the return on the non-
depreciated capital of the Transmission System, with the rate of return being 
approved by RAE) and the annual cost of any works for the expansion of the 
System, which are paid by the HTSO. System charges are then allocated to 
generation -including imports- (G) and load –including exports- (L) according 
to a 30% - 70% split until 1 January 2006 (according to the 2001 Grid Code), 
which will then change to 15% - 85% (according to the 2005 Grid Code). 
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: HUNGARY 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts Electricity Act CX of 2001 as amended  
Gas – Act XLII of 2003 on natural gas supply as amended. 
Unbundling Electricity : Accounts,  Legal. The incumbent MVM (99,8% public) still 
owns the grid, which is operated by MAVIR  (also public). It is 
understood that both will remain into public ownership. DSOs have the 
monopoly in supply to regulated customers. For gas, MOL has legally 
unbundled its gas sector in three units: storage MOL Foldgaztarolo, 
trading arm MOL Foldgazellato and gas shipment and system operator 
MOL Foldgazszallito. Sale of these units (probably 75% of share 
capital) is presently in progress.  
Regulator Hungarian Energy Office (HEO) fixes network access conditions, and 
handles complaints and appeals (within 60 days: 1393 in 2003), 
establishes rules for pricing and prepares tariffs. But the Ministry 
approves tariffs (ex-ante). It also approves Operating, Business and 
Distribution Codes, grants licences for power plants with capacity of 50 
MW or more.  In co-operation with General Inspectorate for Consumer 
Protection monitors supply and demand order to ensure security of 
supply and supports. 
Interconnection Electricity: Interconnection capacity is substantial (1,8 GW – 22% of 
installed generating capacity) nevertheless there is congestion. It is 
dealt with by explicit auctions (about two per year), while co-ordinated 
auctions with neighbouring TSO are planned for 2006; eventually 
market splitting. There is a strong need of a new interconnector with 
Slovakia. It is important to note that about 40% of the available 
interconnection capacity is allocated on the basis of old long-term 
import contracts. 
Gas: The main supply pipeline is that coming from Russia through 
Ukraine; it is congested in the winter, but there is some free capacity in 
the summer. There is free capacity in the interconnectors with Austria 
and with Serbia(for export). There is a working group for a new 
interconnector with Slovakia. There are also plans for a new 
interconnector with Croatia to be used either for export or for import. 
(Gaz de France plans to build a LNG facility in Krk island). The 
possibility of a new interconnector with Romania is also being 
examined and, of course, there is a strong interest in the Nabucco 
project (capacity 30 Bcm/year). 
Security of Supply Installed generation capacity amounts up to 8800 MW in Hungary, 
while peak demand for electricity is around 6357 MW. Security of 
supply obligations are incumbent to TSO.  
Other Issues Renewable energy is mostly represented by biomass. Geothermal 
looks promising.  
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General/ Customer Service  There are 5.3 million electricity customers in Hungary, 4.9 of which are 
households. All non-domestic users are eligible, representing about 
67% of the consumption. In practice 75-80% of the electricity is sold at 
regulated prices. 
Consumer protection minimum standards include: 
• Universal service (households) 
• Disconnection practice 
• Service quality 
• Default supplier at regulated price 
• Social welfare electricity allowance  
Switching The Hungarian electricity sector is divided into two parts; a regulated 
sector, which supplies captive customers and a market sector. Eligible 
customers are free to switch back and forth from regulated to 
competitive sector at no cost. The regulated sector wholesaler (MVM) 
purchases the electricity for the public utility sectors from import and 
from domestic generators (long-term PPAs) and has a legal monopoly 
to supply the regulated sector.   
The other segment is the competitive sector, supplying eligible 
customers who chose to enter the free market. Undertakings wishing 
to be active in both regulated and free market must establish legally 
separated companies. Presently this segment includes 1357 
customers on 2603 sites. In June 2005, 1129 eligible customers had 
switched to the free market, representing 31,8% of national 
consumption. 
Competition The wholesale market in Hungary (i.e. the competitive sector) is 
currently a bilateral trading market between generators/traders and 
customers. The dominant position of the incumbent MVM is a major 
problem: it owns directly around 30% of generation capacity (including 
Paks nuclear power plant) but its share reaches 80% aDcing existing 
PPAs with other generators. MVM also controls 40% of import 
capacity, thus leaving little room for effective competition: it controls 
100% of the public utility sector and 25.6% of the competitive one. 
Prices Electricity prices have been rising slowly in the last few years. As 
explained above most market is made by regulated prices.  
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
 
HU price  59 112 95 
EU average 56 101 96 
Network Access The HEO both sets allowed revenues and approves the individual 
charges. 
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GAS 
General / Customer Service  There are 3.5 million gas customers in Hungary; households are 3.1 
million. Currently, all non-household customers are eligible to choose 
supplier which is in theory over 65% of total demand. The market will 
be fully opened in July 2007. Minimum standards are implemented 
through conditions in suppliers’ licences and include: 
• Disconnection practice 
• Universal service 
• Regulated price 
Switching Like the electricity sector, Hungarian gas sector is divided into a 
regulated sector and a market sector. Switching is limited by lack of 
gas on the free market: none of the large power plants has been able 
to switch. Presently only 8% of the gas consumption is served by 
suppliers other than the incumbent (13% of the competitive market). 
HEO website mentions only 44 eligible customers who have actually 
switched into the competitive market versus a potential number of 
around 180.000. MOL has a legal monopoly to supply the public utility 
suppliers supplying regulated customers 
Competition The incumbent (MOL) supplies 96.74% of national gas sales. The 
number of traders on the competitive market is 13, but only 3 out of 
those are actually conducting commercial activities.  
Prices Over 90% of the gas is supplied within the public utility sector at 
regulated prices.  
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
 
HU price  19 21 24 
EU average  17 27 40 
Network Access At end 2004 HEO published and enforced the ÜKSZ (Network and 
Commercial Code, which regulates the access to networks and 
storages, the schedule and the co-operation rules among the 
participants of the system. It stipulates that spare capacity of the 
transmission system and storages shall be published 15 months in 
advance, provides detailed rules for contracting capacity, and 
describes the scope of basic services provided by system operators. 
Capacity shortage occurs on the main import pipeline (from Russia 
via Ukraine). So far, capacity has been allocated by using capacity 
auction. Rules of the auction are included in the ÜKSZ.  MOL 
Transmission, the transmission licensee, is required to publish on its 
website the available capacities for each entry and exit point of the 
transmission system. An entry-exit system of capacity reservation and 
transmission tarification was introduced in 2005. The fees for access 
to storage in the free market are negotiated. 
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: IRELAND 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts 
 
 
Electricity Regulation Act 1999, Statutory Instruments 511/2005, 287/ 
2005, 60/2005, 632/2003,  328/2003 304/2003, 217/2002, 145/2002, 
445/2000, 49/2000 
Gas – not notified 
Unbundling All network operators have been unbundled in management terms 
since 2001. The electricity transmission system operator is a legally 
separate company (Eirgrid\ESBNG) although the ownership of the 
network remains within the vertically integrated groups. The 
distribution network is owned by ESB network. Legal unbundling of the 
gas TSO has not yet been implemented leading to infringement 
procedures. 
Regulator CER regulates both network and end-user supply tariffs. CER is an 
independent body with three Commissioners which are appointed by 
the relevant Minister. In 2001 a five year investment programme was 
agreed between the regulator and network operator. A similar 
programme s agreed for gas. 
Interconnection The regulators and governments of the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland agreed to the creation of an all-Ireland energy 
market. Interconnection capacity is now 330MW following 
reconnection in 1995. A further increase is planned between the two 
jurisdictions. An undersea interconnector between Ireland and Great 
Britain of up to 1000MW is being discussed. New interconnection is 
seen as the key to dealing with ESB dominance of the electricity 
market. 
Security of Supply The Irish system has approximately 5800MW installed capacity while 
peak consumption is 4500MW. Reliable reserve margins have been 
low in recent years. CER have had to take considerable measures to 
maintain security of supply including a tender process for new capacity 
and an obligation on ESB to procure peaking plant. However, 750MW 
of capacity were aDced between 2000 and 2003 and aDcitional 
550MW of capacity will be aDced to the system in 2006 of which 
150MW will be CHP. It is now expected that further capacity needs will 
be met from market participants especially after a stable wholesale 
market framework is established. For gas there is adequate import 
capacity following the construction of the second interconnector with 
the UK in 2003. ADcitional local production from the Corrib gas field is 
expected by 2007-08. 
Other Issues There has been considerable growth in the use of renewable energy 
sources. Over 400MW of wind capacity is in place a further 2600MW 
is being discussed, around half the installed capacity. An obligation 
exists on ESB to purchase a certain quantity of energy from renewable 
resources for which it is compensated through a levy on all customers.  
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General/ Customer Service  There are 1.85 million electricity customers in Ireland. The electricity 
market was opened 100% in February 2005. A range of consumer 
protection guidelines have been put in place by the regulatory agency. 
Minimum standards are implemented through conditions in suppliers’ 
licences and include: 
• Disconnection practice 
• Contract transparency 
• Default supplier at regulated price 
• Marketing and billing standards 
Switching Customers can change supplier without charge or delay and around 
30% have now either changed from the incumbent supplier or moved 
from a regulated to a competitively determined tariff. Most switching 
has been from industrial and commercial customers. However some 
households have changed to renewable suppliers. 
Competition The wholesale market in Ireland is currently a bilateral trading market 
between generators and suppliers. This is likely to be changed to a 
centralised Pool structure under the all-Ireland arrangements. Until 
2000, the incumbent Electricity Supply Board (ESB) owned all 
generation plant. The main new entrant into the generation market is 
Viridian which has 400MW plant and is planning a further unit. ESB 
has also offered blocks of capacity for sale in VPP auctions. However 
its market share remains high, of the order of 80-90% of capacity. 
There are seven independent electricity suppliers and by mid 2005 
their market share was 30% of total demand. This includes ESB 
(Independent). Four of the new entrants concentrate on selling 
renewable energy and CHP. Viridian and Bord Gas Eireann (BGE) are 
the main conventional energy competitors to ESB.  
Prices Electricity prices have been rising significantly as a result of aDcitional, 
network investment costs, fuel prices. For customers remaining with 
the default supplier, prices are regulated by the CER.  
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
IE price  77 143 120 
EU average 56 101 96 
Network Access The CER both sets allowed revenues and approves the individual 
charges. Network charges are broadly in line with European average 
levels.  
 
 EN 140   EN 
GAS 
 
General / Customer Service  There are 0.5 million gas customers in Ireland. Currently, all non-
household customers are eligible to choose supplier which is over 
80% of total demand. The market will be fully opened in October 2005. 
Minimum standards are implemented through conditions in suppliers’ 
licences and include: 
• Disconnection practice 
• Contract transparency 
• Default supplier at regulated price 
• Marketing and billing standards 
Switching Already 64% of gas consumption is served by suppliers other than the 
incumbent. The major part of this volume reflects the fact that large 
electricity generators purchase their own gas.  
Competition Wholesale gas prices in Ireland are determined by those prevailing in 
the GB gas market. As well as the former incumbent company Bord 
Gas Eireann (BGE), electricity companies are also seeking to become 
gas supplier and Powergen has also entered the market. A new 
supplier, Flogas, has been nominated as the default supplier for newly 
connected towns in the west of Ireland.  
Prices For customers remaining with the default supplier, prices are regulated 
by the CER. Gas prices have risen to reflect market conditions and are 
higher than the EU average  
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
IE price  - 33 63 
EU average  17 27 40 
Network Access The CER both sets allowed revenues and approves the individual 
charges. An entry-exit system of capacity reservation and transmission 
tarification was introduced in 2005.  
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: ITALY 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts 
 
 
DL 79/1999 is Legislative Decree n° 79 of 16 March 1999. It is the 
main measure for the implementation of Directive 96/92/EC.  
DL 164/2000 is Legislative Decree n° 164 of 23 May 2000. It is the 
main measure for the implementation of Directive 98/30/EC. 
Law 239/2004 is Law n° 239 of 23 August 2004. It is the main 
measure for the implementation of Directives 2003/54/EC and 
2003/55/EC.  
Unbundling Transmission network unbundling was realized according to the ISO 
model. Italy’s ISO was created as a state-owned company. The 
separation between grid ownership and management is going to be 
superseded. Enel sold on 15 September  29,99% of Terna capital (the 
main grid owner) to Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (a public body).Enel own 
nowadays 5,14% of Terna, but the operation is subject to remedies 
defined by the Antitrust Authority. Terna will finally merge with the ISO 
unit dedicated to transmission and dispatching.Functional 
unbundling of DSOs has not yet been properly addressed. 
Regulator AEEG (Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas is the Italian Regulator). 
AEEG regulates both network and end-user supply tariffs. It is an 
independent body with five Commissioners which are appointed by 
decree of the President of the Republic. This decree is issued after the 
approval of the nominee by the Council of Ministers upon proposal by 
the Minister of Productive Activities. Nomination are also submitted to 
the competent Parliamentary Committees for scrutiny and the 
appointment is based on a two-thirds majority vote. 
Interconnection Italy has 18 electricity interconnection lines: 4 with France, 9 with 
Switzerland, 1 with Austria; 2 with Slovenia, plus one sub sea cable 
with Greece and another with Corsica. Total capacity is 7.150 MW, but 
demand is much larger and there are serious congestion problems. 
Imports cover over 14% of the demand. 
For gas there are four import pipeline (Switzerland, Austria, Algeria 
and Libya) and a LNG regasification terminal (Panigaglia). Two more 
LNG terminals (Rovigo and Brindisi) are being built; more are planned. 
Security of Supply The Italian electricity system has approximately 80.000MW installed 
capacity while peak consumption is 54.100MW. Reliable reserve 
margins have been low in recent years when hydro plants where non 
available and thermal plants were undergoing maintenance or 
refurbishment. A major blackout occurred in 2003. More power plants 
are being built. 
For gas there is adequate import capacity and upgrading of import 
pipeline is planned. Italy imports from several producing countries. 
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
General/ Customer Service  There are 7.59 million electricity eligible customers (measured as 
withdrawal points) in Italy (all non-domestic), plus about 20 million 
captive ones. Legislation provides for a range of consumer protection 
rules, including : 
• Universal service 
• Disconnection practice 
• Service quality 
The provision on labelling has not yet been implemented. 
Switching Eligible customers can change supplier without charge or delay; 
however only about 126.000 have actually switched supplier, 
representing around 60% of consumption. 
Competition An electricity exchange is active since 1 April 2004, consisting of: Day-
Ahead Market - MGP; Adjustment Market – MA and Ancillary Services 
Market - MSD. 
The Italian electricity generation market is composed of one dominant 
operator, (Enel 43,9%), one main competitor (Edison 12,1%, but 
Edison also owns 40% of Edipower which has 9% of the market), two 
smaller competitors (Endesa Italia, 7,4%, ENI 6,0%) plus other minor 
actors, none of which has more than 2,5%. There are about 100 
distribution companies, but Enel Distribuzione has more than 50% of 
the market. 
Prices For industrial users, electricity prices, both net and gross of taxes, 
continue to be higher in Italy than the European average. More 
specifically, for the central categories of industrial consumers, i.e. 
those using from 2 to 20 million kWh/year, Italian prices net of taxes 
are over 35% higher.  
Euro/MWh Ig Ib  Dc 
IT price  82 120  151 
EU average 56 101 96 
For customers remaining within the captive market, prices are 
regulated by the AEEG.  
Network Access The AEEG both sets allowed revenues and approves the individual 
charges. 
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GAS 
General / Customer Service  There are more than 18 million gas customers in Italy; all are eligible 
since 2003.  
Legislation provides for a range of consumer protection rules, 
including:  
• Default supplier at regulated price 
• Disconnection practice 
• Quality standards of service  
• Quality of gas 
• Marketing and billing standards 
Switching 23% of large customers, 3% of medium customers and 1% of small 
customers have changed supplier. Together they represent about 60% 
on consumption. 
Competition The structure of the Italian gas market is similar to electricity: ENI 
supplies 67,5% of the total market of 79,3 BCM; Enel 20,5%, Edison 
comes third with 12%, and Plurigas follows with 4,4%. No other 
supplier has more than 2,5%. There are about 480 distribution 
companies; Italgas (ENI) has about 30% of the market. Activities 
involving the entire supply chain in the sector continue to be strongly 
concentrated in ENI hands: production, imports, transport and sale. 
The gas release programs have had only a limited effect on 
competition, and the infrastructure for import is entirely under the 
control of ENI. Import contracts linked to take or pay contracts, many 
of which were entered into by ENI shortly before the Directive 
98/30/EC, make very little capacity available for new entrants. 
Prices Also gas prices, net of taxes, are generally higher than the European 
average and show considerable consumption-based differences 
between one customer category and another. While small domestic 
users benefit from low cooking gas prices, the cost of consumption for 
individual or collective heating is about 14% higher than the European 
average. 
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
IT price  19 35 40 
EU average  17 27 40 
Prices for consumption levels of around one million cubic metres per 
year are, on the other hand, in line with the European average.  
Network Access The AEEG both sets network entry-exit tariffs (including LNG 
regasification terminal) and approves the distribution tariffs set by 
DSOs. 
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: LATVIA 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts 
 
Elektroenergijas tirgus likums 
Energetikas likums 
Unbundling The electricity transmission system operator Augstsprieguma tikls is a 
daughter company of the vertically integrated company Latvenergo. 
Latvenergo is also the main electricity distribution company in Latvia. 
For small distribution companies a light functional unbundling is 
required. Gas transmission, supply and distribution are done by 
Latvijas Gaze. 
Regulator Public Utility Commission is an independent agency under the Ministry 
of Economy. PUC regulates end user prices, network tariffs and has a 
number of other tasks related to energy markets.  
Interconnection Interconnection capacity of Latvia is about 3.000 MW with Estonia and 
Lithuania. Currently there is no congestion on interconnector lines.  
Security of Supply The Latvian electricity system has 2.684 MW installed capacity while 
peak demand is around 1.300 MW. The Latvian system is hydro based 
and depends on power imports with low water levels. All gas is 
imported from Russia. 
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
General/ Customer Service  The electricity market was opened for all industrial customers 1 July 
2004. In practise there are no alternative suppliers on the market. In 
addition to Latvenergo there are only 7 small local distribution 
companies in Latvia. The regulated end-user price is the lowest in 
Europe. 
Switching Not a single customer switching has taken place in Latvia. 
Competition There is no competition at the moment on the Latvian electricity 
market. 
Prices Electricity prices have been rising slightly as a result of increased fuel 
prices. The prices are among the cheapest in the EU. 
Euro/MWh45 Ig Ib Dc 
LV price  33 64 70 
EU average 56 101 96 
Network Access PUC sets the methodology for end-user price and network tariff 
calculation, based on a price-cap and on a three year review cycle. 
 
                                                 
45 Eurostat categories, without taxes 
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GAS 
General / Customer Service  Latvia has pipeline connections to Russia, Estonia and Lithuania. All 
customers are supplied by the vertically integrated company Latvijas 
Gaze.  
Switching There is no switching as there is only one supplier. 
Competition There is only one supplier Latvijas Gaze. Enduser prices remain 
regulated.  
Prices The prices are among the cheapest in the EU. 
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
LV price  12 14 17 
EU average  17 27 40 
Network Access PUC sets the methodology for end-user price and network tariff.  
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: LITHUANIA 
COMMON ISSUES 
 
Main Legal Texts 
 
Electricity Law of 2002, amended in 2004 
Gas law of 2001 currently being updated 
Unbundling For electricity, both the transmission system operator and the two 
main distribution companies are legally unbundled. 
For gas, the business remains vertically integrated. Separate accounts 
are prepared. 
Regulator The National control Commission for Prices and energy (NCC) has 
operated since 1998. It is responsible for network access and also 
licensing, NCC also have supervisory powers over the electricity and 
gas markets. It also regulates end-user prices. It operates 
independently of other government bodies. 
Interconnection Lithuania is well connected with the other Baltic Member States and 
also former USSR regions. But market opening is less well advanced 
and trade is still not easily achieved.  Connections with Poland have 
not been advanced.  
Security of Supply There is approximately 4500MW of installed capacity compared to 
peak demand of around 2000MW.  In addition there is considerable 
import capacity.  
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  All commercial customers are now able to choose their electricity 
supplier. 
Switching Around 15% of the large customers have changed supplier since 
market opening of which 12% are with new independent suppliers.   
Competition There are two main producers in Lithuania, the largest being Ignalina 
nuclear plant which is 50% of installed capacity. Lietuvos Elektrine is 
the second largest with 35%. There are 5 companies active in the 
supply market including some new entrants. The two largest retain 
over 85% of the market 
Prices The prices are among the cheapest in the EU, especially for small 
users. 
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
LT price 48 75 61 
EU average 56 101 96 
Network Access NCC sets network tariffs covering a three year regulatory period.  
 
 EN 149   EN 
GAS 
 
General / Customer Service  
The market is open for customers consuming more than 1 mcm/year. 
There are 27 customers in this category consuming 80% of the total 
demand. 
Switching No customers have changed supplier to date. 
Competition There are 5 suppliers of gas. All purchase gas from the same external 
source. 
Prices The prices are among the cheapest in the EU. 
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
LT price 10 14 21 
EU average 17 27 40 
Network Access NCC regulates the transport and distribution tariffs of the vertically 
integrated company. 
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: LUXEMBOURG  
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts 
 
The directives have not yet been transposed into national law.  
Unbundling Legal separation has been applied to the two main transmission and 
distribution system operators for electricity. However this has not yet 
been applied to the gas networks.   
Regulator The regualtor (ILR) has not yet been given all the competences 
required by the Directive. Currently network tariffs are proposed bt the 
companies themselves, for approval by the Minister. The ILR provides 
advice on the decision taken.  
Interconnection Luxembourg has two electricity transmission networks that are not 
interconnected between each other, but are integrated into its 
neighbouring companies: Germany, and Belgium. 
Security of Supply Security of supply is not a relevant concept for Luxembourg taken 
alone due to the high level of interconnectin with neighbouring 
countries. 
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General / Customer Service  All non-residential clients are eligible to choose supplier. Public service 
requirements will be incorporated into the forthcoming laws 
implementing the Directives. 
Switching Customers with a total of around 10% of total national consumption 
have changed supplier. 
Competition Competition is mainly from neighbouring countries. 
 
Prices Prices are above the Eu15 average, especially for smaller companies 
and households. 
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
Luxembourg                 42 147 131 
EU average  56 101 96  
Network Access  
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GAZ 
 
General / Customer Service  All non-residential clients are eligible to choose supplier. Public service 
requirements will be incorporated into the forthcoming laws 
implementing the Directives. 
Switching Only 2 customers have changed supplier to date. 
Competition The main incumbent is SOTEL currently controls the access to gas in 
Luxembourg. 
Prices Gas prices in Luxembourg are 
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2  
Luxembourg         16              27 46 
EU average  17 27 40 
Network Access   
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: MALTA 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts 
 
 
Electricity - L.N. 164 of 2003; L.N. 511/2004 – Application pending for 
derogation as “small isolated system”. 
Gas – LN432/2004 – No natural gas in Malta. 
Unbundling Electricity – TSO: Does not exist; DSO: accounts. 
 
Regulator Malta Resources Authority (MRA) in entitled by article 4 of MRA Act 
XXV of 29 September 2000 of a wide range of tasks. It fixes ex-ante 
electricity tariff structures.  
Interconnection No Interconnection. The possibility of an undersea electrical  or gas 
interconnector with Sicily is being investigated, but no action is 
planned for the time being 
Security of Supply The Maltese system has 571MW installed capacity (2 plants) while 
peak consumption is 402MW. SoS is an issue: MRA registered 557 
minutes/year/customer of power failure. No new generation capacity 
has been authorized to date, while demand could increase at the rate 
of 3-4%/year. 
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
General/ Customer Service  There are 246000 electricity customers in Malta. The electricity market 
is entirely supplied by Enemalta, a vertically integrated company. A 
range of consumer protection guidelines have been put in place by 
legislative measures; they : 
• Disconnection practice 
• Subsidized tariffs (vulnerable customers) 
• Regulated tariffs 
• Standards comprehensive contract 
Switching Not possible. 
Competition Not possible.  
Prices Electricity prices might rise significantly as a result of growing fuel 
prices: the two plants are oil fuelled.  
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
MA price 56 83 60 
EU average 56 101 96 
Network Access Not possible.  
 
 
 EN 155   EN 
COUNTRY SUMMARY: NETHERLANDS  
COMMON ISSUES 
Primary Legislation  
 
Elekticieitswet 1998 as amended 
Gaswet 2001 as amended 
Unbundling The transmission systems for electricity and gas are totally separated 
and owned by the national government as separate companies 
(ownership unbundling).  
The distribution networks are currently legally separate from supply 
businesses. The government has proposed ownership unbundling 
from 2007.  
Regulator The regulator DTE is an independent agency within the Competition 
Authority. The Ministry is not entitled to give instructions on individual 
cases and decisions. DTE regulates access to transport and 
distribution networks. 
Interconnections The Netherlands is quite well connected with neighbouring countries 
with a capacity of 3350MW. The construction of a cable 700MW with 
Norway has been started recently. 
Gas interconnection with the UK through the BBL pipeline will be 
completed at the end of 2006.  
Security of supply Peak electricity demand is around 16.5GW compared to generation 
capacity of 20GW. There is 1.1GW of wind energy. 
The Netherlands is an important gas producer and meets over 60% of 
its own consumption and also exports to other Member States. Imports 
from Russia and Norway are increasing.  
Other issues   
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  The electricity market has been fully open to competition since July 
2004. The customer service provisions in Annex A of the Directive 
have been implemented. 
The regulator has an important role in protection of small customers. It 
assures the transparency of the market in terms of price and freedom 
of choice and will investigate procedures such as billing. 
Customer Switching  8% of households have already changed supplier since July 2004. 
Competition  The 3 largest generators hold 69% of installed capacity and also have 
83% of the supplier market. There are 18 other suppliers which each 
have a small part of the market below 5%. Around 15% of electricity is 
exchanged on the APX spot market. 
Auctions of production capacity (VPPs) were organised by Nuon   
during 2005. 200MW were made available. 
Prices There are no longer regulated prices for end users. Prices are a little 
above the European average. 
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
Netherlands 55 108 111 
EU average 56 101 96 
Network Access Network changes are fixed by DTE. 
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GAS 
 
General / Customer Service  The electricity market has been fully open to competition since July 
2004. The customer service provisions in Annex A of the Directive 
have been implemented. 
The regulator has an important role in protection of small customers. It 
assures the transparency of the market in terms of price and freedom 
of choice and will investigate procedures such as billing. 
Switching 5.5% of households have already changed supplier since July 2004. 
 
Competition  Gasunie Trade and Supply controls around 80% of gas available in the 
Netherlands. 
Gas is traded freely on the TTF wholesale market and its volume is 
now around 5% of national consumption. 
Prices There is no regulation of end user prices in the Netherlands. Prices 
are lower than the EU average for large users, but much higher for the 
small household sector. 
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
Netherlands                        14 28 58 
EU average  17 27 40 
Network Access Network access tariffs are fixed by the regulator.  
Access to storage is negotiated. Storage operators must publish 
indicative tariffs and conditions on an annual basis.   
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: POLAND 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts Prawo energetyczne (“Energy Law”) 10 April 1997, latest modification 
2005 no. 62 item 552 
Unbundling The Transmission System Operator is a legally separate company 
(PSE - Operator) as part of the PSE Group. PSE also is involved in the 
generation market and is the counterparty to long term contracts with 
come generators. PSE is owned by the state which also has 
generation interests. DSOs have not yet been legally separated from 
supply businesses. The situation is similar in the gas sector, where a 
legally separate TSO (OGP Gaz System) has been established , but 
DSO unbundling is still not implemented. 
Regulator The regulatory authority (URE) has a full range of competences 
including those required by the Directive. URE also co-operates with 
the competition authority (OPCC) on market surveillance issues. 
Interconnection Poland is not very well connected with neighbouring Member States 
for electricity. The available capacity with Germany and the Czech 
Slovak Republics is rather poorly developed and some network 
reinforcements would appear to be beneficial. These are planned for 
the 2005-09 period. There is no connection with Lithuania. In all, 
available capacity is barely equivalent to 10% of generation capacity. 
For gas, Poland is an important transit country for gas imported 
through Russia. In theory it should be able to receive nominations from 
other sources of gas, although in practice this is difficult due to the lack 
of integration of network access at European level. 
Security of Supply The Polish system has approximately 35000MW installed capacity 
with 28000MW reliably available. Peak consumption is around 
23000MW. Reserve margins are relatively comfortable at present 
although new investment is neededin coming years as demand is 
expected to grow rapidly, while older plant will need replacing. An 
additional 2000MW capacity is expected in the next few years. For 
gas, Poland is highly dependent on supplies from Russia. Current 
import capacity may not be adequate for future needs and the 
possibility of diversification into LNG is being examined. 
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  The Polish electricity market is open to all non households 
corresponding to 80% of demand. Domestic customers are still served 
by the distribution company. The regulator still approves end-user 
tariffs for all customer groups.  
The energy law imposes certain requirements on suppliers, especially 
relating to disconnection.  
Switching Switching rates have, to date, been low, mainly, it is argued, due to 
inadequate separation of distribution companies from supply 
operations. To date only around 20% of large users have changed 
supplier and less than 1% of smaller businesses. 
Competition The wholesale market in Poland is a bilateral trading market, with 
brokered deals. There is also a power exchange, Gielda, although 
liquidity is low. Around 50% of generation plant is tied to contracts with 
PSE which, in the past, acted rather like a single buyer. However 
these contracts are being restructured at present, which should 
increase liquidity. Generation is not concentrated, the largest two 
groups own around 45% of capacity. In the supply market, the 
distribution companies are still dominant in their particular region 
although new traders are entering the market, often linked to one of 
the main generators. 
Prices Electricity prices are relatively low in Poland and are largely still under 
regulatory control  
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
Poland  44 90 71 
EU average 54 103 106 
Network Access URE sets a revenue cap for network companies with benchmarking of 
the operating distribution companies using regression techniques. The 
Benchmarking was implemented in 2002 and used for 33 distribution 
companies, existed in 2002. After consolidation of distribution 
companies the benchmarking was adapted to existing 14 companies. 
URE also monitors network performance.  
Balancing charges are set on the basis of offers from generators to 
increments and decrements to their production i.e. a market 
mechanism. 
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GAS 
 
General / Customer Service  The Polish gas market is also open for all non-households and this 
corresponds to 72% of demand. 
End user prices are still regulated and there are strict controls on 
disconnections as for electricity. 
Switching No switching has taken place in Poland due to many barriers that exist 
to a functioning free market, specifically the monopoly structure at 
wholesale level, inadequate unbundling of DSOs and insufficient 
metering arrangements. 
Competition Competition in Poland is not functioning at present. Only one company 
has access to the market and other avenues for gas transmission 
appear to be blocked in other Member States 
Prices Gas prices a regulated by the URE. They generally reflect existing 
purchase agreements for which prices are relatively low by EU 
standards 
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
Poland  17 23 27 
EU average  17 27 40 
Network Access Network access is based on an entry exit system. Capacity is provided 
on a first come first served basis. There are considerable long term 
contracts for capacity rights.  
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: PORTUGAL 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts 
 
 
Decree-Law nº 182/95, of 27 July, amended by Decree-Law nº 56/97, 
of 14 March: implement Directive 96/92/CE. Directive 2003/54/EC has 
not yet been implemented: an infringement procedure is presently 
open: 2004/2249. 
Gas – “Emerging market”: derogation until 2007. 
Unbundling Electricity: TSO: ownership; DSO: EDIP Distribuição is a subsidiary of 
EDP - legal unbundling is assured regarding generation and supply in 
the liberalised market, notwithstanding EDP Distribuição performs 
simultaneously activities of distribution and regulated supplier. 
Gas: legal unbundling between TSO and DSOs. 
Regulator ERSE established in 1995, it approves tariffs (ex-ante), fixes network 
access conditions, and handles complaints and appeals. Sufficiently 
independent from Government. 
Interconnection Mibel (Mercado Ibérico de Electricidade) should have started in 2003, 
but it is not yet operational. Few market operators now expect it to be 
working before 2007. The new market will need both harmonisation of 
regulations of the two countries and an upgrading of interconnectors. 
Present interconnection capacity is around 1000/1545 MW (depending 
on season and direction) and should reach 1610/2330 MW by year 
2007-2008.  
In 2004, the relative contribution of imports from Spain was 14,1% of 
total demand. 
Natural Gas was introduced in Portugal in 1997 after the construction 
of the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, which transports the natural gas of 
Algerian origin from the Algerian-Moroccan border to the Iberian 
peninsula. For the imports of natural gas through this pipeline, 
Transgás signed in 1993 a long term take-or-pay (“TOP”) agreement 
with the Algerian company Sonatrach. 
A LNG terminal and re-gasification plant started operating in 2004 in 
Sines. The maximum annual capacity of this terminal is 5,256 bcm. 
The terminal is owned and operated by Transgás (GDP) which holds 
all capacity rights. 
Security of Supply The Portuguese system has 11708MW installed capacity while peak 
consumption is 8249MW, but growing. Reliable reserve margins have 
been low sometimes, when drought makes some hydroelectric 
capacity unavailable. There are plans for 2650MW of new gas fired 
power plants, as well as 4500MW of wind generators. 
With a total import capacity of 8,95 bcm/year against a 2004 
consumption of 3.54 bcm in 2004 Portugal enjoys a relative security of 
supply, even allowing for the growing consumption 
 
Other Issues • After approval by European Commission, the Portuguese 
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Government published a Decree-Law that establishes the 
regime for cessation of the long-term agreements between 
binding generators and the transmission system operator, as 
well as the forms of calculation and payment of the associated 
stranded costs. 
• The Government has announced that a framework law for the 
electricity sector will be adopted to replace the 1995 legal 
framework and transpose directive 2003/54/EC to the 
Portuguese law. 
The Government also announced that a new framework law for natural 
gas will be adopted to transpose directive 2003/55/EC to Portuguese 
law and establish a liberalisation timeframe for this sector. 
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  There are 6 million electricity customers in Portugal. The existing 
regulatory model of the power market began to be structured in the 
beginning of the nineties.  
The electricity market was opened 100% in August 2004. A range of 
consumer protection guidelines have been put in place. Minimum 
standards are implemented through conditions in suppliers’ licences 
and include: 
• Universal service and SoLR 
• Social tariff (max 400 kWh/year) 
• Quality of service 
• Commercial Relations Code 
 
Switching Since 2004 all electricity consumers are eligible. However, eligibility  of 
household customers can only be implemented when the required 
computer platform becomes operational (expected to 2006). 
There is a dual regulated and free market system in Portugal. 
Customers can change supplier without charge or delay and switch 
back to the regulated tariff. Switching out of the regulated sector 
represents 19.8% of national market (by volume). 
Competition The wholesale market in Portugal is currently a bilateral trading market 
between generators and suppliers. The incumbent EDP still generates 
52.9% of national consumption, and owns 69,4% on installed capacity. 
The main new entrants into the generation market are Turbogás 
(13.4%) and Tejo Energia (9,6%); imports cover 14,1% of demand. 
Retail competition was mainly developed through imports from 
Spanish suppliers. 
Prices Electricity prices have been relatively stable in the last few years, for 
customers remaining within the regulated price. 
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
PT price  66 109 131 
EU15 average 56 101 96 
Network Access ERSE both approve network charges and sets conditions for access to 
network.   
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: SLOVAKIA  
COMMON ISSUES 
Primary legislation 
 
Act No. 656/2004 of 26 October 2004 on Energy and amending some 
other Acts : it implements both the Directives 2003/54/EC and 
2003/55/EC 
Unbundling The TSO is a separated 100% state owned company (‘ownership 
unbundling’).  
The 3 main distribution companies are partially owned (49%) by EON, 
EDF and RWE. The remaining share is with state govnerment. There 
is no legal separation from associated supply companies.    
SPP remains the owner and operator of the gas transmission system. 
There is no legal unbundling in place.     
Regulator  Regulatory Office for Network Industries (RONI) established in 
2001 determines and approves the method, procedures and 
conditions for both connections and access to a national networks, 
and for pricing for transmission and distribution of elektricity, transport 
and distribution of gas ; it approves tariffs for supply of both electricity 
and gas  to the households ; it lays down rules of operation of the 
market 
Interconnections  
  
Security of Supply Peak electricity consumption is 4350MW with installed capacity of 
8270 MW. 1600 MW of nuclear capacity will be closed in 2008.  
Slovakia is an important transit country for gas and there is no 
shortage of import infrastructure for its needs. In fact it is 12 times the 
national consumption. Currently, long term contracts with Gazprom 
serve 97% of consumption. Slovakia also has important storage 
resources close to the potential hub at Baumgarten.  
Other  issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General / Customer Service  The market is open for all non-households. Prices are still regulated 
for households. 
Switching Around 1% of consumers have changed supplier up to 1/1/05.  
 
Competition Issues SE produces 84% of electricity in Slovakia  
 
Prices Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
Slovakia                      65        95             112  
EU average 56 101 96           
Prices are rather above the EU average for large users but lower for 
smaller business and households.         
      
Network Access  
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GAS 
 
General / Customer Service  All non-household customers have been eligible to choose their 
supplier since 1 January 2005 
 
Switching No switching has yet taken place in the gas sector.  
 
Competition Issues SPP supplies 98% of customer demand. 
 
Prices Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
Slovakia                    19 20 38 
EU average  17 27 40 
Network Access  Network Tariffs are based on a postage stamp model. Entry-exit tariff 
system for transit. 
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: SLOVENIA 
COMMON ISSUES 
 
Main Legal Texts The “Energy Act” covers both electricity and gas 
Unbundling The electricity TSO is 100% state owned. Electricity DSO serve all 
more than 100.000 customers and has to unbundle in legal terms by 1 
July 2007. The gas as TSO is legally unbundled,  all gas DSOs are 
below 100.000 and are exempted from unbundling.  
Regulator The Energy Agency determines ex-ante methodologies and individual 
network access charges and conditions. Ministry has veto right with 
respect to methodologies.  
Interconnection In electricity interconnection capacity amounts to around 70% of 
installed capacity. However, interconnections with Italy and Austria are 
congested. Slovenia benefits from a temporary with respect to the 
obligation contained in the Regulation on cross-border exchanges in 
electricity to allocate capacity “market based”.   
Security of Supply The Slovenian system has approximately 2760 MW installed capacity 
while peak consumption is around 12000 GWh. In gas, Slovenia 
depends entirely on exports, with Russia being the largest supplier 
(56,8%) 
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  There are 860.000 electricity customers in Slovenia. The electricity 
market has been open for all non-household customers since 1 July 
2004 (amounting to a degree of market opening of around 75) 
Switching The network operator is obliged to carry out a change of supplier 
within one month.  Around 3% of low-voltage customers and 6,4% of 
medium voltage customers have switched supplier.  
Competition The wholesale market in Slovenia is currently for the largest part a 
bilateral trading market between generators and suppliers and around 
2% of total volume is currently traded at the electricity exchange.  The 
state owns the majority of the shares in all electricity production 
companies and network operators. The largest electricity producer has 
a market share of around 70%. Concentration at the retail level is 
significantly lower with 2 suppliers having a share of around 20% and 
three of around 10%.  
Prices Electricity prices for eligible customers are not regulated and they 
were below EU-average in 2004.  
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
SI price  53 105 87 
EU average 56 101 96 
Network Access Charges appear to be above EU average  
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GAS 
 
General / Customer Service  There are around 106.000 gas customers in Slovenia Currently, all 
non-household customers (around 8900 customers) are eligible to 
choose supplier, amounting to a degree of market opening of 90%.  
Switching No switching activities: all gas in Slovenia is supplied by the incumbent 
supplier (GEOPLIN), directly or indirectly via distribution companies.  
Competition The only wholesale supplier is the incumbent supplier GEOPLIN, of 
which the state is the larges shareholder (31%). As a result, at the 
moment there is in practice no competition in Slovenia. No new 
suppliers entered the market.  
Prices Prices for eligible customers  
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
SI price  19 - 35  
EU average  17 27 40 
 
Network Access  
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: SPAIN 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts Electricity Power Act 54/1997; Hydrocarbons Act 34/1998; Royal 
Decree 1955/2000; Royal Decree 1434/2002. 
Unbundling 
 
 
 
 
 
All network operators have been unbundled in legal terms so that all 
trading corporations which conduct regulated activities must have as 
their exclusive corporate purpose the development of such activities 
and, consequently, they are unable to carry out production and 
commercialisation activities. In the case of corporate groups, activities 
which are incompatible as per the Law can be carried out provided 
that this is done by different companies. The electricity TSO only 
undertakes regulated activities. Both the electricity DSOs and the gas 
TSO and DSOs however supply energy on the “regulated market”. 
Functional unbundling of the gas TSO and of the gas and electricity 
DSOs has not yet been implemented. 
Regulator The CNE (Comisión Nacional de Energía) has a wide range of 
functions to ensure effective competition, and the objective and 
transparent functioning of the markets. The Ministry however decides 
over access tariffs. The CNE is composed of nine Commissioners 
which are appointed by Royal Decree. 
Interconnection The allocation mechanism of capacities for international 
interconnections comprises two related processes, one based on 
implicit auctions, executed within the Daily Market, and the other 
based on explicit auctions for the allocation of capacity to bilateral 
transactions. These capacity allocation mechanisms serve to define 
the use of the capacity at the borders with Portugal and Morocco.  As 
regard, the interconnection with France, in January 2005 the Spanish 
and French regulators agreed on a new joint allocation mechanism, 
which is pending application.  In the case of the interconnection 
between Spain and Portugal, the level of congestion has been 
reduced with the increase in capacity which took place in December 
2004 with the connection of the new line between Alqueva and 
Balboa. 
Security of Supply A planning procedure was established leading in 2002 to the drawing 
up of a Planning Document for the 2002 – 2011 period. The planning 
process for electricity and gas transportation infrastructures is being 
revised. As a result of concern regarding security of supply, the 
National Energy Commission has drawn up, on an annual basis, a 
study for medium term electrical and gas coverage. In the gas sector, 
no investments in new natural gas production fields are expected over 
the next three years. Several projects for increasing entry capacity 
over the next three years are underway. The promotion of an increase 
in the entry capacity to the system is secured via centralised planning 
and the application of an appropriate rate of remuneration for the 
infrastructures. The Law renders it compulsory for all agents 
incorporating gas to the system (i) to maintain minimum security 
stocks of 35 days of sales or final consumption; and (ii) to diversify 
supplies, in order that the proportion thereof deriving from a single 
country should not exceed 60%. 
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ELECTRICITY 
General / Customer Service Since January 2003, all household and non-household customers are 
eligible to choose suppliers. Consumers can however also be supplied 
by the distributors under a regulated tariff, which is reviewed and 
published annually by the Government. Minimum requirements for 
contracts signed with domestic customers are set out in the Law. The 
contracts must clearly specify information such has the duration of the 
contract, the conditions for renewal and the causes of cancellation and 
termination thereof; the dispute settlement procedure; information on 
applicable prices and rates. This information should be constantly 
updated through billing. Consumers should be duly notified of any 
intention to change the contract conditions and informed of their right 
to terminate the contract upon receiving this notification.  
Switching Procedures currently exist for the change of supplier prepared by the 
Spanish National Energy Commission, but which have not yet been 
published in the Official State Gazette and which, based on the 
experience accumulated in these years of deregulation, are now being 
reviewed and updated.  At present no charge is being applied for a 
change in the energy hiring modality (tariff to market or vice versa) or 
for a change of supplier. For low voltage, the change of supplier must 
take place either within 15 days of the request for a change or after the 
meter reading cycle (max. two months for residential consumers). 
Competition 
The companies with the largest market shares are. Iberdrola, Endesa 
and Unión Fenosa, whose market shares are up to approximately 
84%. There are 11 companies which act in the market and which are 
independent of the electricity transport network and distribution 
managers, although the sum of their market shares amounts to just 
9%. Nine commercialisation companies of a non-Spanish scope have 
penetrated the retail market, including EDP and ENEL which have 
entered the Spanish market through the acquisition of Hidrocantábrico 
and Viesgo. The market share of the external commercialisation 
companies is of about 8%. The production market is to be managed by 
two Operators: the Market Operator (the company, Operadora del 
Mercado Español de Electricidad, S.A. – OMEL), which is responsible 
for the market’s economic management, and the System Operator 
(Red Eléctrica de España – REE), which is responsible for its technical 
management.  
Prices Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
ES price 58 104 90 
EU average 56 101 103 
Network Access Regulated third party access to electricity networks is in place. The 
System Operator, RED ELECTRICA DE ESPAÑA, is the authority 
responsible for the system’s technical management, its purpose is to 
guarantee the electricity supply’s continuity and security and the 
production and transport system’s correct co-ordination. As regard 
access tariffs, each year the Government approves both the electricity 
sector’s access tariffs and integral tariffs, through the publication of a 
Royal Decree.    The CNE has the function of participating, through 
proposals or reports, in the process of drawing up projects on the 
establishment of tariffs, tolls and the remuneration of energy activities. 
It is currently working on the development of a methodology for 
establishing the individual remuneration of each distributor company.   
 EN 172   EN 
GAS 
General / Customer Service  Since January 2003, all household and non-household customers are 
eligible to choose suppliers. Consumers can however also be supplied 
by the distributors under a regulated tariff, which is reviewed and 
published annually by the Government. In 2004, 80% of all supplies 
was made through the deregulated market. The consumer protection 
measures specified in Annex A are not regulated, and there is no 
legislative reform regarding these consumer protection measures, 
although some of these measures are already included in the 
industry’s current regulations. 
Switching Matters relating to switching suppliers are regulated. Any consumer 
may request, either themselves or through a dealer, to switch 
suppliers. Applications to switch suppliers must include a number of 
information determined by Law. Switching from a fixed-rate supply to 
the deregulated market shall not involve any costs for the consumer or 
for the supplier.  
Competition In 2004, 46% of the deregulated market was supplied by companies 
other than the incumbent (Gas Natural which also owns the entirety of 
domestic production).  The three largest supply companies accounted 
for 73% of the domestic market. A high number of suppliers was 
however participating in the market.  
Prices Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
ES price  17 30 48 
EU average  17 27 40 
Network Access Regulated third party access to gas networks and gas storages is in 
place. 
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: SWEDEN 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts Ellag (2005:404)  
Naturgaslag (2004:403) 
Unbundling The electricity transmission system operator Svenska Kraftnät is part 
of the Swedish state. Distribution companies have been ownership 
unbundled already in the past, functional unbundling is required with 
the new law for companies with more than 100.000 customers. Legal 
and functional unbundling is required for all gas network companies. 
Regulator Swedish Energy Agency (SEA) is an independent authority. SEA 
regulates network tariffs and has a number of other tasks related to 
energy markets.  
Interconnection Interconnection capacity of Sweden is about 8.500 MW with  Norway, 
Finland, Germany and Poland. A further increase has been decided, 
600 – 800MW with Finland.  
Security of Supply The Swedish system has about 33.000 MW installed capacity while 
the highest peak consumption has been 27.000 MW. Reserve margin 
is relatively low in Sweden, but in the Nordic market as a whole, taking 
into account the interconnectors, it is still considered sufficient. The 
Swedish TSO has contracted temporarily reserve capacity which can 
be used in extreme demand conditions. 
Other Issues  
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ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  The electricity market reform started already in 1996. However, 
customers who wanted to switch supplier were obliged to install 
equipment for hourly metering. This requirement was abolished in 
1999, giving all electricity users the opportunity for free choice of 
electricity supplier. The market is characterised by vertical integration 
of distribution and retail business. There are about 200 distribution 
areas, partly run by the same company, and about 150 electricity 
retailers. There are no major public service obligations, competition is 
supposed to provide good service for customers. There are some 
provisions regarding the disconnection of customers in case of non-
payment. 
Switching In the Swedish electricity retail supply market about 54% of household 
customers have changed the supplier or renegotiated their contracts 
between 1996 and 2004.  
Competition The wholesale market in Sweden is integrated to the Nordic power 
market. It consists of a bilateral trading market between generators on 
one hand and suppliers and industrial companies on the other hand, 
and of a voluntary Nordic power exchange Nordpool which has a spot 
market and a forward market.   
From a Nordic perspective, the three largest electricity producers had 
about 40 % of the total Nordic electricity production. 
Prices Electricity prices have been rising slightly as a result of increased fuel 
prices and emission trading costs. The prices are significantly below 
EU average. 
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
SE price  46 71 81 
EU15 average 56 101 96 
Network Access EMI monitors the tariff with a tool called “Network Performance 
Assessment Model”. This tool compares the tariff to the costs of a 
theoretically optimal network and indicated whether the tariff is 
reasonable. Network tariffs vary considerably depending on the area 
covered. 
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GAS 
 
General / Customer Service  The Swedish natural gas market is relatively small with a pipeline 
connection only to Denmark. Only the South-Western part of the 
country is covered by a gas network. The market opening has followed 
the minimum requirements, household customers being eligible only in 
2007. However, most of the gas is consumed by commercial 
customers, 95% of the consumption is eligible since 1 July 2005. 
Switching Very few customers have changed supplier or renegotiated their 
contracts.  No specific studies have been made on the subject until 
now. 
Competition There are 7 distribution companies in Sweden, all of them are also 
retail suppliers. Dong, a Danish company, imports all gas used in 
Sweden, hence there is limited scope for competition. 
Prices Gas prices in Sweden are somewhat above the European average. 
There are only a limited number of household customers.  
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
SE price  22 40 42 
EU average  17 27 40 
Network Access Transmission and distribution tariffs are approved ex-ante by SEA.  
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COUNTRY SUMMARY: UNITED KINGDOM 
COMMON ISSUES 
Main Legal Texts 
 
 
Electricity Act 1989, Utilities Act 2000, Energy Act 2004, Electricity 
Order (NI) 1992 modified by Order 335/2005, Energy Order (NI) 2003.  
Gas Act 1986 (amended 1995), Petroleum Act 1998, Utilities Act 2000, 
Energy Act 2004, Gas Order (NI) 1996 
Unbundling In Great Britain (GB), both the electricity and gas transmission system 
operator are totally separate companies owned by National Grid. GB 
has gone beyond the requirements of the Directives to get as close as 
possible to full ownership unbundling. The introduction of the British 
Electricity Transmission Trading Arrangements (BETTA) introduced a 
single system operator, independent of generation and supply 
interests for the whole of GB. The transmission network in Scotland is 
owned, but not operated, by SP and SSE (both gas and electricity 
suppliers and electricity generators) in a legally separate holding. 
Regarding distribution, legal unbundling has been in place since 2000. 
Some local networks are fully ownership unbundled. SSE also now 
own part of the gas distribution network. 
In Northern Ireland the regulations have just been signed which will 
provide for legal unbundling of the TSO. 
Regulator Ofgem’s role is to protect the interests of consumers, wherever 
appropriate by promoting effective competition. It regulates the 
monopoly companies that own the gas pipes and electricity wires. 
Ofgem is also responsible for market monitoring and has competition 
policy competences. Ofgem is an independent non-ministerial 
government department with a Chairman and a Board of at least two 
members. Regulation is incentive based with allowed revenues 
normally set for a five year period. Ofgem also issues all licences and 
most regulatory policy is conducted through licence conditions. 
Detailed industry codes (e.g. network operation, balancing code) are 
also approved by Ofgem. The government may provide Ofgem with 
general guidance on  social and environmental policy. Large 
generation plant requires authorisation from the Ministry.  
Ofreg is the regulator for Northern Ireland. 
Interconnection There are interconnectors between GB and Belgium and Ireland (gas) 
and between GB and France and Ireland (electricity).I Increased 
connections between Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland are 
likely in the context of the creation of an all-Ireland energy market. A 
new undersea interconnector between Ireland and Great Britain of up 
to 1000MW is being discussed. A project between the UK and 
Netherlands is also possible on a merchant basis. For gas, a new 
pipline between the UK and Netherlands is under construction, in 
addition to expansion of the interconnector with Belgium. 
Security of Supply The UK system has approximately 77000MW installed capacity while 
peak consumption is not expected to exceed 60-62000MW [54100MW 
is the historic peak]. Reserve margins have been around 20%  in 
recent years. Mothballing of some plant appears to have been 
reversed recently in response to higher electricity prices. Ofgem 
considers that a market with freely determined prices will deliver new 
investment in coming years and several companies have made 
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announcements to this effect. An additional 1800MW capacity is 
expected by 2008.  For gas the decline in North Sea production is 
expected to be met by additional import infrastructure, currently under 
construction. Capacity of up to 85bcm/year should be in place by 
2007/08 which will reverse the current tight position. 
Other Issues Considerable new capacity from offshore wind farm developments are 
expected including 280MW capacity next year.  
 
ELECTRICITY 
 
General/ Customer Service  There are around 26 million GB electricity customers. The market has 
been fully open since 1998 and all price controls were removed in 
2002. As well as incentives to improve network performance there are 
arrangements for compensation payments for poor service. There are 
also a range of consumer protection guidelines also in place in supply 
licences including: 
• a code of practice on billing and late payment 
• protection of vulnerable customers 
• transparency relating to contract conditions 
• rules for terminating contracts 
Switching Customers can easily change supplier and around 45% have now 
changed from the incumbent supplier. Some have changed back to 
their old supplier. Almost all industrial and commercial customers have 
changed supplier at least once. 
Competition The wholesale market in GB is a bilateral trading market, with 
brokered deals. There is also more than one power exchange, 
although UKPX has the largest volume. Ownership of generation 
capacity is rather diverse with 8 companies sharing around 70% of 
capacity. There are six main suppliers active in the household market 
with additional companies active in the large user sector. The main 
new entrants are Centrica and GDF. Originally there were 14 regional 
suppliers.  
Prices Electricity prices have risen somewhat in the last two years and the 
UK prices are above the EU average for households, slightly below for 
the industrial and commercial customers.  
Euro/MWh Ig Ib Dc 
UK price  46 99 108 
EU average 56 101 96 
Network Access Ofgem sets allowed revenues and approves the individual charges 
submitted by companies. Network charges are usually lower than 
European average levels.  A well developed balancing market is in 
place so that imbalance prices reflect the costs imposed on the 
system. The 2004/05 average TSO buy and sell prices were 
27.5€/MWh and €40.1/MWh respectively, a spread of €12.5/MWh. 
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GAS 
 
General / Customer Service  There are 21 million domestic gas customers in the UK, all of which 
are eligible to choose supplier. Conditions in suppliers’ licences apply 
to both gas and electricity relating to  
• a code of practice on billing and late payment 
• protection of vulnerable customers 
• transparency relating to contract conditions 
• rules for terminating contracts 
Switching Already 64% of gas consumption is served by suppliers other than the 
incumbent. In the household market also 50% of consumers have 
switched supplier since market opening in 1998. 
Competition The GB gas market has a high level of competition with around 10 
companies active in the wholesale market. As with electricity, 6 
companies account for the majority of the domestic supply market. 
Other than Centrica, the remaining five are new entrants to the gas 
supply market. Larger users buy direct from the wholesale market, 
which also includes many major oil companies. 
Prices Gas prices for large users have risen to reflect market conditions and 
are now at around the EU average after a long period of being much 
lower. However prices for household users are still well below the EU 
average. 
Euro/MWh I4 I1 D2 
UK price  17 26 30 
EU average  17 27 40 
Network Access Network access is based on an entry exit system under which entry 
capacity is auctioned over different time frames, the longest of which is 
15 years. There are clear use-it-or-lose-it rules in place. Imbalance 
settlement is based on a market based framework. 
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APPENDIX 1 
List of respondents to consultation 
Established energy companies 
Eurelectric 
Eurogas 
OGP 
Vattenfall 
EMT (Hungary) 
Electrabel 
EDF 
Dansk Energi 
VKU (Germany) 
UNESA 
VEO (Austria) 
Iberdrola 
Svensk Energi 
CEZ 
Finnish Energy 
Enel 
AEP  
Centrica 
Statoil 
GDF 
DEGAZ (Hungary) 
Uprigaz 
PGNIG 
BG Group 
Association of Energy Trading Poland 
Airtricity 
Scottish and Southern Electricity 
Network operators 
ETSO  
UCTE 
Nordel 
GIE 
CEDEC 
Vattenfall Transmission Europe 
Large users 
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IFIEC 
Eurometaux 
VIK (Germany) 
WVM (Germany) 
ECSLA  
Energy traders and market operators 
EFET 
Europex 
Barclays capital 
Small distributors / suppliers 
GEODE 
FNCCR 
New entrant groups 
BNE (Germany) 
Natgas 
AFM+E 
Small commercial and household users 
BUEC 
UAEPME 
Unions 
EPSU 
Renewable Energy Producers 
WWEA 
